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Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to add knowledge to the 
understanding in which way the measures of the audit reform 
are in accordance with the EC’s intended objectives. This is 
examined for the case of Germany. The study further contributes 
to the program impact theory by applying this theory to a new 
research area.  
Methodology: The methodology applied in this study is based on a qualitative, 
inductive approach.  
Theoretical Perspectives: The theoretical framework is based on the program impact 
theory. This framework provides a basis for an evaluation of the 
assumed correlations between the measures and objectives of 
the EU audit reform  
Empirical Foundation: The research question has been addressed by a qualitative 
document analysis of 81 documents and by a qualitative analysis 
of nine conducted interviews. 
Conclusions: This study points out that three measures (external mandatory 
rotation, the prohibition and cap of NAS, the enhancement of 
the audit committee) out of four examined measures are not in 
accordance with the EC’s intended objectives. The fourth 
analyzed measure, enhancement of the EU and national 
oversight, might accomplish the EC’s intended objectives.  The 
study also pinpoints to interdependencies between measures and 
objectives, which seem not to be considered by the EC. In 
regard to the program impact theory the study reveals that 
improvements of this theory are necessary and are thus applied 
in this paper.    
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1 Introduction  
  
1.1 Background 
In the beginning of this century company scandals such as Enron and WorldCom led to a 
”change in climate” for the audit profession as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) introduced 
major modifications to existing practices (Weinstein, 2007, p.28). Furthermore, as a 
consequence of these scandals it has been argued that the media’s scrutiny of auditors is at 
least “somewhat justifiabl[e]” (Wyatt & Gaa, 2004, p.24). The criticism of the audit 
profession and auditors’ work itself, concomitant with the American SOX led to regulation 
changes on the European level as well. The Directive 2006/43/EG titled “Reinforcing the 
Statutory Audit in the European Union” (EU) is said to be the European equivalent of SOX 
and is regarded as a “groundbreaking enterprise” (Humphrey at al., 2011, p.435).  
The financial crisis in 2007-08 in turn did not focalize blame on auditors: rather this time 
regulators were questioned intensively (The Economist, 2013). Following the worldwide 
economic tumble, the EU published the Green Paper “Audit Policy: Lessons from the Crisis” 
(European Commission, 2010a, p.2) in 2010 which anticipated further changes in European 
audit regulation. This Green Paper was followed by the audit reform in 2014 consisting of 
“two legislative instruments” (European Commission, 2014b, Online), namely the Directive 
2014/56/EU and the Regulation 537/2014 applying for public-interest entities (PIE). The audit 
reform was passed on 16th of June 2014 and requires implementation until the 17th of June 
2016 (Buhleier, Niehues & Splinter, 2014a). This situation of change sets the background for 
this paper. 
1.2 Development and Approach of the Research Question  
According to the public-choice theory, regulators increase their intentions to implement new 
regulations after crises (Audit Committee Institute e.V., 2014), which is also the case for the 
audit reform following the 2007-08 financial crisis (Humphrey et al., 2011). Consequently, 
the EU’s intention to question the efficiency of the current corporate governance mechanism 
and to improve audit practices are understandable and follow reasonable behavior. In order to 
address deficiencies which became visible during the financial crisis, the aim of the audit 
reform is threefold: Firstly, the reform shall clarify the “societal role for statutory auditors” by 
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increasing audit quality and enhancing transparency (European Commission, 2013, Online). 
Secondly, the auditor’s independence shall be increased by reducing familiarity threats and, 
hence, decrease conflicts of interests (European Commission, 2013, Online). Thirdly, “a more 
dynamic and better supervised EU audit market” shall be established (European Commission, 
2013, Online). According to the former European Internal Market and Services Commissioner 
Michel Barnier, the reform of the audit sector will increase audit quality and re-establish 
“investor confidence in financial information, an essential ingredient for investment and 
economic growth in Europe” (European Commission, 2013, Online).  
At the same time, the audit reform raises continuous critique from various angles. On the one 
hand, several articles in business newspapers claim that the reform is too ambitious (see: 
Clausen, 2011; Hopt, 2013; Kaindl, 2012; Kaindl, 2014), on the other hand, others claim that 
the reform is too loose (see: Bauer, 2015; Metzger, 2012). Furthermore, most critique on the 
audit reform seems to be biased. The articles published in business newspapers claiming that 
the reform is too weak are written mostly by those opposing the Big Four (see: Bauer, 2015; 
Metzger, 2012), whereas the articles published in business newspapers claiming that the 
reform is too ambitious are mostly written in the interest of Big Four related authors (see: 
Clausen, 2011; Hecht, 2013; Kaindl, 2012; Kaindl, 2014). Consequently, it seems that most of 
the existing literature represents the opinion of interest groups such as the Big Four, mid-tier 
and small audit companies, as well as academics.   
Since there is no uniform opinion about the audit reform this paper addresses the following 
research question: 
In which way are the measures of the EU audit reform on statutory audit in 
accordance with the EC’s intended objectives, examined for the case of Germany? 
In order to answer the research question this paper designs an analytical framework based on 
the program impact theory. This theory “deals with the assumptions that guide the way 
specific programs, treatments, or interventions are implemented and expected to bring about 
change … indicating clearly what is assumed and expected in the operation and outcomes of a 
program” (Donaldson & Lipsey, 2006, p.64-65). As the program impact theory is typically 
applied to evaluate social benefit programs this paper justifies its usage by discussing the 
model of description suggested by Rose and Miller (1992). These authors conceptualize 
regulation not only in regard to social benefit programs but from a more general approach. 
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Since the theory and the model of description share the same approach to analyze programs, 
the evaluation theory is appropriate.  
1.3 Relevance and Unit of Analysis 
Even though there is no agreement whether the effects of the audit reform will be desirable, 
there is consensus that the audit reform will reshape the audit profession, audit practice and 
the audit market (see: Bauer, 2015; European Commission, 2014a; Kaindl, 2011; Nicolas and 
Gélard, 2014). Consequently, this study has a highly practical relevance since it aims to 
provide knowledge about the audit reform. Furthermore, this analysis is significant as it points 
out interrelationships between the enforced measures and the intended objectives, which then 
lays the groundwork for future research in this area.  
In addition, the paper is relevant for society because the intended objectives and the audit 
reform itself are said to have a high impact on society. Hence, the analysis, in which way the 
measures of the audit reform are in accordance with its objectives, is vital for society. 
Moreover, as the study is conducted half a year after the endorsement of the audit reform and 
the implementation for Member States is coming closer, the analysis is done within the 
interesting context of elaborated discussions amongst academics, professionals and regulators. 
Hence, the characteristic of being a recent topic further makes the study relevant for society, 
the audit profession, as well as the regulators.  
Furthermore, the study is theoretically relevant since it applies the program impact theory to a 
new research area. Prior studies have applied this theory mainly in the field of social benefit 
programs, especially healthcare (Rossi, Freeman & Libsey, 2004). Consequently, a research 
gap persists as the program impact theory has not been applied to regulation in the field of 
auditing. Hence, this paper contributes by indicating a new approach to analyze audit 
regulation. It is, therefore, possible to add knowledge to the discussion about the connectivity 
between the audit reform’s measures and objectives by assessing these assumed connectivities 
with the sophisticated and approved program impact theory. Simultaneously, this study 
contributes to the program impact theory by extending its application. Also, since the paper 
demonstrates practical interrelations between the objectives and the measures of the audit 
reform, it contributes to the understanding of regulation in the area of auditing. Due to the 
objective focus of this study, the analysis is relevant because it enables a neutral perspective 
to a subjectively guided discussion about the audit reform.  
 4 
 
In order to limit the scope of analysis, a single country study is conducted. Since one 
objective of the audit reform is to enhance competition in the audit market, a country is 
chosen where the audit market is currently dominated by the Big Four. A study in 2009 
revealed that when considering only listed companies “the average market share of the Big 
Four firms [in Europe] is above 90%” (Le Vourc’h and Morand, 2011, p.6). However, when 
considering all audited companies, and not only listed companies, the market share of the Big 
Four is moderate (Le Vourc’h and Morand, 2011). Therefore, it is argued that a country 
should be chosen for analysis where the market share of the Big Four is in coherence with the 
European trend. Among others in France, Germany and Sweden the Big Four have market 
shares above 90% (2009), when only considering listed companies (Le Vourc’h and Morand, 
2011).   
Nevertheless, it is not only important that the market share of the Big Four is high, but it is 
also crucial that the mid-tier audit companies have solid power in order to make the audit 
market more dynamic. Figure 1.1 represents the market share ratio between the Big Four and 
top 20 mid-tier audit companies for all audited companies. The figure illustrates that in 
comparison with other European countries the German market share ratio is placed in the 
middle (Le Vourc’h and Morand, 2011). This means that there is a dominance of the Big Four 
companies, but still the “mid-tier breakthrough is moderate” (Le Vourc’h and Morand, 2011, 
p.97). Hence, it is argued that the German audit market presents valuable characteristics for 
the study. Furthermore, the German audit market has the peculiarity that in 2012/2013 KPMG 
and PwC conducted 26 audits of the 30 highest capitalized German companies, called DAX30 
(Bauer, 2015). Hence, it could be argued that a Big Two concentration is visible in Germany 
and consequently, it is even more vital to see if the EC’s objectives are reached in this 
particular country.   
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Figure 1.1 - Big Four Market Share / Top 20 Mid-Tier Market Share (Cited in Le Vourc’h and 
Morand, 2011, p.97) 
An additional reason for choosing Germany as the unit of analysis is that statutory audits 
present deficiencies in Germany, just like in other EU countries. During the 2013 inspections 
of the German Auditor Oversight Commission (Abschlussprüferaufsichtskommission, 
APAK), it was revealed that every fourth of the 28 inspected audit companies had material 
flaws (APAK, 2013). According to the APAK, this is due to the missing critical attitude of the 
auditors towards their clients (APAK, 2013). This points to a lack of independence which in 
turn presents a deficiency that the audit reform aims to improve. Furthermore, the two-tier 
board system which is a distinctive characteristic of the German institutional logic (DCGK, 
2014) is another reason for choosing Germany as the unit of analysis. Since the audit reform 
aims to increase the cooperation between the audit committee and the auditors, it will be 
worthy to study how this particular aspect influences the respective objectives. Since a single 
country study is conducted, only the major components of the audit reform that possibly 
trigger the intended objectives of the audit reform in Germany will be examined in chapter 
five.  
The scope of this paper does not cover a country comparison since an in-depth single country 
study is intended. Furthermore, the development of the objectives does not provide an 
examination of lobbyism and its influence on the audit reform.  
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1.4 Purpose and Research Question 
The main purpose of this paper is to add knowledge to the understanding in which way the 
measures of the audit reform are in accordance with the EC’s intended objectives by applying 
the program impact theory. This is highly relevant since the reform is said to have major 
impacts on the auditee as well as auditors themselves and imbeds major challenges to the 
regulators of the European Member States. Hence, the intention of this paper is to provide an 
in-depth analysis of a recent and significant topic for society. The in-depth analysis is possible 
as the perceptions of major stakeholders are captured. This analysis further substantiates 
complexities of audit regulation as the examination facilitates a discussion about major 
concepts in auditing.  
Besides this, another purpose of this paper is to indicate the development of the reform’s 
measures and objectives in order to identify the underlying assumptions of their linkage. 
Since the program impact theory is applied to a new research area, this study aims to 
contribute with a new approach of analysis for audit research. Therefore, the study also aims 
to add knowledge to the program impact theory by demonstrating if the program impact 
theory can be applied in a meaningful manner to other research areas. 
In order to limit the scope of analysis the directive will be analyzed in regard to the measure 
of strengthening the public oversight authorities of the audit profession. The regulation will be 
analyzed in regard to the measures of mandatory external rotation, the prohibition of non-
audit services and the limitation of non-audit fees as well as the measure of strengthening the 
audit committee of PIE’s. This approach is reasonable since frequently cited German 
academics, such as Velte (2014a) and Quick and Sattler (2011) suppose that these measures 
are the most influential on the German audit market. Consequently, the overall research 
question can be structured in the following way: 
In which way are the measures  
1) ‘mandatory external firm rotation’  
2) ‘prohibition of NAS and cap on NAS fees’  
3)  ‘enhanced role of the audit committee’  
4)  ‘enhanced EU and national oversight’   
of the EU audit reform on statutory audit in accordance with the EC’s intended objectives 
examined for the case of Germany? 
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For clarification, in this study the term ‘in which way’ refers to the evaluation of the 
intervening processes between the measures and objectives which reflects the applied 
program impact theory.  
1.5 Outline 
In order to address the research question the paper is organized in the following way. The 
subsequent chapter establishes the analytical framework for the evaluation of the audit reform. 
Therefore, the theoretical background regarding complexities of regulation is described, 
followed by the presentation of the program impact theory which represents the analytical 
framework for this paper. Furthermore, the problematics of government are used as a model 
of description in order to transfer the program impact theory from social programs to audit 
regulation.  Chapter three describes the methodology of this paper in order to explain the 
applied approach. The program impact theory, as well as the model of description from Rose 
and Miller (1992), suggests the following steps of analysis:  
 Development of the reform’s objectives and measures over time 
 Examination of the measures and their corresponding objectives  
Following this approach, chapter four traces back the development of the audit reform in 
order to identify its underlying assumptions and to incorporate them into the analytical 
framework, which according to the program impact theory constitutes the foundation of 
analysis. The fifth chapter presents the focus of this paper. Based on a qualitative document 
analysis and qualitative interviews, this chapter examines in which way the measures of the 
audit reform are in accordance with the EC’s intended objectives by following the logic of the 
analytical framework. Chapter six discusses the contradictions within the concepts of the 
audit reform, the findings in regard to the program impact theory and the limitations of the 
findings. The seventh and final chapter of this paper gives concluding remarks. 
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2 Analytical Framework    
Regulation in the EU is a complex process as it involves several levels of influence e.g. the 
EU and their Member States as well as several powerful interest parties. Hence, due to the 
regulatory complexities, regulation is often a tradeoff between different stakeholders’ 
interests. This leads to the question in which way the implemented measures are in 
accordance with the EC’s intended objectives or whether the measures are captured by the 
complexities in regulation. Therefore, the starting point for this analytical framework is a 
brief description of complexities in regulation. The outcome of these complexities is a 
program that might not necessarily be coherent with its objectives. Black (2012) even claims 
that “paradoxes … of regulation … produces the opposite effects from those intended” 
(p.1039). Hence, in a next step the program impact theory is explained and used since it 
allows discussing the outcome of regulation in a conceptual manner. Furthermore, as the 
program impact theory is typically applied to evaluate social benefit programs this paper 
justifies its usage by discussing the model of description ‘problematics of governments’ 
suggested by Rose and Miller (1992).  
2.1 Complexities of Regulation 
In their conceptualization of multilevel regulation Chowdhury and Wessel (2012) argue that: 
… the process of regulation has undergone a dramatic change over the last two 
decades. It has gone from being a limited political activity of the State – that of 
managing the market to secure public interest goals, to that of a more open-ended 
process by which an independent public (technocratic) authority interacts with a 
host of public and private actors (regulatees) in norm formation, norm 
enforcement and norm adjudication within a specific public policy area. (p.337) 
This development in the regulation process results in regulation being regarded as a 
construction of different actors due to their interactions and hence, might not solemnly reflect 
the states’ point of view or its intentions any more (Chowdhury & Wessel, 2012). Following 
this argumentation Chowdhury and Wessel (2012) point out that due to the interactions of 
different actors on different levels, “the danger of regulatory overlap and dissonance as an 
outcome of lack of cohesiveness and fragmentation may lead to regulatory uncertainty” 
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(p.339). It can be argued that the concept of multilevel regulation shows the influences of 
different actors and the legal impact of this development onto regulation.  
Chowdhury and Wessel (2012), therefore, argue that the outcome of multilevel regulation is 
that the “post-regulatory state” (p.357) is questioned as a strong and straight forward regulator 
due to the influences of various actors on several levels. Applying this thought to the audit 
reform, multilevel regulation implies that the former intentions of the EU in regard to the 
audit reform most likely have been shaped by various actors. Even though this paper does not 
address the question of who influenced the development, it seeks to show how the intentions 
changed over time as well as questioning in which way the measures of the reform correlate 
with the EC’s intended objectives. Consequently, multilevel regulation sets the theoretical 
background for this paper as the audit reform is endorsed by the EU which demonstrates the 
characteristics of multilevel regulation. 
2.2 Program Impact Theory  
Programmes [sic] presuppose that the real is programmable, that it is a 
domain subject to certain determinants, rules, norms and processes that can 
be acted upon and improved by authorities. They make the objects of 
government thinkable in such a way that their ills appear susceptible to 
diagnosis, prescription and cure by calculating and normalizing 
intervention (Rose and Miller, 1992, p.183). 
As pointed out by the quote, programs and regulation in general assume that the problems of 
society can be addressed by regulatory intervention. However, even though problems are 
identified and regulators see the necessity to intervene it does not follow that the proposed 
solution is appropriate to address the problems. As the program impact theory analyses “the 
conditions of program implementation and mechanisms that mediate between processes and 
outcomes as means to understand when and how programs work” (Weiss, 1997, p.41), the 
application of this theory is reasonable for investigating the audit reform.  
The purpose of this evaluation theory is to „determine if … expectations are met“ and, 
therefore „to render a summary judgment on certain critical aspects of the program’s 
performance” (Rossi, Freeman & Lipsey, 2004, p.40). An underlying assumption of this 
theory is that involved actors have subjective presumptions of how the program should work 
and how to reach its goals (Rogers, 2007). This implies that if the logic of the program is 
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defective the intended outcome cannot be reached regardless of how well it is designed and 
implemented (Weiss, 1972). Therefore, Sharpe (2011) points out that “[t]he development of a 
program theory is necessary when hoping to determine why a program is succeeding or 
failing and if and where program improvement should be focused” (p.72). Program impact 
theory can be understood as “a model showing a series of intermediate outcomes, or 
mechanisms, by which the program activities are understood to lead to the desired ends” 
(Rogers et al., 2000, p.6). Suchman (1967, cited in Rogers et al., 2000) points out that 
“activity A will attain objective B because it is able to influence process C which affects the 
occurrence of this objective, An [sic] understanding of all three factors – program, objective 
and intervening process - is essential to the conduct of evaluative research” (p.177), and 
hence, program evaluation can shed light on interrelations of the three factors.  
These interrelations between program activities and objectives assume a causal connection 
within programs. Hence, the program impact theory is applicable as “it describes a cause-and-
effect sequence in which certain program activities are the instigating causes and certain 
social benefits are the effects they eventually produce” (Rossi, Freeman & Lipsey, 2004, 
p.102). The basis for this kind of evaluation is “a conceptual model, of how the program is 
expected to work and the connections presumed between its various activities and functions 
and the social benefits it is intended to produce” (Rossi, Freeman & Lipsey, 2004, p.98). 
Hence, “the representation of the program assumptions and expectations” (Rossi, Freeman & 
Lipsey, 2004, p. 98) facilitates the point of departure for the evaluation. Crucial to recognize 
within these assessments is the uniqueness of each program and its situation which results in a 
specifically tailored conceptual model for each program evaluation (Rossi, Freeman & 
Lipsey, 2004). Figure 2.1 represents the conceptual model of the program impact theory, 
which will be applied to the audit reform throughout this paper. This guides the reader 
through the undertaken evaluation process as it is adapted in chapter four in regard to the 
audit reform’s measures and the EC’s intended objectives. In chapter five the model is further 
extended in regard to the findings of analysis and thereby visualizes the findings of this paper 
which are discussed in chapter six.  
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Figure 2.1 - Conceptual Model of Program Impact Theory (Own Representation) 
As indicated in the graph, the impacts of the program activities are assumed to lead to the 
intended program objectives. If the impacts may lead to the desired objectives, represents the 
core question of this concept. Therefore, the routes of the arrows in the graph, or in other 
words the impacts, are crucial since “they constitute the means by which the program expects 
to bring about its intended effects. These [connections] are thus operationalization of the 
program’s impact theory, the assumptions about the change process actuated or facilitated by 
the program and the improved conditions expected to result from inducing that change” 
(Rossi, Freeman & Lipsey, 2004, p.100).  
Coming back to the above addressed complexities of regulation, this means for the program 
impact theory that the “evaluators generally solicit input from all the major stakeholders and 
attempt to incorporate their concerns so that the evaluation plan will be as comprehensive as 
possible and the results as useful as possible” (Rossi, Freeman & Lipsey, 2004, p.47). By 
addressing all major stakeholders different, as well as conflicting, perspectives are captured. 
Hence, section 3.3.1 will identify the main stakeholders. This results in an in-depth 
investigation of the program. Furthermore, the following examination of problematics of 
government sets out to further understand the discourse evolving through the complexity of 
regulation and, therefore, extends the program impact theory. 
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2.3 Problematics of Government  
The model of description from Rose and Miller’s (1992) article titling “Political power 
beyond the State: problematics of government” introduces three levels of how programs 
evolve (programmes in the writing of Rose and Miller). Consequently, their model 
contributes to an understanding of underlying assumptions in programs which is important in 
order to evaluate the connections between the program activities and program objectives 
within the program impact theory. This chapter introduces Rose and Miller’s (1992) approach 
and section 2.4 connects it to the audit reform in order to apply the program impact theory 
onto other fields than social benefit programs where it is mainly used (Rossi, Freeman & 
Libsey, 2004).  
2.3.1 Political Rationalities  
Rose and Miller (1992) point out that political rationalities analyze “the changing discursive 
fields within which the exercise of power is conceptualized, [and] the moral justification for 
particular ways of exercising power by diverse authorities” (p.175). Hence, political 
rationalities imply a dialog about actions taken and the reasoning for them. Their analysis is 
crucial in two ways. Firstly, it “helps us elucidate … the systems of thought through which 
authorities have posed and specified the problems for government” and secondly, by 
analyzing political rationalities “the systems of action th[r]ough which they have sought to 
give effect to government” becomes visible (Rose and Miller, 1992, p.177). Consequently, the 
analysis of the justification for certain actions taken to address a problem allows shedding 
light on the intentions behind them.  
Rose and Miller (1992) point out three characteristics of political rationalities which can be 
found in the justification for the audit reform. The first characteristic refers to the moral form 
of rationalities. This implies that authorities “consider the ideals or principles to which 
government should be directed [such as] growth [and] fairness” (Rose & Miller, 1992, p.179). 
As mentioned above the audit reform is justified by strengthening future economic growth, 
hence, showing the characteristic of moral rationality. The second characteristic of 
rationalities is their epistemological approach which is “articulated in relation to some 
conception of the nature of the objects governed” e.g. society or the economy (Rose & Miller, 
1992, p.179). Addressing the clarification of the “societal role” (European Commission, 2013, 
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Online) of statutory audits by this audit reform, as well as the aim of economic growth, 
implies that the governed subjects likely mirror the need for such improvements.  
Finally, the third characteristic of rationalities is their formulation as distinctive idioms. 
Political discourse is “a kind of intellectual machinery or apparatus for rendering reality 
thinkable in such a way that it is amenable to political deliberations” (Rose & Miller, 1992, 
p.179). This shows that idioms are necessary in order to articulate the justification in a way, 
that it makes political intentions acceptable or as Rose and Miller (1992) say “thinkable 
through language” (p.179). This might become visible in the European Commission stating 
“inefficient markets” during the financial crisis or the quest of the former commissioner 
Barnier to “maximize social welfare” (Deegan, 2011, p.42).  
2.3.2 Governmental Technologies: Programs 
Rose and Miller (1992) state that “government is a problematizing activity [as] it poses the 
obligation of rulers in terms of the problems they seek to address” (p.181). The authors 
explain that throughout time humans have weighted the given reality against their conception 
of the perfect and found themselves wanting to strive for the perfect, thus problematizing 
reality. This behavior of problematizing is reflected by governments and the governance of 
their programs. The connection between political rationalities, so to say the justification for 
given problems, and the articulation of the programs themselves introduces the idea of 
translation. Rose and Miller (1992) declare translations as “an expression of a particular 
concern in another modality” (p.181). Accordingly, “such translatability between the 
moralities, epistemologies and idioms of political power, and the government of a specific 
problem (…), establishes a mutuality between what is desirable and what can be made 
possible through the calculated activities of political forces” (Rose & Miller, 1992, p.182). 
These calculated activities from Rose and Miller are so called government technologies.   
These government technologies include two approaches: firstly, the programs and secondly 
the techniques. Programs provide an “intellectual machinery for government, in the form of 
procedures for rendering the world thinkable, taming its intractable reality by subjecting it to 
the disciplined analysis of thought” (Rose & Miller, 1992, p.182). Following the justification 
of the audit reform, the formulation of the objectives (see section 4.1) shows the so-called 
programs of government in this model of description offered by Rose and Miller. Since the 
government addresses societal issues with formulated goals it makes the reality possible to be 
ruled. This activity is majorly important for the government as “this enables ‘the economy’ to 
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become something which politicians … think can be governed and managed, evaluated and 
programmed, in order to increase wealth” (Rose & Miller, 1992, p.182).   
2.3.3 Governmental Technologies: Techniques 
In Rose and Miller’s (1992) model, the techniques implement the political rationalities and 
their programs. The techniques in this paper are the measures taken in the audit reform in 
order to address the objectives (according to Rose and Miller programs) of it. Rose and Miller 
(1992) point out “we need to study the humble and mundane mechanisms by which 
authorities seek to initiate government” (p.183). But why is it important to study these 
mechanisms in particular? Aside from other reasons offered by the authors, two interrelated 
implications are important for this paper.  
Firstly, the objectives that are addressed by the techniques are interdependent as the powerful 
actors are assumed to influence them in a favoring manner for their position. Rose and Miller 
(1992) consequently conclude that “the problems of one [actor] and those of another seem 
intrinsically linked in their basis and their solution” (p.184). So, different actors have different 
problems and due to the governmental actions, these are addressed simultaneously. This 
relation becomes challenging in regard to the second implication. As each actor “seeks to 
enhance their powers ‘by translating’ the resources provided by the association so that they 
may function to their own advantage” (Rose & Miller, 1992, p.184) the model implies the 
following. Different problems of different actors might impact the other or present problems 
to actors where no problems were before. This becomes further challenged by the impact of 
each actor involved in the process as they will try to achieve an advantageous situation for 
themselves. For Rose and Miller (1992) actors translating techniques into their personal terms 
enables “rule at a distance” (p.184).  
2.4 Connecting Program Impact Theory and Problematics 
of Government 
Since this paper’s analytical framework is based on the program impact theory and the model 
problematics of government (Rose and Miller, 1992), this section points out where the theory 
is supported and supplemented by the model of description. Generally, both the program 
impact theory and the problematics of government investigate the impacts of governmental 
programs and raise the question whether the intended outcomes can be reached. Nevertheless, 
a major difference between the two approaches is their direction of investigation. Rose and 
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Miller (1992) start with the moral justifications which lead them to the objectives and then 
question the implemented measures. The program impact theory, on the other hand, questions 
the impact of the measures onto the objectives. As the research question implies the latter 
direction, the main theory used in this study is the program impact theory which is, 
nevertheless, supplemented by the following thoughts on problematics of government in order 
to transfer this theory to the research area of audit regulation.  
Firstly, problematics of government have a more focused and extensive discussion about the 
moral justifications behind the objectives and the objectives themselves. Therefore, the 
extensive discussion about the development of the reform’s objectives in chapter four mirrors 
this aspect of the problematics of government and supplements the program impact theory in 
this regard.  
Secondly, the model of problematics of government focuses extensively on possible 
compromise settlements which are also pointed out by multilevel regulation. Therefore, 
problematics of government anticipate that the measures of the audit reform are based on 
compromises, which might hinder their impact. Since the program impact theory has no 
multilevel regulation background and originates in social benefit programs, compromises 
behind the measures are not considered. As a result, this study supplements the program 
impact theory by the thought of compromise settlements.  
Thirdly, connected to the previous argument, the problematics of government recognize that 
the objectives are interdependent which is not identified by the program impact theory. 
Hence, this study implements this supplementation into the program impact theory.  
Lastly, even though problematics of government address a wide range of thoughts connected 
to the regulation in the EU, a major restriction in this model is the lack of a structured 
approach for analysis. This lack results from the missing consideration of the intervening 
processes between the measures and the objectives. Since this paper aims to analyze these 
particular processes, the program impact theory is applied, but supported and supplemented 
by the model of problematics of government.  
Accordingly, to constitute the first step in the program impact theory, chapter four of this 
paper applies Rose and Miller’s (1992) concepts of political rationalities (objectives) and 
governmental technologies (measures) by tracing the development of these factors in the audit 
reform from the perspective of the European Commission. According to the program impact 
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theory, the second step consists of analyzing and visualizing the justification of the reform 
itself, and the articulated objectives and measures throughout its development. This presents 
an essential foundation to discuss the interconnections between the measures and the 
objectives of the audit reform afterwards.   
The third step in the program impact theory is the evaluation of the logic behind the 
intervening processes from the stakeholder’s perspective in Germany which is conducted in 
chapter five. Hence, this step facilitates the comparison between the EC’s assumptions and 
the German stakeholders’ perception of these intervening processes which allows to answer 
the research question.  
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3 Methodology 
This chapter describes and justifies the methodology used in this study in order to answer the 
research question.  
3.1 Research Philosophy and Approach 
Philosophical positions and assumptions are important for the quality of research since a good 
understanding of the research philosophy helps the researcher to create an appropriate 
research design (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Jackson, 2012). This study evaluates in which 
way the measures of the EU audit reform on statutory audit are in accordance with the EC’s 
intended objectives in the case of Germany. The research purpose requires gathering personal 
and subjective opinions as the topic is new, and a real world implementation is not in place 
yet. Consequently, the study is not value-free. This leads to an interpretivist epistemology of 
this paper. According to Bryman and Bell (2007) in an interpretivist epistemology the “social 
reality has a meaning for human beings” (p.20) and, therefore “the subjective meanings of 
social action” (p.19) have to be analyzed and interpreted from the actors’ point of view. 
Therefore, instead of conducting a positive research, this paper is explanatory using 
interpretations for the understanding of social reality (Bryman & Bell, 2007). This implies 
that the researcher’s intentions are to interpret and to create sense for one specific situation or 
case (Scapens, 2007) and thus, generalizations are difficult to draw upon.   
In addition to the epistemological considerations, the ontological standpoint has to be 
considered in order to ensure high quality of this research. The present study has an 
ontological position of constructivism since the authors believe that “researchers' own 
accounts of the social world are constructions” (Bryman & Bell, 2007). This implies that this 
study indicates a particular version of social reality constructed “through social interactions” 
(Bryman & Bell, 2007, p.23) which are constantly changing (Scapens, 2007). Since opinions 
about the research topic have to be gathered, the interactions between the individuals involved 
in the collection of the information influence the interpretation (Scapens, 2007). The authors 
of this paper as well as the written and oral sources of information are in interaction with each 
other and present “indeterminate knowledge” (Bryman & Bell, 2007, p.23) where reality is a 
social construct.  
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Based on the epistemological and ontological assumptions an inductive research approach is 
appropriate. This implies that the model evolving from the program impact theory is built 
within the process of evaluation (Bryman & Bell, 2007). An inductive research approach is 
most appropriate since the research topic is diverse and addresses a rather unexplored topic as 
the audit reform is not yet implemented. 
3.2 Research Strategy  
Since the paper examines whether the measures of the EU audit reform are in line with their 
intended objectives, the program impact theory represents a suitable research strategy as 
explained in chapter 2.2. According to Donaldson and Lipsey (2006), program impact theory 
“deals with the assumptions that guide the way specific programs, treatments, or interventions 
are implemented and expected to bring about change” (p.64). Consequently, by “indicating 
clearly what is assumed and expected in the operation and outcomes of a program” 
(Donaldson & Lipsey, 2006, p.65), the program impact theory aims to determine the 
governmental technologies that are crucial for the audit reform’s success. Rogers et al. (2000) 
argue that literature reviews, discussions with stakeholders, “review[s] of program 
documentation” (p.7) and “observation[s] of the program itself” (p.7) are some of the possible 
methods to gain information for program impact evaluations. As the audit reform is not yet 
implemented, observations of the technologies are not possible and hence, a qualitative 
research strategy is most appropriate. 
The inductive view together with the interpretivist and constructionist philosophical 
assumptions, as well as the program impact theory, suggest a qualitative research design. 
Qualitative methods are characterized by “their ability (…) to understand people’s meaning, 
(…) and their natural way of gathering data” (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Jackson, 2012, 
pp.27-28). This method offers the advantage that the researcher is able to “see through the 
eyes of the people being studied” (Bryman & Bell, 2007, p.416) which facilitates the 
understanding of subjective meanings held by the actors relevant for this study. Due to the 
topic’s actuality prior insights are modest and, therefore, the “exploratory and flexible” 
(Ghauri & Grønhaug, 2005, p.202) characteristics of qualitative research suit well to the 
research purpose. The “loosely structured approach to the collection of data” (Bryman & Bell, 
2007, p.420) increases “the possibility of getting at actors’ meanings and of concepts 
emerging out of data collection” (Bryman & Bell, 2007, p.426). In addition, a qualitative 
method is appropriate since this study intends to evaluate whether the audit reform is in 
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accordance with the intended objectives in a specific context – in this case Germany – instead 
of aiming at generalizations which most quantitative research does.   
Nevertheless, the selected method also has some limitations. According to Saunders, Lewis 
and Thornhill (2009) it is difficult to replicate the research since the specific context and time 
determines the research’s findings. Consequently, other researchers might interpret the same 
information differently; leading them to other findings or researchers conducting similar 
studies at different times and contextual settings might find other results. Therefore, the 
process of interpretation of data is critical in qualitative research (Easterby-Smith, 2012). 
However, by stating clearly the research strategy, its underlying assumptions and the analysis 
of data (see Section 3.4) the authors’ approach is open to scrutiny for other researchers 
(Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009). Therefore, figure 3.1 provides an overview of the 
study’s research strategy and the objectives of each phase of the research process.   
 
Figure 3.1 - Overview of Research Strategy (Own Representation) 
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3.3 Data Collection Method 
Following the previous arguments, the authors of this paper have decided to apply a 
qualitative research design consisting of two different data collection methods. Firstly, a 
qualitative analysis of texts and documents was conducted which forms the background to the 
investigations and the foundation for the analytical framework. Furthermore, the document 
analysis provides relevant information for the evaluations of the intervening processes. 
Secondly, qualitative interviews were realized in order to support the findings gained by the 
qualitative examination of documents. Moreover, the interviews are necessary in order to 
identify the connections between the measures and their intended objectives or the missing of 
these connections. This two-fold approach represents a suitable research method for program 
impact theories (Rogers et al., 2000).  
3.3.1 Qualitative Document Collection 
The program impact theory requires a two-step approach to gather information from texts and 
documents. First, it is necessary to collect data in regard to the EC’s presumptions of how the 
program should work and of how to reach the goals which forms the foundation of the 
analysis (Rossi, Freeman & Lipsey, 2004). Therefore, chapter four identifies the objectives 
and measures of the audit reform by examining the development of the reform. For this 
purpose, three occurrences and their communication are analyzed because they are crucial 
within the reform’s development. These are the 2010 Green Paper on “Audit Policy: Lessons 
from the Crisis”, the Commission proposals of the directive and the regulation as well as the 
final Directive 2014/56/EU and the Regulation 537/2014. The identified measures are then 
connected to the EC’s objectives by following the reasoning provided by the EC in the 
Directive 2014/56/EU, the Regulation 537/2014 and in the EC’s Memo which was published 
on 16th June 2014, shortly after the adoption of the audit reform by the European Parliament 
(EC, 2014b). These links “constitute the means by which the program expects to bring about 
its intended effects” (Rossi, Freeman & Lipsey, 2004, p.100).  
The second step of the document data collection consists of gathering input from the major 
stakeholders identified in the following in order to contrast their opinions to the EC’s 
assumptions of how the program is expected to work. In order to assure the “authenticity”, 
“credibility, “representativeness” and “meaning” of the data (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.555), 
 21 
 
the units of analysis for the second step of document collection have to conform to the 
following four criteria: type of actor, document category, time frame and keywords.  
The first criterion, namely type of actors, was deduced from the program impact theory since 
major stakeholders and their conflicting perspectives should be considered (Rossi, Freeman & 
Lipsey, 2004). In order to address the first criteria, the key actors in regard to the audit reform 
were identified using the model of Samsonova-Taddei and Humphrey (2014) and applying it 
to Germany (Appendix A). Since the study is placed in a German context, the focus lies on 
the German parties involved, and only the EC was considered on EU level (Samsonova-
Taddei & Humphrey, 2014). From a German angle the Ministry of Economy and Energy 
(BMWi), the Ministry of Justice (BMJV), the IDW, the WPK and the APAK form the major 
governmental and legislative actors (see section 5.1). The German subsidiaries of the large 
accounting firms namely PwC, KPMG, Deloitte and Ernst & Young, as well as the two 
leading mid-tier firms, namely Rödl and Partner and BDO (Lünendonk®-Liste, 2013), also 
play a major role in representing the professions opinion in regard to the audit reform. Since 
the audit reform wants to “contribute to a more dynamic audit market” (EC, 2014b), it is also 
relevant to consider smaller audit companies. Other actors involved in the debate are 
academics and the business media (Samsonova-Taddei & Humphrey, 2014; Appendix A).  
The second criterion, document category, was selected in order to identify the key locations 
where the above-mentioned actors will publish their comments on the audit reform. 
Consequently, public official documents (Bryman and Bell, 2007) prepared by EU and 
German institutions and officials were reviewed “such as policy drafts, studies, 
communications, public consultation reports and stakeholder responses” (Samsonova-Taddei 
& Humphrey 2014, p.60). Furthermore, organizational documents of the Big Four and mid-
tier companies were analyzed which are available on the official web-pages of these actors 
using the time frame from January 2013 to April 2015 because the trilogue between the EC, 
the European Parliament and the EU Member States was already in progress and is hence, 
captured with this time frame (FEE, 2014). Moreover, publications in German professional 
accounting, auditing and business media covering the issue of the audit reform were examined 
in order to gather information from smaller audit companies as well as from an academic 
point of view. The documents from professional journals were searched by using wiso, a 
German database of professional journals of economics and social science, for which the 
same time frame as stated above (2013-2015) has been applied. The academic articles were 
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extracted from LUBSearch with an extended time frame (2010-2015). This extension of the 
time span is necessary in order to capture the general academic discussions about the 
correlation between the measures and objectives, which was initiated with the publication of 
the Green Paper in 2010. The amplification is further required to increase the number of 
search results. 
In addition, all documents selected for the qualitative analysis must mention the keywords 
”audit reform”, ”Directive 2014/56/EU” or “Regulation 537/2014”, and ”Germany”. 
Furthermore, the search included the keywords of the measures and objectives identified in 
chapter four. This search was conducted in English and also with the German equivalences to 
the mentioned keywords.  
Based on these criteria 123 documents were found from which 81 were used for the analysis 
in chapter five. Even though all 123 documents fulfill the selection criteria, 42 documents 
were not used for the analysis, as their content was not relevant for the study. All used sources 
are stated in Appendix B, and the following table represents an overview of those sources.  
  
German Auditing 
Institutions 
Big Four and Mid-
Tier Audit Firms Business Media Academics 
Document 
Source 
Respective Web 
Pages Respective Web Pages wiso LUBSearch 
Time 
Frame 
January 2013  
– April 2015 
January 2013  
– April 2015 
January 2013  
– April 2015 
January 2010 
– April 2015 
Keywords 
Obligatory: ”audit reform”, ”Directive 2014/56/EU” or “Regulation 537/2014”, 
and ”Germany”; Variances: “rotation”, “NAS”, “NAS Fee-Limit”, “Audit 
Committee”, “Oversight”, “Independence”, “Quality”, “Dynamic Audit 
Market”, “Cross-Border Provision”, “Supervision and Coordination” (English 
and German) 
Number of 
Documents 
used 
20 12 35 14 
Table 3.1 - Overview of used Documents (Own Representation) 
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3.3.2 Qualitative Interviews 
The second data collection method, consisting of qualitative expert interviews was chosen to 
increase the robustness of the results derived from the qualitative document analysis. Semi-
structured telephone interviews were conducted with nine experts from German government 
institutions, the audit profession and one academic. Explanatory expert knowledge is gathered 
to allow subjective interpretations from the experts in regard to the audit reform (Bogner, 
Littig & Menz, 2009). This leads to a systematizing expert interview as their opinion on the 
audit reform provides information which is only accessible in this manner (Bogner, Littig & 
Menz, 2009). Due to their similar course of questioning, systematizing interviews allow 
comparability of the retrieved data. Nevertheless, in order to receive detailed information the 
interviewer must be able to elaborate on his line of thought and thus, a semi-structured 
interview is appropriate.  
Furthermore, a semi-structured interview approach was chosen because, on the one hand, this 
approach is more flexible (Bryman & Bell, 2007) than structured interviews, and on the other 
hand, the risk of leading to poor data when doing unstructured interviews is reduced 
(Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Jackson, 2012). A semi-structured interview seems more 
appropriate since “the researcher is beginning the investigation with a fairly clear focus” 
(Bryman & Bell, 2007, p.479) which is the case in this study. As a consequence, better 
comparisons between the different statements of the interviewees are facilitated as the same 
topics are addressed, although in a different order. This implies that “validity and reliability 
depend, not upon the repeated use of the same words in each question, but upon conveying 
equivalence of meaning” (Denzin, 1989; in: Barriball & While, 1994). In addition, guided 
open interviews offer the possibility that new aspects and topics, which the researcher did not 
have in mind, arise naturally during the interview (Bryman & Bell, 2007). Furthermore, the 
complexity of the audit reform’s technologies might sometimes need further clarifications and 
hence, semi-structured interviews are most suitable (Barriball & While, 1994).  
For the primary data collection method a purposive sampling is applied which implies that 
interviewees were selected in a strategic way based on the participant’s ability to contribute to 
the understanding of the research question due to their special knowledge in their respective 
field (Bryman & Bell, 2007). Therefore, the sample member, male or female, was required to 
work in a German audit-oriented organization with either an institutional, academic or 
professional audit background. Consequently, the key actors which were already identified for 
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the qualitative document analysis following the model of Samsonova-Taddei and Humphrey 
(2015) were contacted for the interviews in order to capture the various perspectives regarding 
the audit reform (Appendix A). Therefore, the authors searched for publications from those 
key actors regarding the audit reform and contacted these persons directly. Following these 
criteria 16 highly relevant persons were approached from which nine experts agreed to 
conduct an interview. These nine experts are employed by German auditing institutions, 
German regulators, German audit companies (Big Four, Mid-Tier and small audit companies) 
or work in the academic discipline (see table 3.2).  Therefore, a degree of variety among the 
interviewees is ensured. This is crucial for applying the program impact theory as “a modest 
number of carefully selected stakeholder informants who are representative of significant 
groups or distinctly positioned relation to the program is typically sufficient to identify the 
principal issues” (Rossi, Freeman & Lipsey, 2004, p.94).  
Of course the purposive sampling includes some bias because the participants are not selected 
randomly (Bryman & Bell, 2007). However, the purpose of this study requires to interview 
individuals who have opinions and understand this particular concept in order to gain 
meaningful opinions about the audit reform. The series of interviews were conducted during 
April/May 2015 and the interviews lasted between 15 to 50 minutes. The interview guideline 
which was sent to the respondents before conducting the interview is attached in Appendix C. 
These questions only represent a guideline for the interviews as follow-up, probing and 
specifying questions, as well as interpreting questions, were asked during the interviews. An 
example of the interpreting questions is also provided in Appendix C. The following table 
summarizes the characteristic of each interviewee. 
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Interview Category Position of 
the 
interviewee  
Organization 
if permitted 
Gender Date  Duration 
of the 
interview 
E1 Academic - - Female  April 24th 
2015 
30 min 
E2 German 
Regulator 
- Federal 
Ministry for 
Economic 
Affairs and 
Energy 
(BMWi) 
Female April 24th 
2015 
37 min 
E3 Small audit 
company 
CEO (Auditor) - Male  April 27th 
2015 
35 min 
E4 German 
Institution 
Management 
Board 
WPK Male April 28th 
2015 
15 min 
E5 Big Four Management 
Board 
PwC Male May 4th 
2015 
50 min 
E6 Big Four Management 
Board 
KPMG Male May 4th 
2015 
40 min 
E7 German 
Institution 
for Mid-
Tier Audit 
Companies 
Head of Audit 
Reform 
Working 
Group 
Wp.net Male May 6th 
2015 
41 min 
E8 Mid-Tier 
Audit 
Company 
Auditor BDO* Female May 7th 
2015 
40 min 
E9 German 
Regulator 
Head of 
Administration 
APAK Male May 7th 
2015 
42 min 
Table 3.2 - Interview Respondents (Own Representation) *personal opinion, no generalization for 
organization 
Moreover, ethical aspects have to be considered when conducting interviews as they deal with 
sensitive information. Therefore, the ethical principles of Bryman and Bell (2007) are taken 
into account for the interviews as well as for the treatment of the received information. Thus, 
the research purpose was clearly communicated to the interviewees. Furthermore, the 
respondents were asked for permission to record the interview and, where applicable, the 
transcribed interview was sent to the interviewee for approval in order to transparently 
address the use of the data. In order to respect the privacy of the respondents, the interviewees 
are given the possibility to anonymize their identity completely. From the nine interviewees, 
two asked for full anonymization. 
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3.4 Data Analysis 
After selecting the relevant sources, a suitable strategy for the data analysis was selected. For 
the qualitative examination of documents a content analysis approach was chosen in order “to 
interpret meaning from the content of text data” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p.1277). As the 
analyzed texts are only important in regard to their opinion and valuation of the audit reform, 
the analysis focuses on the texts themselves. The question based content analysis offers a 
suitable way as it “moves from the specific to the general, so that particular instances are 
observed and then combined into a larger whole or general statement” (Chinn & Kramer, 
1999 in: Elo & Kynga, 2008, p.109).  
The data analysis for the interviews is also based on a thematic content analysis. Therefore, 
the interviews were transcribed if permitted and in the case where the recording was not 
permitted (expert 2), the written notes, which were made during the interview, were rewritten 
in a structured manner directly after the interview. If requested, the respondent was also 
granted the possibility to modify its interview transcript. The analysis of the documents, as 
well as the interviews, follows the approach of Meuser and Nagel (1991) where a thematic 
arrangement of the data is followed by a thematic comparison.  
The content analysis approach requires in a first step the establishment of categories that are 
applied on the data. Argumentative-connected sentences were defined as the unit of analysis. 
A two-step approach was used to identify the categories. Firstly, a priori themes which are 
based on the “investigator’s prior theoretical understanding of the phenomenon under study” 
(Ryan & Bernard, 2003, p.88) were established within chapter four. Consequently, the 
thematic belonging of a passage to a measure and a corresponding objective was required for 
each analyzed data extract. The objectives and their corresponding measures represent the 
level-one categories and level-two categories, respectively. Secondly, the theme identification 
technique of similarities and differences (Ryan & Bernard, 2003) was applied. This implies 
that the researchers “begin with a line-by-line analysis, asking, what is this sentence about? 
And how is it similar to or different from the preceding or following statements?” (Ryan & 
Bernard, 2003, p.91). Afterwards, comparisons between different kind of sources were made 
and the researchers asked themselves: Which argument does this source add compared to the 
pervious source(s)? Simultaneously, the researchers also paid attention to the “degree of 
strength in themes” (Ryan & Bernard, 2003, p.91) as this might identify subthemes. 
Furthermore, linguistic connectors were carefully considered because they indicate causal 
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relations, or in other words intervening processes, between the measures and objectives 
(Rossi, Freeman & Lipsey, 2004). Following this theme-identification strategy 4 level-one 
categories, 22 level-two categories, 36 level-three categories, and 4 level-four categories were 
identified (Appendix D).  
The second step of the content analysis approach is the coding process itself. The researchers 
decided to apply a ‘cutting and sorting’ processing technique as this technique is suitable for 
the analysis of textual, verbatim, and rich narrative data (Ryan& Bernard, 2003). After 
important text passages of the documents and transcribed interviews have been highlighted to 
identify “quotes or expressions that seem somehow important”, these passages were cut and 
sorted into the relevant “piles of things that go together” (Ryan & Bernard, 2003, p.94). This 
means that each investigator individually “went through the transcripts and cut all the quotes 
that pertained to each of the major themes” (Ryan & Bernard, 2003, p.95). This separate 
coding is important in the content analysis since it improves objectivity. In case of a 
disagreement, the authors discussed the categorization of argumentative-connected sentences 
till a consensus was reached.  Therefore, the processing of the codes was conducted in a way 
that the categorized codes are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive, which required 
a constant re-reading of the documents, transcribed interviews, and written notes. The 
following examples illustrate how the authors applied the cutting and sorting technique in 
order to facilitate that the reader comprehends the coding process. 
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Coding Example 
Level 1: Measure  
Level 2: Objective 
Level 3: Argumentation 
Example 1 (Quick & Warming-Rasmussen, 2009, p.142) 
Coding categorization example 1:  
Level 1: Provision of NAS 
Level 2: Effects on independence  
 Argument 1: NAS have no impact on independence in mind 
 Argument 2: NAS has a negative impact on independence in appearance 
Example 2 (Expert 5, own translation) 
Coding categorization example 2:  
Level 1: Provision of NAS 
Level 2: Effects on independence  
 Argument 1: Independence NAS have no impact on independence in mind 
 Argument 2: High NAS impacts independence in appearance negatively 
Analysis 
Quick and Warming-Rasmussen (2009) and expert 5 agree that NAS have no effect on 
independence in mind. Nevertheless, both sources see a negative correlation between NAS 
and independence in appearance, hence confirm the intervening process ‘2A’.   
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3.5 Methodological Limitations  
According to Mayer (2009) quality criteria are needed to verify the applied methodology. 
Validity and reliability are crucial criteria to assess the quality of quantitative studies (Bryman 
and Bell, 2007). Lincoln and Guba (1985) provide four different criteria to analyze the 
validity and reliability of qualitative research.  
The first criterion, namely credibility, examines how trustworthy the interpretations of the 
social reality made by the authors are (Bryman and Bell, 2007). To increase the credibility of 
the study the interviews were recorded and transcribed, if the interviewee declared their 
agreement on the recording. Furthermore, the credibility is ensured by a reflexive 
documentation (Flick, 1995) of the coding process. The credibility is further enhanced as all 
opinions of major actors (which are pointed out by Samsonova-Taddei and Humphrey, 2015) 
in the German auditing environment are represented in this study. Moreover, the fact that 
some interviewees are board members of the Big Four or have key positions in the German 
regulator body and auditing institutions, contributes to the credibility. 
According to Lincoln and Guba (1985) transferability is the second criterion and refers to the 
likelihood to generalize the research findings (Bryman and Bell, 2007). Even though 
generalizations might sometimes be possible (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Jackson, 2012), the 
possibility to generalize based on this study are very limited since this paper is “oriented to 
the contextual uniqueness” (Bryman and Bell, p.413) of Germany and relatively few 
interviews were conducted.  
The third criterion is dependability which “means the degree to which a study can be 
replicated” (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.410). The dynamic of the context and the impossibility 
to “freeze a social setting and the circumstances” (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.410) of a study 
may complicate the possibility of replication. Nevertheless, dependability can be increased by 
a detailed description of the whole research process, including the decisions made by the 
researchers throughout this study. Consequently, other researchers can reconstruct and follow 
the argumentation of this paper.  
Confirmability is another criterion since qualitative research tends to be very subjective due to 
the impossibility “to control their pace, progress and end points” (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and 
Jackson, 2012, p.28). Furthermore, the researcher him- or herself by interacting with the 
interviewee (Bryman and Bell, 2007) and by establishing trust with the respondent (Saunders, 
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Lewis & Thornhill, 2009) influences the outcome. Hence, it is impossible to act objectively 
since implicit behaviors of the researcher might already lead to subjectivity. To increase the 
confirmability to an appropriate level, an interview guide was established and sent to the 
interviewees prior to the realization of the interviews, which shows that the researchers “have 
acted in good faith” (Bryman & Bell, 2007, p.414).  
Furthermore, the applied conceptual model of the program impact theory is a visualization of 
the theory’s claims of causalities. Nevertheless, the visualization in this paper is the author’s 
interpretation of the causalities based on extensive research on the program impact theory and 
the EC’s claims. Due to the application of a properly designed model the analysis might be 
subjective since proper classifications have been made. Classifications include the possibility 
to oversimplify as there is a risk of making static and deterministic claims, even though, the 
classifications might be ambiguous, and other researchers would classify differently. 
However, the authors tried to be most objectively by relying on appropriate sources and 
making the process of evaluation reasonable.  
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4 Description of the Case 
The case of this paper’s analysis is set out by the EU audit reform with its two legislative 
instruments, namely the Directive 2014/56/EU and the Regulation 537/2014. “A regulation is 
a binding legislative act [that] … must be applied in its entirety across the EU”, whereas “a 
directive is a legislative act that sets out a goal that all EU countries must achieve” (EU, 2015, 
Online). Within these instruments Member State options are common. The usage of proposed 
options, both, of the regulation and the directive, cause differences in the application of the 
audit reform among Europe. In order to incorporate the measures and objectives of the audit 
reform into the analytical framework in the end of this chapter, section 4.1 and 4.2 will shed 
light on the development of those starting with the issue of the Green Paper in 2010 until the 
final audit reform in 2014. This description of the case is necessary to facilitate an in-depth 
discussion of the research question in chapter five.  
4.1 Development of Objectives: From the Green Paper to 
the Final Audit Reform 
For the identification of the objectives only information from the EC’s official website for the 
‘Reform of the Audit Market’ was used since it is important to refer to the original source to 
increase the credibility and validity of data. Figure 4.1 facilitates an overview of the 
occurrences referred to in this paper.  
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Figure 4.1 - Key Dates in the Legislative Process (FEE, 2014, p.59) 
In order to mirror the development of the objectives from the Green Paper to the final audit 
reform, the data collection was limited to three major occurrences using the EC’s statements 
and regulations regarding these three events. Only EC’s statements are considered in the 
development of the objectives because the EC was the initiator of the audit reform. Since the 
reform’s initiative started in 2010 with the Commission’s Green Paper on “Audit Policy: 
Lessons from the Crisis”, the Green Paper is the first source to be analyzed. The 2010 Green 
Paper was followed by a public consultation process where almost 700 responses were 
received resulting in the “presentation of two Commission proposals in November 2011” (EC, 
2014b), which represent the second event to be considered. The data of these two sources are 
then compared to the final agreed versions of the Regulation 537/2014 and the Directive 
2014/56/EU which entered into force in June 2014. Table 4.1 represents the objectives’ 
comparison of these three major sources in order to draw conclusion about the development 
of the audit reform’s objectives.  
To clarify again, the influences of several stakeholders which have caused several changes in 
the reform’s objectives are not examined in this paper since this discussion does not 
contribute to the paper’s research aim.  
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Table 4.1- Comparison of the Audit Reform's Objectives (Own Representation) 
The analysis of the 2010 Green Paper shows that seven different objectives exist in this stage 
of the audit reform. Generally the analysis of the objectives’ development reveals that the 
Green Paper 2010 European Commission 30 November 2011 
European Commission 
16 June 2014
Interpretation
1 "Determining whether there are possible 
ways to lower any gap between what 
investors expect from an auditor and what 
the auditor actually delivers, and whether 
the role of the auditor should be 
revisited" (EC, 2010b)
"clarify and define more 
precisely the role of the 
auditor" (EC, 2011)
"Further clarify the role of 
the statutory auditor" (EC, 
2014b)
From the reform’s initiative to the 
proposals and to the final version only 
minor terminology changes have taken 
place throughout the development of this 
particular objective.
2 "Exploring possible ways to improve the 
auditors' communication to 
stakeholders and regulators on what 
work they have carried out and what they 
have 'discovered' during their audit" (EC, 
2010b)
Is not stated anymore explicitly in the 
2011 proposals and the final 2014 
versions. However, this objective is 
addressed indirectly for example by the 
enhanced role of the supervisory board 
and the audit committee which will 
become visible in section 4.3 when the 
development of the measures is analyzed.
3 "Examining whether there are conflicts of interest in the current system e.g. when a 
firm both audits a company's results and 
offers it consultancy services; if so, what 
would be the appropriate manner to 
eliminate such intrinsic conflicts of interest 
so as to ensure complete auditor 
independence" (EC, 2010b)
"reinforce the 
independence and 
professional scepticism of 
the auditor" (EC, 2011)
"Reinforce the 
independence and the 
professional scepticism of 
the statutory auditor" (EC, 
2014b)
In 2014 this ambitious objective has been 
specified with the result that it refers now 
only to statutory auditors.  Hence, over 
time minor terminology changes have 
taken place. 
4 "Ensuring effective and independent 
supervision throughout the EU" (EC, 
2010b)
"improve the supervision of 
auditors" (EC, 2011)
"Improve the supervision 
of statutory auditors and 
the coordination of audit 
supervision by competent 
authorities in the EU" (EC, 
2014b).
The final versions further add 
“coordination of audit supervision by 
competent authorities in the EU” (EC, 
2014b). As a consequence, minor 
terminology changes have taken place 
which lead to an extension of this 
particular objective.  
5 "Identifying if the current system entails any 
systemic, too big to fail risks because of 
the concentration in the audit market. 
What impact would the failure of one of 
the big audit firms have on the rest of the 
financial system? How could such 
accumulation of such risks be addressed?" 
(EC, 2010b)
"make the top end of the 
audit market more 
dynamic" (EC, 2011)
"Contribute to a more 
dynamic audit market in 
the EU" (EC, 2014b).
Even though the final reform still aims to 
dynamize the audit market in the EU, the 
sub-aims (e.g. contingency plan for big 
audit companies) asked for in the Green 
Paper’s questions are not considered in 
the final reform’s objective anymore.  
6 "Improving the internal market of audit by ensuring further mobility for audit 
professionals and firms within the EU, 
possibly by creating a European Passport 
in this area" (EC, 2010b)
"facilitate the cross-border 
provision of statutory audit 
services" (EC, 2011)
"Facilitate the cross-
border provision of 
statutory audit services in 
the EU" (EC, 2014b). 
The scope of the Green Paper’s sixth 
objective includes the more specific 
objective of the creation of a  European 
passport for auditors, whereas the 
proposal as well as the final version are 
more general. Consequently, the scope of 
this objective is changed throughout its 
development.
7 "Addressing the proportionality of the 
application of regulatory requirements 
to reduce administrative burden for 
SMEs where possible." (EC, 2010b)
"reduce unnecessary 
burdens for SMEs" (EC, 
2011)
- The Green Paper’s seventh objective to
“reduce administrative burden for SME’s”
(EC, 2010b) was still addressed in the
proposal but abandoned from the final
version. 
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Green Paper states the objectives more hypothetically using questions and “considerations for 
public consultation” (EC, 2010b). Nevertheless, posing questions instead of clear objectives 
seems to be normal in the early stage of reform development since the opinion of stakeholders 
shall be gathered. The five objectives which are finally adopted in June 2014 present only 
minor changes in terminology or scope when comparing between the initial intentions of the 
Green Paper, the proposal, and the final version. These changes in terminology or scope lead 
either to specifications (e.g. objective three) or to generalizations (e.g. objective four, 
objective five and objective six) of the Green Paper’s objective compared to the final version 
of the audit reform in 2014.  
One of the Green Paper’s objectives, namely “improve the auditors’ communication to 
stakeholders and regulators” (EC, 2010b, Online), is not noted explicitly in the 2011 
proposals and the final 2014 versions. However, this objective is addressed indirectly, i.e. by 
the enhanced role of the audit committee which will become visible in section 4.2 where the 
development of the measures is analyzed. In contrast, the Green Paper’s seventh objective to 
“reduce administrative burden for SME’s” (EC, 2010b) is still addressed in the proposal but it 
is abandoned in the final version and is transferred to the Directive 2013/34/EU. Overall, it 
seems that the parties involved in the process did not have severe problems to come to an 
agreement regarding the objectives because only minor changes were made between the 
proposal’s objectives and the final reform’s objectives. Nevertheless, this is not surprising as 
the objectives are more general and do not directly influence the stakeholders which makes it 
easier to agree on them compared to the agreement on specific measures. This is also pointed 
out by Rose and Miller (1992) as stakeholders mainly get involved after the justifications for 
the program’s objectives have been announced.  
4.2 Development of Measures: From the Green Paper to 
the Final Audit Reform 
After identifying the objectives and their development, this section examines the development 
of the measures from their initial consideration in the Green Paper to the claims in the 2011 
proposal to the final agreed audit reform in order to identify major changes. This is necessary 
in order to critically reflect on the measures as an in-depth knowledge of which measures 
were aimed at and which measures were finally implemented contributes to the discussion in 
chapter five. The identification of changes within the measures facilitates a first insight of 
whether they are in accordance with the objectives’ modifications. The data collection is 
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again based on the three events mentioned above using the EC’s official statements, 
respective regulations and directives. In the following only the major findings of this analysis 
are represented. However, Appendix E contains a tabular comparison of the measures over 
time which was used to identify the major changes. This implies that the list is not exhaustive. 
For example detailed sub-items (e.g. transparency report in Article 13 of the Regulation (EU) 
537/2014) and some topics (e.g. record keeping in Article 15 of the Regulation (EU) 
537/2014) were not considered, because they are not contributing to the research question. 
The analysis of the measures’ development points to three classifications of accepted 
measures. 
4.2.1 Measures Accepted with Minor or No Changes 
The first category includes measures that are accepted with minor or no changes from the 
initial considerations in the Green Paper to the final audit reform. Hence, these measures 
cause changes in the audit market compared to the pre-audit reform. Those measures are the 
suggested compliance with the International Standards on Auditing (ISA), the prohibition of 
contractual clauses and quality certifications for audit firms as well as auditors (Appendix E).  
Furthermore, the amended directive and regulation require a restructuring of public oversight 
of auditors. Nevertheless, the measures to enhance oversight at national and European level 
have also undergone minor changes. On EU-level, the coordination between the Member 
States’ authorities is not designated to the European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA) as suggested by the 2011 proposal regulation and proposal directive (EC Proposal 
Regulation, 2011; EC Proposal Directive, 2011). Instead, cooperation will be organized by the 
Committee of European Auditing Oversight Bodies (CEAOB) “which should be composed of 
high- level representatives of the competent authorities” (Regulation (EU) 537/2014, 
L158/82; Directive 2014/56/EU). However, ESMA is in charge of “the cooperation between 
Member States and third countries in the field of public oversight of PIEs” (EC, 2014b, 
Online). Consequently, the CEAOB with the support of ESMA, “take(s) over the tasks of the 
existing European Group of Auditor Oversight Bodies (EGAOB)” (EC, 2014b, Online).  
On the national level, the audit reform further requires that “each Member State should 
designate a single competent authority to bear ultimate responsibility for the audit public 
oversight system” (EC, 2014b, Online). Moreover, in order to increase the power of these 
authorities, the sanction regime has been strengthened compared to the Directive 2006/43/EC. 
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However, the stricter sanctions which are granted to the national oversight bodies are not 
mentioned in the regulation as suggested by the 2011 proposal but instead in the 2014 
directive (EC Proposal Regulation, 2011; Directive 2014/56/EU). This implies that the 
sanctions conferred to the oversight bodies do not only apply to PIEs (EC, 2014b).  
4.2.2 Measures Accepted with Changes 
The second category characterizes measures that are accepted with changes to the scope from 
the initial considerations in the Green Paper to the final audit reform. As a consequence, these 
measures cause changes compared to the pre-reform situation, but not in the same way as 
initially proposed by the Green Paper or the 2011 proposals. The identification of those 
measures that are now less strict in the final version than they were initially intended, is 
especially relevant as it might point out whether or not measures that were weakened might 
not be in accordance with the objectives due to their change. Therefore, the development of 
the measures included in this category is explained in more detail. 
Compared to the Directive 2006/43/EC the most significant change of the audit reform is the 
new regulation of mandatory external rotation of PIEs (EC, 2011). Although the audit reform 
requires mandatory firm rotation of statutory audits of PIEs, the finally agreed rotation period 
is quite far from what has initially been suggested in the 2011 proposal. The proposal’s 
regulation suggests a mandatory rotation of audit companies after a maximum of six years 
which might be extended to nine years in case of joint audits and a cooling off period of four 
years (EC Proposal Regulation, 2011). Contrary, the 2014 regulation allows a maximum 
rotation period of ten years which can be extended by Member States to 20 years when a 
public tendering process for the statutory audit is conducted and to 24 years when joint audits 
are conducted requiring in all cases a cooling off period of four years (Regulation (EU) 
537/2014). Consequently, the maximum rotation period has been extended drastically 
comparing the 2011 proposal to the final audit regulation which implies that rotation takes 
place less often under the final version than rotations would have occurred under the proposal.  
Furthermore, the proposal and the final audit reform suggest transition periods for the rotation 
of “long-lasting existing engagements between PIEs and statutory auditors” (EC, 2014b, 
Online; EC Proposal Regulation, 2011; Regulation (EU) 537/2014). Nevertheless, the 
transition periods are longer in the 2014 regulation than initially proposed in 2011. For 
instance, the proposal regulation of 2011 suggests a transition period of “3 years: if the 
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auditor has been providing services to the audited entity for a consecutive period between 21 
and 50 years;… 4 years: if the auditor has been providing services to the audited entity for a 
consecutive period between 11 and 20 years; … 5 years: if the auditor has been providing 
services to the audited entity for a consecutive period not exceeding 10 years” (EC Proposal 
Regulation, 2011, p. 83). In contrast, the Regulation (EU) 537/2014 proposes the following 
streamlined transition periods: 
 
Figure 4.2 - Transition Periods for Mandatory Rotation of PIEs (Own Representation, according to 
Regulation (EU) 537/2014) 
The 2014 regulation does not contain a transition period for engagements that lasted less than 
11 years on June 16th 2014 (Regulation (EU) 537/2014). The comparison reveals that the 
2014 regulation has extended the transition periods for eleven or more years to twice as much 
as in the 2011 proposal, but does not provide a transition period for engagements shorter than 
11 years on June 16, 2014 (EC Proposal Regulation, 2011; Regulation (EU) 537/2014). The 
impact of these transition periods, as well as the mandatory external rotation, will be 
discussed in section 5.2.1. 
Another measure that belongs to the second category is the prohibition of certain non-audit 
services to PIEs and the limitation of fees for non-audit services to PIEs as well as total fees 
received from one PIE client. The Green Paper as well as the 2011 proposal regulation 
suggest the establishment of pure audit firms, which result in “a complete ban on the 
provision of non-audit services (NAS) by the large audit firms” (EC Proposal Regulation, 
2011, p. 6). Only several related financial audit services might be allowed under the proposal 
regulation 2011 (full list see Appendix E), such as “audit or review of interim financial 
statements; … providing assurance on corporate governance statements; … providing 
certification on compliance with tax requirements where such attestation is required by 
national law” (EC Proposal Regulation, 2011, p. 30). Nevertheless, the Regulation (EU) 
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537/2014 does not mention the term pure audit firm anymore and has reduced the black list of 
prohibited NAS significantly compared to the 2011 proposal (Appendix E). This is, on the 
one hand, caused by the permission that under certain circumstances Member States may 
allow services included on the blacklist of the Regulation (EU) 537/2014. On the other hand, 
some services, such as due diligence or the establishment of comfort letters for investors, have 
been allowed only with approval of the competent authority under the proposal regulation but 
are allowed without approval in the 2014 final regulation (EC Proposal Regulation, 2011; 
Regulation (EU) 537/2014).   
Furthermore, the new audit reform also introduces fee limits for audit services which were 
already suggested by the Green Paper. However, since the proposal regulation requires pure 
audit firms, the requirements for fee limits on NAS, related financial audit services and total 
fees differ from the requirements of the 2014 regulation. Besides the stricter prohibition of 
NAS in the 2011 proposal, the limitations on the proportion of NAS to total fees have been 
stricter in the 2011 proposal regulation compared to the 2014 regulation. Whereas the 
proposal suggests that the “fees for the provision of related financial audit services to the 
audited entity should be limited to 10 % of the audit fees paid by that entity” (EC Proposal 
Regulation, 2011, p. 30), the 2014 regulation allows that the not prohibited NAS can amount 
to “70 % of the average of the fees paid in the last three consecutive financial years for the 
statutory audit(s)” (Regulation (EU) 537/2014, p. L158/85). Consequently, the fee limit for 
allowed NAS has been extended.  
In addition, the total fees received from one audit client are regulated by the new audit reform. 
The EC proposal regulation requires that the auditor informs the audit committee if the total 
fees “received by an auditor from a PIE reach more than 20 % or, for two consecutive years, 
more than 15 % of the total annual fees” (EC Proposal Regulation, 2011). In addition, if the 
percentage of total annual fees from one PIE reach more than 15% for two consecutive years 
the competent authorities have to be informed which then “decide if the audit can be 
continued for not more than 2 years” (EC Proposal Regulation, 2011, p.29). The final 
regulation follows the stricter limit of 15% of total fees received by an auditor form a PIE but 
instead of calculating them on the basis of two consecutive years (EC Proposal Regulation, 
2011); the 2014 regulation allows the 15% for three consecutive years. In addition, the audit 
committee has to be informed if these 15% are exceeded but there is no obligation to inform 
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the competent authorities (Regulation (EU) 537/2014). Consequently, the requirements on the 
total fee limit have been weakened throughout the development of this measure.  
Furthermore, the scope of the transparency report of audit companies has been weakened 
throughout this measure’s development. Even though the 2014 regulation accepts most of the 
proposed changes, the proposal’s suggestion to submit a statement on the corporate 
governance of the audit company and to disclose all entities from which the “audit firm 
receives more than 5% of its annual revenues” (EC Proposal Regulation, 2011, p. 49) are not 
included in the final version (Regulation (EU) 537/2014). Moreover, the simplifications for 
SMEs in regard to audits are accepted only for small companies and not for medium size 
companies (Regulation (EU) 537/2014). As a consequence, the scope of this measure has also 
been reduced throughout its evolution.  
On the contrary to these diminutions, the requirements regarding the reinforced role of the 
audit committee of PIEs have been further strengthened throughout the process of establishing 
the audit reform. Even though the requirements on the composition have been weakened from 
the proposal to the final audit reform, the direct responsibility in the appointment of a new 
statutory auditor or audit company as well as the demands for an enhanced internal 
communication have increased.  
While the proposal directive of 2011 states that the audit committee of PIEs must have at least 
two independent members “and at least one member of the audit committee shall have 
competence in auditing and another member in accounting and/or auditing” (EC Proposal 
Regulation, 2011, p. 8), the Directive 2014/56/EU requires only that one member must have 
competencies in accounting or auditing and there is no specific requirement on the 
independence of the audit committee (Directive 2014/56/EU). Furthermore, it becomes visible 
that the enhanced requirements on the audit committee which were stated in the 2011 
proposal regulation have been transferred to the directive.  
Although the external communication is extended compared to the 2006 directive, the 
improvements are not as strong as initially demanded by the EC (Appendix E). When 
comparing the proposal and the final agreed version it becomes visible that some 
requirements of the public audit report have been transferred to the additional report for the 
audit committee of PIEs (EC Proposal Regulation, 2011; Regulation (EU) 537/2014). These 
are for example the “methodology used, especially how much of the balance sheet has been 
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directly verified and how much has been based on system and compliance testing, [and] the 
levels of materiality” (EC Proposal Regulation, 2011, p.7). The direct responsibility of the 
audit committee of PIEs for the mandatory tendering of new auditors or audit companies, 
which was already suggested by the Green Paper, also contributes to the enhanced role of the 
audit committee.  
4.2.3 Measures not Accepted and Conclusion 
The third category entails measures that are deleted completely from the initial considerations 
in the Green Paper to the final audit reform. The analysis of the development of the measures 
comes to the conclusion that the following measures have been deleted from the Green 
Paper’s suggestions to the final audit reform in 2014: need for substantive verification, need 
for independent assurance of CSR report, examination of the financial outlook of the auditee 
by the auditor, third party appointment of the audit company, code of governance for audit 
firms, new ownership rules for audit firms, mandatory joint audits, contingency plan for audit 
companies (see Appendix E).  
To conclude, the analysis of the development of the reform’s measures reveals that a major 
weakening of the measures has taken place. The possible impact of some measures is reduced 
by softening the requirements whereas other measures have been removed from the 2011 
proposals to the final audit reform. This further raises the question in which way the reform’s 
measures, which have undergone a process of change, are still in line with its intended 
objective, which have been modified only slightly. Furthermore, the analysis indicates that the 
process to establish an agreement on the measures seems to be more difficult since major 
changes have occurred throughout the whole development.  
4.3 Implementing Final Measures and Objectives into the 
Analytical Framework 
After having identified the most important measures and objectives in the previous sections, 
this section incorporates the EC’s presumptions – of how the program should work and of 
how it should reach its goals – into the analytical framework of section 2.2, because this is the 
program impact theory’s point of departure of evaluation (Rossi, Freeman & Lipsey, 2004). 
The intervening process of the analytical framework presented in section 2.2 are the 
“connections presumed between its [the program’s] various activities and functions and the 
social benefits it is intended to produce” (Rossi, Freeman & Lipsey, 2004, p. 98) which in this 
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particular case is the EC’s justification of how the impact of the applied measures can 
contribute to the desired objectives.  
In order to determine the EC’s justifications in the analytical framework, it is therefore 
important to consider the official objectives identified by the EC (EC, 2014b, Online):  
The reform aims to improve audit quality and restore investor confidence in financial 
information, an essential ingredient for future investment and economic growth... The main 
objectives of the reform are to: 
1. Further clarify the role of the statutory auditor 
2. Reinforce the independence and the professional scepticism [sic] of the statutory 
auditor 
3. Facilitate the cross-border provision of statutory audit services in the EU 
4. Contribute to a more dynamic audit market in the EU 
5. Improve the supervision of statutory auditors and the coordination of audit 
supervision by competent authorities in the EU 
Unlike the last four objectives, the first objective is very unspecific and hence more 
explanation is needed. What does the EC understand under “clarify the role of statutory 
auditor” (EC, 2014b, Online)? According to former commissioner Barnier, a clarified societal 
role includes “increased audit quality to reduce the ‘expectation gap’ … enhanced 
transparency … [and] better accountability” (EC, 2013, Online). Since accountability and 
transparency are intrinsically linked to audit quality, and the “primary objective of the reform 
is to increase the quality of statutory audit” (EC, 2014b, Online), the analytical framework 
provided below will analyze audit quality as a proxy for a clarified societal role.  
Apart from the objectives, the analytical framework considers four specific measures in order 
to evaluate the program. These four measures were selected since Velte (2014a) and Quick 
and Sattler (2011) argue that these four measures are the most influential ones. These are  
‘mandatory external rotation of audit firms’; the ‘prohibition of specific NAS’, including the 
‘NAS fee-limits’; the ‘enhanced role of the audit committee’ which involves ‘mandatory 
public tendering’ and ‘increased internal communication’ (e.g. long form audit report); as 
well as ‘enhancement of oversight at national and European level’.  
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The above identified measures are then linked to the EC’s objectives by following the 
argumentations and assumptions provided by the EC in the Directive 2014/56/EU, the 
Regulation (EU) 537/2014 and the EC’s Memo which was published shortly after the 
adoption through the European Parliament of the audit reform (EC, 2014b). These 
connections “constitute the means by which the program expects to bring about its intended 
effects” (Rossi, Freeman & Lipsey, 2004, p. 100) and are represented in figure 4.3.  
 
Figure 4.3 - Analytical Framework Applied to EC’s Assumptions (Own Representation) 
Hereinafter, the intervening processes between the measures and the objectives are explained 
by referring to the EC’s argumentation. Appendix F contains the sources used for each 
intervening process in figure 4.3 on which the study is based. Each intervening process can be 
identified by using numerical digits for the program activity and an alphabetical character for 
the program objective. The intervening processes connecting measures and objectives 
represent the criteria of evaluation applied for this study’s analytical framework because 
identifying the relevant criteria is necessary to make an assessment in chapter five (Rossi, 
Freeman & Lipsey, 2004).  
One of the most relevant measures is the mandatory external rotation of auditors of PIEs as 
“mandatory rotation is the 'sine qua non' of the whole package of proposals as the other 
measures in isolation will not be sufficient to reinforce independence and professional 
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scepticism [sic]” (EC, 2011, Online). According to the Regulation 537/2014 long-lasting 
professional relationships may cause an over-familiarity between the auditor and the auditee 
(Regulation (EU) 537/2014). As a result, the EC argues that mandatory external rotation of 
audit firms reduces this familiarity threat (Regulation (EU) 537/2014). Following the EC’s 
argumentation, the reduction of the familiarity threat “reinforces independence” (Regulation 
(EU) 537/2014, p. L158/81). This argumentation represents the EC’s justification of how the 
impacts of the applied measures ‘mandatory external rotation’ can contribute to the desired 
objective of ‘reinforced independence’ and explains the connection ‘1A’ made between (1) 
‘mandatory external rotation’ and (A) ‘reinforced independence’ in figure 4.3.  
Furthermore, long lasting relationships between the auditor and the auditee can have negative 
impacts on the professional skepticism of the auditor (EC, 2014b). Therefore, the EC argues 
that mandatory rotation will reduce “the risks of carrying over repeated inaccuracies, and 
encourage fresh thinking” which “will hence contribute to a better audit quality” (EC, 2014b, 
Online). This argument is represented in figure 4.3 by the connection ‘1B’ between (1) 
‘mandatory external rotation’ and (B) ‘clarified societal role’. Nevertheless, it is argued that 
reinforced independence simultaneously increases audit quality, which justifies the 
connection ‘AB’ of figure 4.3 (EC, 2014b). In addition, the EC reasons that mandatory 
rotation requires that another audit firm conducts the audit which benefits mid-tier audit firms 
“as new market opportunities emerge … [and] should make the market more dynamic” (EC, 
2014b, Online), which represents the intervening process of ‘1C’. 
Another measure that is expected to have a high impact is the prohibition of certain NAS and 
the cap on fees for NAS from one audited entity. The EC argues that auditors shall “perform 
their primary ‘societal’ role: statutory audit” (EC, 2014b, Online). However, when the auditor 
provides additional NAS to the auditee, the independence of the auditor is threatened 
(Regulation (EU) 537/2014) and the possibility for conflicts of interest is increased (EC, 
2014b, Online). These claims represent the EC’s justifications regarding the prohibition of 
certain NAS when simultaneously conducting an audit and therefore, the connection ‘2A’ 
between (2) ‘prohibition of NAS’ and (A) ‘reinforced independence’ is established in figure 
4.3. Furthermore, the EC reasons that “the prohibition of certain non-audit services to audit 
clients - requiring de facto that another audit firm provides these services - [is an example of 
measures] that should make the market more dynamic and ultimately less concentrated” (EC, 
2014b, Online), which justifies the connection ‘2C’ in figure 4.3. 
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Related to the prohibition of certain NAS to an audited PIE is the introduction of a cap on fees 
for NAS to PIEs and thus these two measures are represented together in figure 4.3. The 
Regulation 537/2014 states that “the structure of fees can threaten the independence of a 
statutory auditor or an audit firm” (Regulation (EU) 537/2014, p. L158/79). The EC further 
sets out that “introducing a cap on fees for non-audit services to PIEs will strengthen the 
independence of statutory auditors and audit firms vis-à-vis their clients” (EC, 2014b, 
Online). Hence, the audit reform does not provide a direct argument on how the independence 
is increased, but that the independence is reinforced by these measures.  
The enhanced role of the audit committee is another measure that according to the European 
Commission reinforces independence (Directive 2014/56/EU). Additionally, “the new rules 
reinforce the audit committee, both in its composition (most members shall be independent; 
the committee as a whole shall now have competence relevant to the sector in which the 
audited entity is operating), and in its competences” (EC, 2014b, Online), which reinforces 
the independence of the audit committee. Furthermore, the audit committee is responsible for 
reducing and monitoring conflicts of interests which enhances the independence of the auditor 
(Regulation (EU) 537/2014). This argumentation justifies the connection ‘3A’.  
Besides the effects of an enhanced audit committee on independence, the enhanced role of the 
audit committee will also increase audit quality (EC, 2014b) which justifies the establishment 
of the intervening process ‘3B’.  By providing the audit committee “with better and more 
detailed information” (EC, 2014b, Online) via for instance the long form audit report, “the 
reform aims to help reduce the ‘expectation gap’ that often exists between the perceptions of 
what auditors should be delivering and what they are bound to deliver” and hence, increases 
audit quality (EC, 2014b, Online).  
Furthermore, the new procedures to make the audit committee directly responsible for the 
appointment of the statutory auditor (mandatory tendering) and “the monitoring of the audit” 
(EC, 2014b, Online) are also “established to secure the quality of the audit” (Regulation (EU) 
537/2014, p.L158/79). Additionally, according to the EC, the better “technical competences” 
and the increased independence of the audit committee shall contribute to a higher audit 
quality by strengthening professional skepticism (Directive 2014/56/EU, p. L158/200). 
Consequently, the additional report to the audit committee as well as other measures improve 
the communication between the audit committee and the statutory auditor, which enhances 
audit quality (Regulation (EU) 537/2014; Directive 2014/56/EU). 
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Moreover, the EC argues that mandatory tendering, for which the audit committee is 
responsible, will increase the possibilities for mid-tier audit firms to gain new clients as “new 
market opportunities emerge. …that should make the market more dynamic and ultimately 
less concentrated” (EC, 2014b, Online). Consequently, a connection between (3) ‘enhanced 
audit committee’ and (C) ‘contribute to a dynamic audit market’ is made in the analytical 
framework.  
The last measure of the analytical framework, namely enhanced EU and national oversight, 
appears to be the silver bullet of the EU audit reform as this measure is argued to reach all 
objectives. In order to enhance the oversight on the EU level, the CEAOB is established 
which will provide coordination for the exchange of information between the national 
oversight bodies of the Member States (EC, 2014b). On the Member States level oversight is 
enhanced through the requirement to “designate a single competent authority to bear ultimate 
responsibility for the audit public oversight system” (EC, 2014b, Online). This measure can 
be connected to independence which is the intervening process ‘4A’, as the EC states that 
“conflicts of interest” within audit firms or for auditors can be prevented (Regulation (EU) 
537/2014, p. L 158/81). Oversight is also said to contribute to ‘clarify the societal role’ 
(process ‘4B’) on two levels. Firstly, on the level of the individual Member States audit 
market, a ”quality control review” is argued to facilitate a high degree of audit quality because 
“it adds credibility to published financial information” (Regulation (EU) 537/2014, p. 
L158/81). This is said to implement a “quality assurance system” in the audit market 
(Directive 2014/56/EU, L158/198) which is facilitated by the power of sanctioning in order to 
“improve compliance” with the 2014 Regulation and Directive (Directive 2014/56/EU, 
L158/199). Secondly, on the EU level “cooperation between the competent authorities of the 
Member States” is stated as an “important contribution to ensuring high quality of statutory 
audit” (Regulation (EU) 537/2014, p. L158/82).  
The third intended objective of this measure is to contribute to a more dynamic audit market 
(intervening process ‘4C’). The EC argues that competent authorities should “monitor the 
development of the market, particularly … [in regard to] high market concentration” 
(Regulation (EU) 537/2014, L158/82) which will “promote market diversity” (EC, 2014b, 
Online). The EC’s fourth desired objective of enhanced EU and national oversight is to 
facilitate cross-border provision which is the intervening process ‘4D’. The measure of 
oversight is set to facilitate the harmonization of the audit market as the aim to enable 
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statutory auditors and audit firms to provide their services within the borders of the European 
Union makes such an oversight necessary to ensure high quality of audits (Directive 
2014/56/EU, L158/197 & L158/200). Lastly, the intervening process ‘4E’ shows that 
oversight is set to improve supervision and coordination in the audit market. The objective of 
supervision is already considered above and furthermore, oversight is necessary as “the 
interrelation of capital markets gives rise” to strong authorities, which cooperate in regard to 
“exchange of information or quality assurance reviews” (Regulation (EU) 537/2014, p. 
L158/83).   
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5 Analysis of the Audit Reform’s Measures 
and their Accordance with the EC’s Intended 
Objectives from a German Perspective 
Since this paper analyzes the EU audit reform from a German market perspective, section 5.1 
points out central actors of the German institutional environment in order to provide the 
reader with background knowledge. Afterwards the subsequent sections analyze in which way 
the audit reform’s measures are in accordance with the EC’s intended objectives, as identified 
in chapter four. The intervening processes which have been established in chapter four are 
examined from a German market perspective in order to analyze in which way they impact 
the objectives. As stated in chapter three, the evaluation follows the program impact theory 
and is based on a qualitative document analysis and interviews. Besides the intervening 
processes identified by the EC, other side effects which were detected during the analysis will 
be pointed out. At the end of each section, the findings will be implemented into the analytical 
framework which is based on the program impact theory. In the end of the chapter a summary 
of the major findings is provided.  
5.1 German Institutional Environment 
The EU statutory audit directive, the Handelsgesetzbuch (German Commercial Code, HGB), 
the Wirtschaftsprüferordnung (German Public Accountant Act, WPO), and “by-laws of the 
Chamber of Public Accountants” form the legal framework for auditors as well as for the 
German oversight bodies (Volkman, n.d.). Consequently, the new audit reform will bring 
about changes in the WPO, the HGB and other regulations (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft 
und Energie, 2015, Online). In order to understand the consequences of the audit reform, it is 
important to comprehend the German institutional audit environment which sets the 
background for this change process.  
According to article 66 of the WPO the Federal Ministry of Economics and Energy is 
responsible for the state supervision over the Chamber of Public Accountants 
(Wirtschaftsprüferkammer, WPK) and the Auditor Oversight Commission 
(Abschlussprüferaufsichtskommission, APAK). Consequently, the Federal Ministry of 
Economics and Energy controls that the WPK and the APAK fulfill their tasks in accordance 
with legal requirements.  
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The APAK, established in 2005, is an independent public oversight body with “ultimate 
responsibility” (APAK, 2015, Online) regarding all auditor oversight activities. Consequently, 
the WPK is not only subjected to state supervision of the Federal Ministry of Economics and 
Energy but also to public oversight executed by the APAK (European Commission, 2008). 
The APAK’s responsibilities include the examination of whether the WPK “fulfills its legal 
obligations” (APAK, 2015, Online). These are “licensing of public accountants 
(Wirtschaftsprüfer and vereidigte Buchprüfer), licensing of audit firms, revocation of licenses, 
registration of public accountants and audit firms, disciplinary oversight and external quality 
assurance” (IFIAR, 2014).  
Furthermore, the APAK, “governed by independent non-practitioners” (European 
Commission, 2008, Online), “cooperates in case of cross-border oversight proceedings 
concerning statutory auditors with the relevant authorities abroad” (IFIAR, 2014, p.1). 
Therefore, the APAK is interested in international “cooperation of independent audit 
regulators” and “is member of the European Group of Auditors’ Oversight Bodies (EGAOB), 
the European Audit Inspection Group (EAIG) and the International Forum of Independent 
Audit Regulators (IFIAR)” (APAK, 2015, Online).  
Subordinated to the APAK is the WPK which “is a corporation under public law”, 
membership in which is mandatory in Germany for “all Wirtschaftsprüfer [German public 
accountants], vereidigte Buchprüfer [German sworn auditors], 
Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaften [German public audit firms] and 
Buchprüfungsgesellschaften [German firms of sworn auditors]” (Wirtschaftsprüferkammer, 
2015, Online). As mentioned before, the WPK is supervised by the Federal Ministry of 
Economics and Energy, as well as by the APAK, which delegates tasks such as disciplinary 
oversight, audit examination, the adoption of professional rules or quality assurance 
procedures towards the WPK (Wirtschaftsprüferkammer, 2015).  
Special is that the “disciplinary oversight of the German audit profession is organized into a 
two-tier system”, which consists of sanctions raised by the WPK and by special divisions of 
criminal courts (APAK, 2015, Online). This means that investigations about minor abuses of 
professional rules are conducted by the WPK (APAK, 2015, Online); whereas “severe 
violations of professional rules” are investigated by the Chief Public Prosecutor in Berlin and 
sanctioned by independent state courts (European Commission, 2008, Online).  
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Aside from these public and governmental institutions the Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer 
(IDW), the German Institute of Public Auditors, plays a major role in the organization of the 
German auditing profession. The IDW is a private institution which “serves the interest of its 
members who comprise both individual Wirtschaftsprüfer [German Public Auditors] and 
Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaften [German Public Audit firms]” (Institut der 
Wirtschaftsprüfer in Deutschland e.V., 2007, Online). The IDW, of which membership is 
voluntary, aims to preserve the interests of its members on national and international level and 
supports them with technical advice and sets out standards (Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer in 
Deutschland e.V., 2007).  
Besides the German Accounting Standards Committee, an independent standard setter 
(Deutsches Rechnungslegungs Standards Committee, 2015), the IDW is mainly responsible 
for the publications of German Generally Accepted Standards on Auditing (Institut der 
Wirtschaftsprüfer in Deutschland e.V., 2007). The IDW is a member of the International 
Federation of Accountants (IFAC), the Fédération des Experts Comptables Européens (FEE), 
the “International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB), the International 
Accounting Education Standards Board (IAESB), the International Public Sector Accounting 
Standards Board (IPSASB) as well as IFAC’s Small and Medium Practices Committee 
(SMPC)” (Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer in Deutschland e.V., 2007, Online). Other important 
accountancy associations are the Accountants Group in Germany and the Deutscher 
Buchprüferverband (DBV) – the German Certified Accounts Association (ICAEW, 2015). 
An overview of the major German auditing institutions and the relationship between these 
institutions is represented in figure 5.1.  
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Figure 5.1 - German Auditing Institutions (Own Representation adapted from Auditor Oversight 
Commission, 2014) 
The system of auditor oversight is separate from the accounting oversight body; however, the 
two systems cooperate since they exchange information in regard to possible misconducts of 
the “auditor’s duties” (APAK, 2015, Online). The two-tier accounting enforcement system 
“consist of a private body, the DPR [Deutsche Prüfstelle für Rechnungslegung], which 
investigates compliance of published financial reports of firms listed on a regulated market 
segment and … the German securities regulator BaFin [Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht], which on a second level enforces disclosure of these findings 
to establish adverse disclosure” (Ernstberger, Hitz & Stich, 2011, p.253).  
5.2 Impact of the Mandatory External Rotation of PIEs 
on the Corresponding Objectives  
The EC states that “mandatory rotation is the 'sine qua non' of the whole package of proposals 
as the other measures in isolation will not be sufficient to reinforce independence and 
professional scepticism” (EC, 2011, Online). This implies that mandatory external firm 
rotation constitutes the foundation for many other measures. Therefore, it is especially 
relevant to examine whether the mandatory external firm rotation in Germany is in line with 
its intended objectives of reinforced independence, increased audit quality and a more 
dynamic German audit market (as identified in chapter four). Desired and undesired side 
effects that might be caused by the mandatory external firm rotation are considered since they 
might strengthen or harm the intended objectives of this measure as well as other objectives 
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of the audit reform. Before analyzing these impacts, the German companies influenced by the 
mandatory external firm rotation as well as the temporal application of the measure in 
Germany are taken into account.  
5.2.1 Obligated Parties and Temporal Aspects  
Until now the German regulator made use of the 2006/43/EC’s option which requires only 
capital market oriented companies to fall within the definition of PIEs. However, such an 
option is no longer present in the Directive 2014/56/EU. Therefore, additionally to capital 
market oriented companies, non-capital market-oriented credit institutions, and insurance 
companies will fall within the definition of PIEs. According to the German Chamber of 
Public Accountants, the number of PIEs will hence increase from 777 to 1,592 in Germany 
(WPK, 2014a). This implies that within the next two decades almost 1,600 companies have to 
change their auditors (Plendl, 2015, p.V5), causing “a significant effect on auditor switching 
rates in Germany” (Krauß, Quosigk & Zülch, 2014, p. 40).  
In particular, the study by Köhler and Herbers reveals that among the 110 companies which 
were listed on the DAX, mid-cap DAX (MDAX) and Technology-DAX (TecDax) between 
1997 and 2012, 44 companies did not change their auditors within this time span (Buhleier, 
Niehues & Splinter, 2014b, p. 151-152). This implies that these 44 companies of which 24 are 
DAX entities, 13 are MDAX companies and 7 are TecDAX firms, have to change their audit 
company until 2021 (Buhleier, Niehues & Splinter, 2014b, p. 151-152). Furthermore, among 
these investigated companies 20 entities switched their audit company between 1998 and 
2004 (Buhleier, Niehues & Splinter 2014b, p.151-152), which implies that they have to 
change the audit firm by 2024 (Regulation (EU) 537/2014). Experiences from other countries 
where mandatory rotation has already been implemented such as Italy, the Netherlands and 
Great Britain (Braun, 2014; IDW, 2012) demonstrate that companies carry out the change 
from one audit company to another at the beginning of the transition periods (Buhleier, 
Niehues & Splinter, 2014b, p.151-152). Even though it is impossible to predict when exactly 
the companies will change their audit firms, it is clear that the majority of German listed 
companies have to change their auditors before 2024 which brings along consequences for 
companies, audit firms and the German audit market. 
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5.2.2 Effects on Independence (‘1A’) 
Among academics, the business media, the German audit profession and the German audit 
institutions, the opinions are divided regarding the effects of mandatory external rotation on 
independence. This viewpoint is also reflected by the interviewed experts. Whereas few 
authors claim that mandatory external rotation is able to reinforce independence, most authors 
question a positive connection between mandatory external rotation and enhanced 
independence.  
Reduced Familiarity by Mandatory External Rotation 
The authors who claim that independence can be reinforced by mandatory external rotation 
argue that mandatory rotation “brings a fresh set of eyes” (Tan 1995, in: Fiolleau et al., 2013, 
p. 867) which reduces familiarity and hence, increases objectivity and independence (see: 
Köhler & Gehring, 2015; Quick , 2014, in: KPMG, 2014a). Furthermore, it is argued that the 
surpluses which the audit company gains after the initial induction period will be limited due 
to the rotation time which reduces the financial self-interest of the audit company (Quick, 
2014, in: KPMG, 2014a, p.20). Expert 1, 3 and 9 support this view and expert 3 further 
substantiates his opinion by stating “new brooms sweep cleaner”. Noticeable, very few 
individuals, especially non-Big Four experts, German regulators and academics, see a positive 
intervening process between mandatory external rotation and reinforced independence.  
Questionable Intervening Process between External Rotation and Independence 
In contrast, other academics argue that there is no empirical evidence which proves the 
reinforcing impact of mandatory external rotation on independence (Velte, 2014b; IDW, 
2012; Fiolleau et al., 2013; Myers, Myers, and Omer 2003; Ruiz-Barbadillo, Gomez- Aguilar, 
and Carrera 2009; Beasley et al. 2009 in: Fiolleau et al., 2013), which is echoed by expert 4.  
Additionally, expert 4, 5, 6 and 8, which are all representatives of the audit profession, do not 
believe that external rotation increases independence in general. 
Fiolleau et al. (2013) claim that “firm rotation can break relationships with a single audit 
partner, [but] it is unlikely to completely sever links with audit firms” (p. 878). Since 
profitable additional services are provided to the company (WPK, 2013), it is unlikely that 
professional relationships will break up completely, which is also stressed by expert 7. In their 
case study, Fiolleau et al. (2013) revealed that ”all Big 4 firms had working relationships with 
this company both before and after the audit selection decision was made” (Fiolleau et al., 
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2013, p. 878). Consequently, it is questionable if mandatory external audit firm rotation really 
results in a completely fresh and independent attitude.  
Furthermore, the logical consequence of mandatory external rotation is that possible new 
audit firms will take part in competitive tendering. During the process of engaging a new 
audit firm, Fiolleau et al. (2013) found evidence that management is able to ask for ”preferred 
client treatment” (p. 880) due to the management’s powerful position in a highly competitive 
audit market. As a consequence, mandatory external firm rotation could even have a negative 
effect on independence.  
Besides this discussion about the intervening process between mandatory external rotation 
and reinforced independence, the German Chamber of Public Accountants claims that there is 
no necessity for external rotation since familiarity threats are sufficiently counteracted by the 
laws of internal rotation (IDW, 2012). Expert 5 and 6, which are both board members of Big 
Four audit companies, as well as expert 8, also are convinced that the internal rotation which 
is implemented in Germany is more efficient in securing independence than external rotation. 
Legal Grey Zone 
Moreover, legal gray zones further challenge the already questionable intervening process 
between mandatory external rotation and independence. The regulation does not explicitly 
specify that the external rotation also includes employees, which could imply that employee 
rotations from one Big Four to another occur to circumvent the regulation (apa, 2014; Kaindl, 
2014; Henrichs, 2013). According to the association for midsize audit companies, as well as 
expert 7, it is not unusual that auditors change jointly with the client to another (Big Four) 
audit company (Verband für mittelständische Wirtschaftsprüfung, wp.net journal 02-2015). 
For instance, in 2012/2013 the auditors of Gerry Weber moved jobs from Mazar to PwC 
exactly when Gerry Weber changed its audit company from Mazar to PwC (Verband für 
mittelständische Wirtschaftsprüfung, 2015). This gray zone is neither regulated by the internal 
nor the external rotation. Hence, the intentions of the audit reform to reinforce independence 
can be circumvented.  
Another grey zone that hinders the positive impact of external rotation on independence are 
the options granted to the Member States, which allow to extend the maximum engagement 
period from ten years to 20 years in case of a public tendering process and 24 years in case of 
joint audits (Regulation (EU) 537/2014). In the current German draft regulation AreG RefE, 
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the German regulators will implement these long usances of 20 and 24 years respectively 
(BMJV, 2015). However, Velte (2014a) and apa (2014) argue that these long periods reduce 
possible impacts of the external rotation on the intended objective of reinforcing 
independence. Expert 1 and 3 confirm these claims. Expert 5 specifies that these rotation 
periods are nearly a whole lifetime of an auditor and questions “why should this then lead to 
an increased independence?” (Expert 5). In the context of long education periods of auditors 
in Germany (at least seven years) (Nobes & Parker, 2012), the argument of expert 5 seems 
reasonable. Furthermore, expert 6 and 8 do not believe that these time limits are generally too 
long to reinforce independence, but they are convinced that internal rotation is more effective 
and hence, mandatory external rotation is redundant.  
Overall, most arguments reveal a questionable intervening process between external 
mandatory rotation and independence.  
5.2.3 Effects on a Clarified Societal Role (Quality) (‘1B’) 
Weak Intervening Process between External Rotation and Audit Quality 
As identified in chapter four, audit quality is another objective which, according to the EC’s 
logic, shall be improved by mandatory external rotation. For the assessment of this measure 
on audit quality, it is again useful to have a look at the theoretical reasoning for this 
intervening process. So far, empirical research for the case of Germany could not demonstrate 
that mandatory external rotation can cause quality intensification of audits (Velte, 2014a; 
Velte and Stiglbauer, 2012; Wadewitz, 2013a; Kaindl, 2014). Therefore, these academics and 
business journalists argue that mandatory external rotation should not be introduced since it 
lacks the empirical evidence that it can reduce possible flaws of audits. According to Michael 
Andrew, Chairman of KPMG International, all big audit companies do not believe that the 
mandatory external rotation can enforce quality in statutory audits (Hecht, 2013). Besides 
expert 3 and 7, all other experts reflect this argument and question a positive relationship 
between rotation and audit quality. Expert 1 and 5 explicitly state that they do not see a 
connection between mandatory external rotation and improved quality.  
Moreover, the Chamber of Public Accountants (WPK) and the Institute of Public Auditors in 
Germany (IDW) share the same opinion as the authors above. They further add to the 
reasoning that two of three EU-Member States, which introduced the external mandatory 
rotation, changed the measure shortly after it was introduced in favor of internal rotation 
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(WPK, 2010; IDW, 2012; also mentioned by expert 6). Greece and Spain abolished 
mandatory external rotation when it became evident that the intended objective of quality 
improvements of audits was not reached (WPK, 2010; IDW, 2012). The improvement of audit 
quality by mandatory external rotation is further suspicious since during the discussions about 
the 2006 audit directive even the EU Parliament and EU Council acknowledged that there is a 
possible risk of decreasing audit quality (WPK, 2010).  
Loss of Knowledge 
One frequently mentioned reason why mandatory external rotation is said not to improve 
audit quality is that it probably leads to a loss of knowledge upon auditor rotation. The 
institute of Public Auditors (IDW) in Germany complains that “necessary expertise - in 
particular in the necessary level of detailed knowledge of the business, the economic 
environment, the processes and systems of the clients” (IDW, 2012, p.6-7) is mostly lost 
when the audit company rotates. A research by Köhler and Gehring (2015) on German audit 
companies and listed companies on the DAX, MDAX and TecDAX stresses that the factors 
“experience”, “comprehension of the business activity” and “understanding of the systems 
and processes” are key to audit quality (Köhler & Gehring, 2015, p.238).  However, these 
factors are threatened by external rotation and hence, could have a negative impact on audit 
quality (Köhler & Gehring, 2015, p.238).  
Furthermore, the media (Kaindl, 2014; FAZ, 2014; Velte, 2014a; Hecht, 2013) as well as 
other German institutions (WPK, 2010; BMJV, 2015; expert 4) support this view. Attention 
should be paid to the fact that even the BMJV acknowledges that external rotation negatively 
affects audit quality and, hence, the BMJV argues in favor of the options which allow to 
extend the audit engagement period (BMJV, 2015). Moreover, Deloitte (2013), KPMG 
(2014a) and the IDW (2012) reason that during the first years of client relationships, the risks 
to overlook fraud and errors are higher, which was demonstrated by a study of the PCAOB. 
Furthermore, “in the first years of the audit-client-relationship the auditor is highly dependent 
on the information provided by the client whose correctness he cannot control easily” 
(KPMG, 2014a, p.20). Due to the increased dependence of the auditor on the client in the first 
years the quality might suffer as the auditor might have difficulties to detect fraud. 
Consequently, the document analysis revealed that most stakeholders identify a weak 
intervening process between external rotation and quality due to the loss of knowledge caused 
by external rotation. Expert 1, 4, 6 and 8 support this argument. 
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Furthermore, expert 5 adds a new line of argumentation. Due to the “extreme movements in 
the audit market” triggered by the external rotation, he expects that “enormous capacities” 
will become necessary for audit companies to handle the expected rotation wave. Expert 5, 
therefore, concludes that capacity constraints will occur in the German audit market which 
“might easily lead to quality problems”.  
Contrary to the findings of the document analysis where no proof in favor of the intervening 
process was found, expert 3 and 7 have a different view. They claim that the Big Four use the 
argument of a loss of knowledge in order to justify their disfavor of external rotation. 
According to these experts, gaining in-depth knowledge of the organization and its processes 
is a natural element of audits. These experts state that the Big Four try to avoid this extra 
work due to additional costs that are caused by the extra work. Expert 7 further adds that “if 
you audit BMW and in the course of the external rotation you gain the mandate for Mercedes, 
you cannot justify a loss of knowledge due to the similar industries”. Hence, if professional 
expertise for one industry exists within an audit company, it is unreasonable to claim a loss of 
knowledge. Moreover, expert 9 stresses that mandatory external rotation does not per se 
reduce audit quality. According to expert 9, audit reports of companies in which the auditor 
just changed, have a higher probability to be examined by the oversight authorities, because 
according to statistics the risk of error is higher during the first years of an engagement.  If the 
auditor knows that these particular audits represent a main area of inspection by the oversight 
body, then the auditor should invest more time and personnel in order to assure the audit 
quality (expert 9). Therefore, expert 9 argues that audit quality neither decreases nor 
increases.  
Questionable Effects of Low-Balling  
The ambiguous effects of low-balling (high initial audit fee discounts) additionally contribute 
to a questionable intervening process ‘1B’. Academics (Hennrichs, 2013; Krauß, Quosigk & 
Zülch, 2014; Krauss, Pronobis & Zülch, 2014), German audit institutions (Gschrei & Luxi, 
2015; IDW, 2012; IDW, 2010), and business media (Boecker, Hartmann & Zwirner, 2013; 
Lückmann, 2014) agree that mandatory external rotation will lead to a “systematic fee cutting 
for initial audit engagements years in Germany” (Krauß, Quosigk & Zülch, 2014, p. 40). For 
instance, the member of the board of Deutz AG, Mrs. Dr. Haase, stated on the APAK’s 
anniversary celebration that it is worth to tender the audit engagements because it reduces the 
audit fees, even though later the audit company is not changed (Gschrei & Luxi, 2015). 
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Gschrei and Luxi (2015) also reveal in their case study on German MDAX companies that 
within the 17 rotations that occurred between 2007 and 2013, in ten cases the audit fees 
dropped. The Deutz AG even reached approximately a rate of return of 40% when changing 
from PwC (audit fees of EUR 521,000 in 2006), to Deloitte (audit fees of EUR 305,000 in 
2007) (Gschrei & Luxi, 2015).  
Besides this agreement on initial audit fee discounts caused by mandatory external rotation, 
the opinions about low-balling on audit quality are diverse. On the one hand, the IDW (2012), 
Hennrichs (2013), Geiger and Raghunandan (2002; in: Krauß, Quosigk & Zülch, 2014), as 
well as Boecker, Hartmann and Zwirner (2013) are convinced that the measure of rotation 
causes a price pressure which negatively affects the audit quality. According to expert 5, 
“battles of prices … have at least a potential danger for audit quality. Either audit companies 
make losses due to the low prices or they reduce their staff to save costs which results in a 
loss of audit quality.” However, Boecker, Hartmann and Zwirner (2013) also identify the 
ambiguity of paying a high fee for good audit quality and the danger of dependence when the 
audit fee is high.  
On the other hand, Krauß, Quosigk and Zülch (2014) did not find evidence that low-balling 
impairs audit quality in their German research on “992 firm-year observations from 2005 
through 2011” (p. 40). Furthermore, their findings support “DeAngelo’s (1981) theory that 
low-balling is merely an auditor’s natural response to competitive market conditions and not 
necessarily related to auditor dependency issues” (DeAngelo, 1981, p. 126; in: Krauß, 
Quosigk & Zülch, 2014, p. 51). Lückmann (2014) and Krauss, Pronobis and Zülch (2014) 
also share the opinion that audit quality is not impaired by low-balling. This analysis reveals 
that among academics, the business media and the IDW there is no unanimous consensus of 
whether low-balling impairs audit quality or not. However, since no empirical investigation 
proves the negative impact of low balling, it seems that only the perceived audit quality might 
be decreased and not the real audit quality.  
The arguments contained within 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 for the measure of external rotation, lead to 
the conclusion that trade-offs between quality and a reinforced independence must be made, if 
it is possible to strengthen independence after all. The discussion about external rotation has 
demonstrated that the few arguments that justify a strengthening of the independence are 
“opposed by arguments relating to the impairment of the competence and experience of the 
auditor” (Köhler, 2010, p. 1; see also: Köhler & Gehring, 2015). Hence, even if the EC’s 
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assumption of a reinforced independence by the external rotation can be followed, the effects 
of mandatory external rotation on audit quality are contradicting.  
5.2.4 Effects on Market Diversification (‘1C’) 
Necessity to Increase Diversification by Mandatory External Rotation 
The break-up of the market concentration of the Big Four is another objective that the EC 
wants to reach with the mandatory external rotation (Regulation (EU) 537/2014). Before 
considering if this measure can contribute to a more dynamic audit market, it is however 
necessary to examine the German audit market in order to see if there is a need to diversify 
the audit market in Germany. 
When considering all audited companies in Germany, the Big Four reach a market share of 
19% as measured by the turnover in 2009 (Le Vourc’h and Morand, 2011). Nevertheless, this 
picture changes substantially when considering the German PIE audit market. According to 
the WPK’s market structure analysis the big audit companies, namely the Big Four and BDO, 
have a market share of 71.7% as measured by the number of audit clients (WPK, 2013). From 
2011 to 2013 the market share of the big audit companies increased slightly from 69.8% to 
71.7% as illustrated in figure 5.2 (WPK, 2013).  
 
Figure 5.2 - Market Share of the Big Audit Companies in Germany on the PIE Audit Market (WPK, 
2013, p. 11) 
When considering only companies that are listed on the DAX, MDAX, Small-cap-DAX 
(SDAX) or TecDAX, the result of the market share is even stronger as illustrated in table 5.1. 
All companies listed on the DAX were audited by the Big Four in 2011 (dpa/Haufe, 2013; 
Boecker, Hartmann & Zwirner, 2013). The statistics for the MDAX, SDAX and TecDAX 
also indicate a high concentration level of the Big Four.  
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Table 5.1- Number of Audit Clients per Audit Company and Index for 2010/2011 (Boecker, Hartmann, 
& Zwirner, 2013, p.158) 
The table indicates that 87% of the 161 biggest German stock corporations are audited by a 
Big Four audit company. The long-term comparison of Bauer (2015) from 2004/05 to 
2009/10 and the study of Quick and Sattler (2011) between 2005 and 2007 also reveal that the 
market concentration of the Big Four audit companies is extremely high for companies listed 
on the DAX, MDAX, SDAX and TecDax. Besides the high market concentration of the Big 
Four, the distribution of audit engagements also differs among the Big Four Group. Already 
in 2007 it was noticed that PwC and KPMG have a dominant market position against EY and 
Deloitte, leading to a duopoly on the German audit market (Quick and Sattler, 2011). This 
superiority is also reflected by table 5.1 where PwC and KPMG together audit 86% of the 
DAX companies and 56% of the MDAX segment. As a result, these statistics indicate a very 
high concentration level on the German audit market along with a market dominance of the 
Big Four, which leads to the conclusion that a measure such as ‘mandatory external rotation’ 
is necessary to create a more dynamic audit market.  
In contrast, the IDW, the German Government as well as the PCAOB question whether 
market concentration leads to a decrease in audit quality and whether mandatory external 
rotation is necessary and appropriate (IDW, 2012; Le Vourc’h and Morand, 2011). 
Furthermore, it is argued that there are reasons for the development of the Big Four, such as 
the global provision of services which question the necessity to reduce their market 
dominance (Kaindl, 2014). Moreover, it is claimed that the investigations regarding the 
merger between the former Arthur Andersen and EY did not reveal negative consequences for 
the competitive situation in Germany, even though this merger further concentrated the audit 
market (Zimmermann 2008, in: R. Quick und M. Sattler, 2011; WPK, 2010). Hence, these 
authors question the necessity to diversify the audit market, even though the above statistics 
clearly indicate a high concentration and the need for governmental intervention.  
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Intervening Process between Mandatory External Rotation and Market Diversification 
Besides the discussion on the need of a measure that reduces the market concentration, it is 
necessary to analyze in which way the external mandatory rotation is in accordance with the 
intended objective to contribute to a more dynamic audit market. Only few authors recognize 
the possibility that mandatory external rotation can have a positive impact on the competition 
of the German audit market (Kaindl, 2012; BMJV, 2015; BDO, 2014). For instance, BDO 
appreciates that mandatory external rotation offers a possibility to international non-Big Four 
audit companies to increase their perception (BDO, 2014).  
Missing Capacities and Competences of Non-Big Four Audit Companies 
Apart from these few individuals who recognize a positive intervening process between 
mandatory external rotation and market diversification, there are many arguments which 
question a strong intervening process between rotation and market diversification. One strong 
argument is that missing capacities and competencies of smaller audit firms limit the choice 
for large, international clients. This argument is supported by academics, Big Four companies, 
German institutions, and the business media as well as by all interviewed experts. Smaller and 
mid-tier audit companies simply do not have the know-how, organizational structures and 
personnel to provide statutory audits to complex multinational companies which need advice 
for a lot of subsidiaries in several countries (MarketLine, 2013; Fockenbrock, 2013; Bauer, 
2015; Deloitte 2012b; Quick & Sattler, 2011; experts 1-9). Therefore, “a multinational 
company (MNC) would have difficulty putting mandatory audit firm rotation into practice as 
it needs to select auditors that have the relevant capabilities to implement consistent quality 
audits in all of the markets in which the MNC operates” (Deloitte 2012b, p.7). Consequently, 
“it does not matter whether it will be rotated after five or ten years. KPMG and PwC will just 
switch the clients” (Fockenbrock, 2013, p.27).  
Additionally, it is argued that the good brand reputation of the Big Four audit companies 
plays a major role when selecting an audit company (MarketLine, 2013; Quick and Sattler, 
2011). Since “switching from a "Big Four" auditor to a smaller player may be viewed 
negatively by the capital markets” (MarketLine, 2013, p.12), it does not seem that mandatory 
external rotation can increase the market diversification beyond the Big Four. Overall, this 
discussion reveals that there are not many audit companies which can meet the needs of 
MNCs and, as a result, the EC’s argued intervening process between mandatory external 
rotation and a more dynamic audit market is weak.  
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Direction of change 
Additionally, there are two main arguments which infer that mandatory external rotation 
cannot contribute to a more dynamic audit market or will actually lead to a more concentrated 
market. Firstly, from a German perspective it is reasonable to argue that mandatory external 
rotation will benefit the Big Four companies, since in the case of a rotation the companies will 
rotate between Big Four companies (Köhler, 2010; Velte, 2014b; IDW, 2011c; Quick & 
Sattler, 2011; Boecker, Hartmann & Zwirner, 2013; Betriebs Berater 2014; Bauer, 2015; 
WPK, 2010; Verband für mittelständische Wirtschaftsprüfung, 2015). Aside from a consensus 
in the reviewed documents, all interviewed experts agree on this expected “merry-go-around” 
as expert 1 calls it. Furthermore, expert 5 expects especially in the banking and insurance 
sector a high likelihood of rotation from one Big Four to another Big Four company.  
Secondly, all interviewed experts anticipate that most rotations will cause a move from a non-
Big Four audit company to one of the Big Four audit companies. According to them external 
rotation will not lead to a more dynamic audit market. This is statistically proven by a study 
conducted by Köhler (2010) on rotations in the German capital market (financial sector 
excluded). According to Köhler (2010), more audit engagements were lost from non-Big Four 
companies to the Big Four between 2005 and 2010, as shown in table 5.2.  
 
Table 5.2 - Number of Auditor Changes, Differentiated by Direction of the Auditor Change and 
Company Size Categories Based on the Balance Sheet Totals of the Audited Companies (Köhler, 2010, 
p.3) 
Furthermore, Köhler claims that the probability that an audit engagement will be lost by a 
non-Big Four increases with the size of the engagement (Köhler, 2010, p.6). As indicated by 
table 5.2 “in the smallest size category the relative frequency of change from a Big Four to a 
non-Big Four is substantially larger than from a non-Big Four to a Big Four” (Köhler, 2010, 
p. 4 academic). On the contrary, in the largest size category the direction of change is in favor 
of the Big Four (Köhler, 2010). Based on a scenario analysis Köhler (2010) concludes that 
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among all three size categories “a mandatory rotation would result in the shift [of] a total of 
12 engagements and a total audit fee volume of EUR 4.6 million from the non-Big Four to the 
Big Four” (Köhler, 2010, p.6).  
Consequently, mandatory external rotation negatively affects mid-tier and smaller audit 
companies because they will in most cases lose mandates. Therefore, KPMG (2014a), EY 
(2014b), Grant Thornton (in: Metzger, 2012) and the IDW (2012; 2010), as well as the 
interviewees, expect that the market concentration further increases due to mandatory external 
rotation and negatively affects the mid-tier audit companies.  
Another aspect that further leads to a weak and negative intervening process between 
mandatory firm rotation and market diversification are the increased activities of the Big Four 
audit companies in the German medium-sized company sector at the expense of mid-tier audit 
companies. The deselected auditors will head once more in lower market segments and 
additionally increase the market concentration (Lückmann, 2014; Betriebs Berater 2014).  
Overall, the analysis indicates that mandatory external rotation negatively affects mid-tier and 
smaller audit companies as they will lose mandates. Following this line of argumentation, the 
audit market will be further concentrated, and competition will not increase. Since this 
argument is supported by all interviewed experts and the document analysis revealed that 
German institutions, German academics, the Big Four, smaller audit companies and the 
business media identified a negative effect of mandatory firm rotation on the market 
diversification, it seems that this argument is rather strong. Therefore, the intervening process 
‘1C’ is not only weak, but possibly contradicting to the EC’s intentions. 
5.2.5 Side Effect on Cross-Border Provision (‘1D’) 
Even though, the facilitation of the cross-border provision of statutory audits is not an 
intended objective of the external mandatory rotation, the options of this measure provoke 
some side effects on the cross-border provision of audits. Plendl (2015) and Ruhnke (2014) 
criticize that the options which were granted to the Member States in regard to the 
implementation of the mandatory external rotation of PIEs are not beneficial for a uniform 
application of the regulation. According to the Regulation (EU) 537/2014, Member States can 
allow extending the rotation period from ten to 20 years, if a public tendering takes place after 
ten years, or alternatively to 24 years if a joint audit is done. In the current German draft 
regulation, the German regulators will implement these extensions of 20 and 24 years 
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respectively (BMJV, 2015). Nevertheless, other countries will apply these options differently. 
For example, it is anticipated that Italy will determine a shorter rotation period of nine years 
and other countries will not make use of these options at all (Plendl, 2015; Braun, 2014). 
Consequently, transnational companies whose subsidiaries are treated as PIEs in different 
countries are confronted with dissimilar rotation periods. This argument is confirmed by 
expert 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7. Hence, harmonization and the facilitation of cross-border services 
are hindered.  
5.2.6 Side Effect on the Audit Committee  
The IDW (2012), EY (2014a) and Deloitte (2012a) further claim that mandatory external 
rotation limits the autonomy of the supervisory board and audit committee because it limits 
their assessment to choose the most capable audit company. Consequently, “it reduces the 
audit committee’s authority over the audit relationship, which, over time, weakens audit 
committees and is harmful to audit quality” (EY 2014a, p.2). This negative side effect of 
external rotation on an enhanced audit committee is also confirmed by expert 5 who claims 
that the supervision function of the audit committee is depreciated as the audit committee 
might have the perception that it is not necessary to question independence during the first ten 
years, as the government does not see a problem for independence during the first ten years.  
Remarkable is that this particular argument is featured only by representatives of the 
profession. Consequently, it seems that the other stakeholders do not follow this argument or 
at least do not consider it important to mention. Furthermore, Deloitte’s, EY’s and IDW’s 
argument implicitly assumes that one audit company is better or worse than another one.   
5.2.7 Implementing the Findings into the Analytical Framework 
Overall, the document analyses, as well as the interviews, have demonstrated that the 
intervening process between mandatory external rotation and reinforced independence is 
questionable. The desired effects are doubtful or contradicting, as in this analysis no 
meaningful arguments were identified that justify the application of a mandatory external 
rotation to reinforce independence. Legal gray zones and the unproven empirical evidence 
that external mandatory rotation can reduce independence, question the EC’s argued 
intervening process ‘1A’.  
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Furthermore, the analysis also demonstrated that there is a weak intervening process between 
external rotation and quality. On the one hand, missing empirical evidence questions the 
intervening process ‘1B’ and, on the other hand, a loss of knowledge counteracts an improved 
audit quality. The discussion about low-balling further challenges the impact of rotation on 
quality, even though it appears that there is no meaningful negative impact on audit quality by 
initial fee discounts. Furthermore, when contrasting the effects of external rotation on 
independence and audit quality the analysis reveals that even if the EC’s assumption of how 
external rotation should reinforce independence can be followed, the effects of mandatory 
external rotation on audit quality are contradicting. Hence, reinforced independence and audit 
quality offset each other in regard to external rotation.  
Even though there are some parties which claim that it is not necessary to intervene on the 
German audit market; the statistics of the German audit market paint a different picture. The 
German audit market is highly dominated by the Big Four and in some segments even an 
oligopoly of KPMG and PwC is visible. Hence, there is a need to intervene and break up the 
dominance of the Big Four in order to support smaller audit companies. Nevertheless, it is 
questionable whether mandatory external rotation is an appropriate measure to reach this 
objective. Aside from some opinions that see a positive intervening process between external 
rotation and market diversification, the arguments against a positive relationship between 
‘1C’ outweigh. The missing competences and capacities of the non-Big Four, and the 
statistics about the direction of change in case of an auditor change indicate that the external 
rotation will lead to an increased market concentration at the expense of non-Big Four audit 
firms. Consequently, it seems that the EC’s argumentation for implementing mandatory 
external rotation is not in line with its intended objective of a more dynamic audit market. The 
following years will reveal if the contrary to EC’s intentions is reached, but so far the 
statistics lead to the assumption that an increased market concentration might be the result. 
Furthermore, the analysis reveals that there might be a negative side effect on the cross-border 
provision of statutory audits due to the options regarding mandatory external rotation. A 
negative impact on the authority of the audit committee cannot be ruled out.  
When implementing these findings into the analytical framework, the following figure 
emerges.  
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Figure 5.3 - Findings of External Rotation Implemented into the Analytical Framework (Own 
Representation) 
5.3 Impact of Prohibition of Specific Non-Audit Services 
and the Limitation of Non-Audit Fees on the 
Corresponding Objectives 
The prohibition of NAS and the NAS fee limit is to some extent already integrated in the 
German commercial code (HGB). Therefore, this chapter begins by discussing the changes 
occurring in Germany through this measure and then continues to examine the intervening 
process between the measure and independence (process ‘2A’), and diversification (process 
‘2C’). As in section 5.2, side effects that are pointed out by the four groups examined in this 
paper in Germany (business media, academics, audit profession, and audit institutions), as 
well as those pointed out by the interviewees will be integrated into the discussion. 
 
 
 66 
 
5.3.1 Current NAS and Fee-Limit Rules in Germany 
Starting with the discussion on the prohibition of certain NAS (also referred to as “Blacklist”) 
and fee-limits of NAS, it is necessary to point out that the HGB already includes a prohibition 
of certain NAS and a fee limit in §319a HGB (see: Velte, 2014a; Boecker, Hartmann & 
Zwirner, 2013; Quick & Sattler, 2011). This paragraph was already added to the German 
Commercial Code in late 2004 in the course of the German Accounting Law Reform Act 
(Bilanzrechtsreformgesetz - BilReG) (BMJV BilReG, 2004). The BilReG enacts international 
accounting standards as well as “securing the quality of auditing” (BMJV BilReG, 2004, 
p.3166). The main restrictions of §319a HGB that lead to a prohibition of the auditor to audit 
a PIE are (own translation):  
§319a (1) No. 1: if the total amount of fees received by the auditor of one entity during 
the last five years exceed 15% of his total fee volume (networks where the entity holds 
more than 20% of shares are included)  
§319a (1) No. 2: if law or tax advisory services were conducted by the auditor to the 
entity that exceed design alternatives and that have a direct and not only essential 
impact on the presentation of the net assets, financial position and results of operations 
§319a (1) No. 3: if the auditor was engaged in designing, establishing and implementing 
an accounting system, provided that the task was not from minor significance 
§319a (1) No. 4: if the auditor has been responsible for the entity’s audit for more than 
seven years; this restriction does not apply if the auditor’s involvement was two or more 
years ago  
Expert 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 underline that these restrictions are already long implemented 
in Germany and that they do not see problems with NAS as long as no self-review takes 
place. Expert 6 points out that he finds it important in general to prohibit certain services. 
After stating the prohibitions of §319a HGB he continues that “implementing some kind of 
boundaries makes sense. I think that builds trust”. Overall, there seems to be quite a 
consensus that German laws of NAS regulation are appreciated and accepted.  
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Current Application: Total Volume Fee-Limit  
Therefore, following from §319a HGB, Germany already has a total volume fee limit of 15% 
and restrictions to some NAS. A difference in regard to the total volume fee limit is that in 
§319a (1) No. 1 HGB the fee limit is set for five years, whereas the regulation sets it for three 
years (Regulation (EU) 537/2014, p.L158/86). Important to notice is, however, that the EU 
regulation does not strictly forbid the audit if this volume limit is exceeded, in contrast to 
German law. It is stated that if fees exceed the limit, the audit committee needs to be notified 
and informed about the auditor’s “threat to independence and safeguards applied” (Regulation 
(EU) 537/2014, p.L158/86). The audit committee can then decide to continue the engagement 
with that auditor for a maximum duration of two more years (Regulation (EU) 537/2014, 
p.L158/86). Consequently, the measure of total volume fee-limit cannot lead to significant 
changes in Germany as the EU regulation only introduces a shortened time frame (from five 
to three years), but with the possibility to extend this time span to five years.  
Current Application: Prohibition of NAS 
In regard to the restrictions of NAS, the EU’s Blacklist includes, for example, all tax services. 
However, it is according to Article 5 of the regulation a Member States option to permit 
services from the blacklist if requirements (e.g. immaterial effects) apply (Regulation (EU) 
537/2014, p.L158/87). The BMJV, the German ministry which will implement the regulation 
into German law, published the regulatory draft for the German implementation of the 
regulation on 23rd of March 2015 (called AReG RefE). As anticipated by the business media, 
academics and the audit profession (see: Betriebs Berater, 2014; Velte, 2014a; Der Betrieb, 
2015; KPMG, 2014a), the AReG RefE suggests only minor changes to §319a HGB (BMJV, 
2015) which implies that the current German regulation of NAS and total volume fee limit 
will continue. Even though the impact of this measure is arguably limited in Germany, it is a 
highly discussed measure in the German audit environment (all four groups discussed this 
measure intensively) and will hence be included in the discussion of the intervening 
processes.  
Current Application: NAS Fee-Limit 
The limitation of the total NAS fees to “no more than 70 % of the average of the fees paid in 
the last three consecutive financial years for the statutory audit(s)” (Regulation (EU) 
537/2014, p.L158/85) is new to German law. However, this limit is quite high for current 
German customs and hence, might lead to an increase of NAS provided by the entity’s auditor 
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(Betriebs Berater, 2014). The board’s spokesman of PwC Mr. Winkeljohann points out that he 
“finds this number [70%] quite interesting. It is an unwritten rule for DAX30 companies that 
non-audit services should not exceed 30%” (Wadewitz, 2013b, p.10). The business media also 
points out that the regulation restricts the NAS fee limit for consecutive years only (Betriebs 
Berater, 2014). This is perceived by the business media as a regulation gap, as the volume 
limit is not applicable if NAS are not received by an entity for one year and continues 
afterwards, possibly even above 70% (Betriebs Berater, 2014). Even though this measure 
appears to be majorly different to current customs in Germany, it is only rudimentarily 
discussed by the four groups in the German audit environment. Expert 3, nevertheless, points 
out that “now you have these 70%. The 70% can be exceeded in a two-year time frame. The 
Problem now is that there is no cap of how much you can exceed it, such as capping it to 
100%. This can then result in a major disproportion even though you have this measure”. He 
thus concludes that despite the measure’s novelty to Germany this part of the measure is quite 
questionable in its impact. 
German Audit Market Fee Distribution  
In order to discuss possible impacts of the measure onto the objectives, it is necessary to state 
briefly German audit firms’ income distribution. A study published in 2013 by the WPK 
(German Chamber of Public Accountants) (WPK, 2013) split the fee distribution of PIE 
mandates into audit fees, other assurance services, tax advisory services and other services 
(Figure 5.4). The following numbers refer to that study. The Big Four and BDO distribution 
for 2013 consists of 55% audit fees, 23% other assurance services, 6% tax advisory services, 
and 16% other services. For this group the comparison between 2011 and 2013 shows a slight 
decrease of audit fees of 3 percentage points since 2011. Contrary, fees of “The Next 10 
Networks” (and “remaining small audit firms”) are distributed as follows for 2013: 78% 
(77%) audit fees, 6% (7%) other assurance, 5% (8%) tax advisory, and 11% (8%) other 
services. The audit fee amount for the “Next 10 Network” has increased since 2011 from 72% 
to 78% in 2013 which demonstrates that the already major share of audit fees in that size of 
audit companies seems to increase further.  
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Figure 5.4 - Fee Distribution of PIE Mandates in Germany 2013 (WPK, 2013, p.10) 
5.3.2 Effects on Independence (‘2A’) 
The coding of the reviewed documents for this intervening process has pointed to four 
different categories of arguments. Two of them, “increased independence in appearance” and 
“increased independence in mind” can be classified as supporting the aim of this intervening 
process. The others argue against a positive correlation.  
Increased Independence in Appearance  
A positive correlation between the measure and independence in appearance is identified by 
academic sources (see: Quick & Warming-Rasmussen, 2009; Tepalagul & Lin, 2015), 
German auditing institutions (see: WPK, 2012; Gschrei & Luxi, 2015) and the business media 
(Dobler, Dobler & Fichtl, 2013). Their argumentation reveals one major consensus. 
Independence in appearance is perceived and proven by studies from academics to increase 
with the restriction of NAS for the stakeholder group of investors. Other stakeholders’ 
perceptions are not discussed.  
Some interviewees even supported an increased independence in appearance in general. 
Experts 1, 3, 5 and 9 state that NAS are important to keep in mind when it comes to 
independence in appearance. Expert 5 states that “independence in appearance is something 
we take seriously. If an outsider finds that we have less audit turnover from one mandate then 
advisory services, the outsider finds us to lack independence”. Nevertheless, these experts 
again point out that the current German regulations in §319a HGB are already a strong 
protection to independence in appearance. 
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As the discussion for this positive correlation is extensive it can, therefore, be argued that the 
measure, in general, can increase independence in appearance, but mainly as perceived by 
shareholders.  
Increased Independence in Mind 
One academic study “examining financially stressed manufacturing companies for the period 
2005-2009” found that in the German market there is no evidence that “auditors are less 
independent when the level of non-audit fees is high in general, although there is some 
evidence of such impairment when a Big Four audit firm receives relatively high non-audit 
fees from a client in extreme financial distress” (Ratzinger-Sakel, 2013, p.154, 155). The 
proxy used in this study to examine auditors’ independence was going-concern adaptions 
issued by the auditors or audit firms. Consequently, this study supports the claim of the EC 
that companies that are in critical financial situations (like during the financial crisis) do not 
receive fully independent going concern examinations. Nevertheless, this study is the only 
one which points into this direction and should, therefore, be acknowledged but not 
overemphasized.  
Expert 3 supports the EC’s argument that the prohibition of NAS can increase independence 
in mind with the following line of argumentation: “advisory services generate high income. 
High income means it hurts to lose the mandate. This threatens the independence in mind 
when you find something during your audit, but you simultaneously have in mind how 
important this mandate is for you. The danger that the auditor lets something pass in the audit 
because of this cannot be denied.”  
No Impact on Independence in Mind  
Two German Institutions argue against a positive correlation between NAS and 
independence, namely the German Chamber of Public Accountants (WPK, 2010) and the 
German Institute of Public Auditors (IDW, 2010). Their main argument is the missing 
evidence of a negative correlation between NAS and auditor independence thus far. It is 
necessary to mention, that both the WPK and the IDW represent the interests of the profession 
and it can be argued that especially the Big Four have an impact on this institute. Hence, a 
biased opinion towards them is possible. 
Furthermore, an academic study from Quick and Warming-Rasmussen (2009) finds that 
“against expectations derived from theory, the majority of studies on the effect of the 
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provision of non-audit advisory services (NAS) to an audit client failed to find a negative 
impact on independence in mind” (p.142). Even though the study supports questioning the 
intervening process in regard to independence in mind, it is necessary to stress that Quick and 
Rasmussen (2009) come to their conclusion because the “majority” of studies show no 
correlation. Expert 1 echoes Quick and Rasmussen (2009) as she points out that from an 
academic point of view the correlation is difficult to assess as studies can only find mixed 
evidence to this correlation. She continues to state though that theoretically it should improve 
independence. Nevertheless, the above implies that some studies have found a negative 
correlation. Expert 3, 4, 5 and 7 further underline that there are no studies so far that have 
found conclusive results to this correlation. 
As the analysis finds inconclusive opinions and findings in regard to independence in mind, 
this paper regards this intervening process as possible but not proven and questions whether 
regulation that cannot be fully justified is reasonable.  
Volume Fee-Limit of §319a HGB Is Sufficient  
Two sources argue that the volume fee limit in Germany is efficient enough and that 
consequently financial independence should not be regulated further by NAS restrictions. 
Firstly, the IDW (2012) points out that the regulation in §319a HGB with 15% volume fee-
limits have proven to be sufficient and effective in Germany. This is echoed and justified in 
the second source. The academic study by Quick and Sattler (2011) finds the volume 
restrictions in §319a HGB to be effective for fostering independence.  
As pointed out above, the experts’ opinion generally support the regulations of §319a HGB. It 
was however found in the interviews that expert 3 and 8 question the logic of strict percentage 
limits. Expert 8 states “it is always difficult to assess how long you are independent and 
where you start to be financially dependent from a mandate. Is it really 15% or is it higher? 
Overall though, it remains that there is no way to prove that these percentages actually 
improve independence”. 
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5.3.3 Side effect on a Clarified Societal Role (Quality) (‘2B’) 
Even though chapter four does not identify ‘2B’ as an intervening process, the analysis shows 
that this correlation is discussed intensively and is, therefore, relevant for the program 
evaluation.   
Correlation between Specialized Knowledge, Costs and Audit Quality  
These three factors are heavily intertwined according to the examined literature, academics, 
and German institutions as they argue for a correlation of NAS, costs and audit quality. Quick 
and Warming-Rasmussen (2009) state that “it can be assumed that knowledge spillovers from 
consulting services are not used to increase audit quality but to reduce audit costs” (p.155). 
Therefore, these authors do not see a positive correlation between NAS and audit quality. 
Contrary to that, Velte (2014a) argued before the regulatory draft of the BMJV that it is 
reasonable that the German regulator most likely will allow NAS as currently allowed “since 
the significant synergy effects can lead to an empowerment of audit quality” (p.247). Hence, 
Velte (2014a) argues for a positive correlation between NAS and audit quality which is 
supported by another academic who states “increase in quality through the prohibition of 
NAS? Doubtful, more likely to expect quite the opposite” (Hennrichs, 2013, p.9).  
The two German institutions WPK and IDW argue similarly. The WPK points out that “NAS 
are fundamental to allow [for] the generation and preservation of specialized knowledge 
which is inevitably for the audit” (WPK, 2010, p.6). Therefore, it is necessary to keep up the 
multi-disciplinary functioning of audit firms (WPK, 2010, p.30). The IDW further stresses 
that banning certain NAS (especially tax services) would be “factually not justifiable, hostile 
to mid-tier companies and disproportionally” (IDW, 2012, p.11). This is because the IDW is 
also convinced that the specialized knowledge gained through advisory tasks is necessary for 
audits and would increase costs for companies if prohibited (IDW, 2012). Moreover, the IDW 
misses proof of a decrease in audit quality through NAS (IDW, 2012). Furthermore, the IDW 
points out that if companies are unwilling to pay increasing costs due to an increase in audit 
fees through intensified workload for auditors, audit quality will most likely decrease (IDW, 
2011c). This correlation between the prohibition of NAS, resulting in increased costs and 
decreased quality is echoed by the institute for mid-tier auditors. It is said that “fees are the 
most influential quality driver in auditing” and that it is necessary to uphold NAS in order to 
facilitate high-quality audits (Gschrei & Luxi, 2015, p.10).  
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Furthermore, the “Handelsblatt” a major business newspaper states that “the belief of Brussels 
that the separation of advisory and audit will simply result in increased audit quality is 
quixotic” (Fockenbrock, 2013, p.27). Pfitzer, an academic quoted in business media agrees 
with the Handelsblatt that the separation cannot be seen as the silver bullet to audit quality 
and underpins that there is “no evidence that NAS have triggered or fostered the financial 
crisis” (Pfitzer, 2012, p.929).  
Expert 6 points out that “we see that our customers struggle with this question, [separating 
NAS and audit] as they know that the knowledge and know-how of the auditor regarding their 
company is valuable”. Expert 8 echoes this by stating “prohibiting NAS in general just does 
not make sense, you know the company so well that you are able to give qualitative high 
advice … as long as you stick to the prohibition of self-review I do not see why an auditor 
should not give advice”. Contrary to these experts which stress the improvement of quality 
through auditor’s advice, expert 3 points out that “we are not talking about mid-tier 
companies here, we are talking about PIEs and for them it might be that you have to block out 
certain advantageous”.  
One source of academics points out that, “the evidence regarding actual audit quality suggests 
… [that] tax-related NAS actually improve audit quality” (Tepalagul & Lin, 2015, p.112). 
This appears to be echoed by the BMJV as the German regulatory draft continues to permit 
the provision of tax services by arguing that this permission will “improve audit quality” 
(BMJV, 2015, p.19). This is emphasized as well by expert 6 who states “if Germany 
implements the option to allow tax services of the auditor, I think they are choosing right.” It 
is, therefore, possible to see a positive correlation between NAS, in specific tax services, and 
audit quality in Germany. This might however be due to the difficult tax system prevailing in 
Germany and the necessity of advice for companies. 
Nevertheless, the discussion points out that there is the possibility that restricting NAS might 
result in a decline of audit quality.  
NAS and the Effect on Societal Role of Auditor Depend on Company Characteristic  
Deloitte (2012b) states that “in many cases audit clients, particularly smaller companies, value 
the efficiency and effectiveness of appropriate NAS being provided by the auditor” (p.5). This 
is echoed by another source in the group of academics. Dobler (2014) examines NAS 
provided by auditors to family owned businesses, both listed and private, and stresses the role 
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of the auditor in these businesses. Dobler (2014) finds “support for reciprocal knowledge 
spillovers between the services” and that “comparative findings suggest that key threats and 
benefits of jointly provided services are more prevalent among private than among listed 
family firms” (p.427). These arguments imply two things. Firstly, in family owned 
businesses, which are an important business form in Germany, auditors are not only mandated 
for auditing services but also for advisory services. Secondly, the threats and benefits of NAS 
are more prevalent in private companies, which are mainly smaller companies. A threat to 
society or the need to clarify the role of auditors can hence not be found for PIEs. This is an 
interesting finding of Dobler, as the measure only applies for PIEs.  
5.3.4 Effects on Market Diversification (‘2C’) 
The analysis of the literature for this intervening process was in comparison to the above-
discussed correlation fewer and focused on two arguments only. Furthermore, it has been 
found that no supporting documentation of this intervening process could be found.  
Increased Market Concentration by Volume Fee-Limit  
One academic and one German institution argue that the volume fee limit of 15% increases 
the concentration in the audit market. The academics Quick and Sattler (2011) find that 
independence and diversification are two conflicting objectives as their study concludes that 
the total volume fee-limit increases concentration. The WPK (2012) echoes this by stating 
that the volume fee-limit prohibits market-entry. According to the WPK, market-entry is not 
possible for auditors and audit companies if they try to establish themselves in the PIE 
market. The WPK (2012) states that if smaller and mid-tier audit companies would take over 
fee-heavy mandates it would result in an exceeded volume fee-limit due to their overall lower 
fee volume compared to Big Four overall fee volumes. Hence, the WPK (2012) argues that an 
increase in concentration can be the result of volume fee-limits, which is echoed by expert 8 
who claims that “the 15% limit is especially a problem for small audit firms and the limit 
could negatively affect their competitiveness”. They question, therefore, the volume fee limit 
as a measure due to the negative impacts on market diversification. 
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Shift from Auditing to Advisory 
The argument that the prohibition of NAS and NAS fee-limits might lead to a shift from 
auditing activities to a focus on advisory activities is supported by all stakeholder groups 
(Quick & Sattler, 2011; Manager Magazin, 2015; Betriebs Berater, 2014; Börsen Zeitung, 
2013; IDW, 2011c). They argue that the prohibition of NAS and the NAS fee limit will not be 
a significant problem for audit firms. It might, however, trigger a shift away from auditing 
into the more lucrative advisory services due to the NAS fee limit when providing NAS and 
audit services simultaneously. However, since the audit business represents the entrance into 
the more lucrative consulting business, Wadewitz (2014) does not believe that statutory audit 
services will be reduced.  
Interesting is the argumentation stated in the interview with the PwC board spokesman. He 
firstly says “auditing is and will be the core business for PwC” and continues with “PwC 
internally prepares for the impact of the regulation. We are expanding for example our 
business consultancy unit” (Börsen Zeitung, 2013, p.10). He, therefore, acknowledges that 
PwC internally changes its strategy. It is, hence, argued that a shift from auditing to 
consulting services might lead to an increase in market concentration (Betriebs Berater Heft, 
2014; IDW, 2011c).  
This shift towards consulting services might also influence the willingness to take-over 
mandates of other Big Four companies when the maximum rotation period is reached. Even 
though the direction of change when rotating the audit company, the displacement of mid-tier 
audit companies and the missing capacities of smaller mid-tier audit companies indicate that 
the Big Four have the possibility to take over a lot of mandates, it is also important to 
consider the willingness of the other Big Four companies to take over the mandates.  
Due to the NAS fee limit when providing NAS and audit services simultaneously, it might be 
more profitable for audit companies to provide just the more lucrative NAS services instead 
of statutory audits. However, since the audit business represents the entrance into a lucrative 
consulting business, any other Big Four company will replace the prior Big Four company 
when the limit on the engagement period is reached (Wadewitz, 2014). Consequently, 
Wadewitz identifies a willingness to take over the mandate of another Big Four company. 
Expert 5 and 6 further claim that their companies do not consider denying auditing and if the 
client asks for auditing services they will not reject this demand even though they might have 
a more remunerative consulting mandate as it is against their client policy. Noticeable though, 
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these two experts are both management board members of Big Four companies, which should 
be kept in mind when following their line of thought. Contrary, during an unofficial 
conversation a partner from one Big Four company claimed that he believes it is questionable 
if one Big Four really wants to take over the mandate of another Big Four company if in 
return the big consulting revenues are lost due to the cap on NAS fees. Similarly, expert 7 and 
8 also expect that in the future the Big Four will reduce their auditing services dramatically 
and focus more on consulting, because it is more profitable.  
5.3.5 Side Effect on Cross Border Provision (‘2D’) 
Ruhnke (2014) points out further that the prohibition of certain NAS such as tax and due 
diligence services are options and subject to Member States decisions. Consequently, in his 
opinion the measure of prohibition of NAS is majorly obstructing a “coherent regulation in 
the EU” (Ruhnke, 2014). 
5.3.6 Implementing the Findings into the Analytical Framework 
These findings show how difficult and ambiguous the prohibition of NAS and NAS fee limits 
is in regard to an increase in quality. It might hence be possible to understand the German 
regulator in its decision to not change customs in a fundamental way.  
Overall, the analysis shows that for this measure, major changes will not occur as current 
German regulations (especially § 319a HGB) already include features of the measure. On the 
one hand, the analysis demonstrates that the measure might increase independence in 
appearance; nevertheless, the findings for independence in mind are limited. On the other 
hand, the intervening process ‘2A’ is questionable as there is a legal gray zone, an intense 
discussion against independence in mind, and the introduced NAS fee limit is higher than 
current German customs.  
Furthermore, the analysis reveals a negative side effect on audit quality. Moreover, the 
intervening process ‘2C’ is limited in its impact due to the fact that the volume fee limit is 
argued to increase the audit market concentration and that a possible shift from auditing to 
advisory services is anticipated. Simultaneously, the discussion pinpoints a conflict between 
the objective to increase independence and reduce market concentration. Another side effect 
of this measure is the included options which hinder harmonization and hence, the objective 
of cross-border provision is negatively affected.  
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Figure 5.5 - Findings of Prohibition and CAP of NAS Implemented into the Analytical Framework 
(Own Representation) 
5.4 Impact of the Enhanced Role of the Audit Committee 
of PIEs on the Corresponding Objectives 
While coding the documents and interviews for this measure, the authors found that the 
treatment of this measure is different to the two preceding ones. Firstly, while discussing 
independence it was found that the discussed independence cannot be linked to objective A as 
not the independence of auditors is discussed but the audit committee’s independence. 
Secondly, more than half of the statements sorted to this measure during the coding of the 
documents and statements from the interviews did not discuss the intervening processes itself 
but the measure in general. Even though, interviewees were specifically asked about 
intervening processes most did not address the question asked, but stated a more overarching 
view to this measure. Therefore, this section will follow this finding and emphasize the 
discussion of the measure itself as well, and then address the intervening processes and side 
effects were identified. Lastly, tendering, as already addressed in section 5.2, was discussed in 
connection with the audit committee as well. Since the coding is mutually exclusive and 
collectively exhaustive, only tendering arguments that were directly linked to the audit 
committee were coded into this section, which results in a quite brief discussion. 
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5.4.1 Discussion of the Measure Itself 
Support for the Enhancement of the Audit Committee  
This coding section is quite distinct as it was found that the documents and interviewees 
support this measure. It was revealed that a general support for an enhanced role of audit 
committees can be found in the business media (Velte, 2014a; Velte, 2014b; Fockenbrock, 
2013; Wadewitz 2013b), announcements of German Institutions (IDW, 2011c; WPK, 2010; 
WPK, 2012; IDW 2010; IDW 2011b), and the German audit profession (Buhleier, C., 
Niehues, M. & Splinter, S., 2014a; KPMG, 2014b). Furthermore, expert 1, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 9 
also support this measure.  
Another argument occurring in regard to this measure is pointed out by the IDW. The IDW 
(2011a) states that it is already German law, that if a supervisory board exists the auditor is 
appointed by them (if not by the shareholders) and the management can assist the supervisory 
board but cannot decide in this process. Nevertheless, expert 6 (who is generally supporting 
an empowerment of the audit committee) notes that negotiations with the auditor are often 
delegated to management, and that therefore measures may need to be taken to ensure that 
audit committees take full responsibility. Consequently, this might point out that even though 
legal requirements in regard to the appointment of auditors are in place, there is space for 
improvement of the power of the audit committee in Germany, which bridges to the next line 
of arguments.  
Assembly of the Audit Committee - the ‘Financial Expert’  
In regard to the so-called ‘financial expert’ necessary to be included in the audit committee, 
the general opinion is welcoming. More importantly though, is the discussion of what this 
expert actually is and if it constitutes an improvement in Germany.  
The business media (Velte, 2014a; Velte, 2014b; Der Betrieb, 2015; Der Aufsichtsrat, 2014b), 
academics (Buhleier, Niehaus & Splinter, 2014a &2014b), and the interviewees (experts 1, 3, 
5, 6, 7, 8, 9) argue that it is by all means necessary to have members in the audit committee 
that have an understanding of accounting and auditing in order to facilitate constructive work 
between the auditor and them. Expert 6 points out that “financial experts should be clearly 
and narrowly defined”. Expert 3 adds that “when you look at the scandal of the 
Hypovereinsbank and check the audit committee, then the scandal is no surprise as I really 
find these people there good-for-nothing”. Expert 5 on the other side sees no necessity to 
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impose a ‘financial expert’ for DAX30 companies as this currently is “no problem there”. 
Nevertheless, he says that “the other 130 companies in the DAX have quite a different 
situation”. 
Included in the discussion of the ‘financial expert’ is the missing definition of what a 
‘financial expert’ actually is, which seems to weaken this measure. Therefore, it is 
acknowledged that the planned two ‘financial experts’ would have been an improvement to 
the measure, but one ‘financial expert’ cannot improve this problem (Velte, 2014a; Buhleier, 
Niehues & Splinter, 2014b). Furthermore, the independence of the audit committee is 
discussed as well. Directive 2014/56/EU does not connect independence of the board of 
management specifically to the ‘financial expert’ but only to the majority of the members of 
the audit committee. Der Betrieb (2015), therefore, points out, that, even though, this member 
with adequate knowledge of the audit process is extremely important, the directive opens up 
the possibility that this crucial member is not independent.  
Furthermore, the directive includes the option that Member States can ban the independence 
requirement applicable for the majority of the audit committee if all audit committee members 
are simultaneously supervisory board members (Velte, 2014a). For Velte (2014a) this 
included Member State option is the main problem of this measure because the independence 
is not guaranteed anymore. This option is implemented in the AReG-RefE (BMJV, 2015) and 
will hence be implemented into German law. Moreover, as pointed out by Velte (2014a) and 
Der Betrieb (2015), there is no general obligation for PIEs to have an audit committee at all 
due to the German dual system. This implies that the independence requirement is obsolete 
and will have no impact in Germany.  
Consequently, it is possible to conclude that this measure is highly appreciated in the German 
environment but the implemented regulations are not perceived or anticipated as an 
improvement. 
5.4.2 Effects on Reinforced Independence (‘3A’) 
Neither the examined literature nor the interviewees argue for or against the intervening 
process of the audit committee having a direct impact on independence. It was not found 
during the coding process that the audit committee contributes by reducing the conflict of 
interest of auditors as argued by the EC and hence, increases independence of audits (chapter 
4).  
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5.4.3 Effects on a Clarified Societal Role (‘3B’)  
Increased Information Exchange Is Questionable 
As the EC argues that an increased communication between the audit committee and the 
auditor leads to an increased audit quality, the arguments that discussed this ‘dialog’ or 
‘information exchange’ were coded into this section. 
Both, the IDW (2011a) and Deloitte (2012a) express their persuasion that an increased role of 
the audit committee will, through an extensive dialog or “increased, two-way 
communication” (Deloitte, 2012a, p.5), increase audit quality. Expert 7 points out that he sees 
an increased communication implemented through the audit reform. Expert 1 sees the new 
regulation to “impose pressure on the audit committee or the supervisory board”, if no audit 
committee is necessary. She finds that before the audit reform the audit committee or the 
supervisory board often acted by “what I don’t understand, I cannot judge”. Due to the shift 
from oral to written communication this excuse is not possible anymore. Expert 6 finds the 
dialog between the auditor and audit committee to be “very valuable”. Nevertheless, he points 
out that the discussions that are actually taking place thus far are more concerned with audit 
fees and less with audit quality. For him, the audit committee takes audit quality often for 
granted and unrelated to the level of audit fees. Whether or not the audit reform can contribute 
to this dialog is not clear though.  
On the contrary, there is a consensus that in the case of Germany an enhanced role as aimed at 
with the audit reform is somehow already in place. The WPK (2012) points out that the 
“German Corporate Governance Codex already includes principles which ensure an intensive 
and regular communication between the auditor and the audit committee” (p.36). This is 
echoed by Velte (2014a), who points out that the oral report of the auditor to the audit 
committee which is supposed to cover the most important issues during the audit, is already 
implemented in Germany. This is regulated in §171 (1) of the Stock Corporation Act (ActG) 
in Germany, as the auditor has to attend the annual balance sheet meeting with the 
management board and the supervisory board (Velte, 2014a).  
Furthermore, the implemented long form report to the audit committee is said to be a “novelty 
on EU level”, not however in Germany (KPMG, 2014a). This is due to §321 HGB, which 
already imposes such a report with quite specific requirements such as that §321 no.3 HGB 
requires the auditor to state his opinion whether or not the internal monitoring systems need 
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improvement. This report is, according to §321 no. 5 HGB, supposed to be handed over to the 
legal representatives of the company. If the company has a supervisory board, which 
appointed the auditor, the report has to be handed over to them but allowing the board of 
management to state their opinion before it is sent out (§321 no.5 HGB). Therefore, there is 
agreement that this part of the measure will not implement major changes in Germany. 
Expectation Gap Cannot Be Closed  
Furthermore, it is questionable if the goal of a reduced expectation gap is addressed properly 
by the audit reform. The EC claims to close the expectation gap by increasing information to 
external parties. “Even though content to the audit opinion is added, the most important 
information (auditor’s decisions on materiality or a discussion of the auditor regarding 
findings that question the future of the company) is only given to the audit committee. As this 
information is not provided to external addressees the expectation gap cannot be reduced” 
(Ruhnke, 2014, p.10).  
Since the external report of the auditor has not been changed in a fashion that would allow 
more information for outsiders or shareholders, expert 6 concludes that “there are necessary 
topics such as the modification of the audit opinion, those are however, in my opinion, more 
attempts than real achievements”. When asking expert 5 whether the measure can increase 
audit quality he answered, “no, this regulation only hinders the supervisory board to do their 
work”. Expert 1 agrees as she cannot find anything in the directive or the regulation to close 
the expectation gap from a German perspective. Even though there was very little discussion 
on this topic, the measure seems however questionable.  
5.4.4 Effects on Market Diversification (‘3C’) 
Tendering Will Increase Diversification  
Two experts support the EC’s argumentation that the tendering process will help to reduce the 
market concentration. Expert 3 says, “I see a change through the tendering, not because of the 
tendering itself but because the audit committee has to hand over their recommendation to the 
supervisory board. Therefore, they have to justify their recommendation which in my opinion 
will help that the mid-tier firms will at least get a chance due to a thorough look of the audit 
committee and thus gain a foothold”. Expert 9 echoes this as he finds that “the audit 
committee now has a crucial role in the tendering process due to their recommendations to the 
shareholder’s meeting and, therefore, they contribute to a more dynamic market”. 
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Tendering Is Not Able to Increase Diversification  
Even though two experts see potential in the tendering process through the audit committee, 
the coding of the critical arguments resulted in a distinctively larger amount of arguments.  
Expert 4 formulates it quite neutrally and states that “it is not possible to see an impact 
through this measure on the audit profession at this time”. KPMG (2014b) points out that 
“supervisory board and audit committee have to give thoughts to the audit execution before 
the actual tendering takes place, this however, is supposed to take place without any advice of 
the auditor” (p.5). However, especially this advice is needed as in-depth knowledge from the 
auditor is necessary to conduct a tendering (expert 1, 3 and 7). When considering the above 
arguments about the existing expertise in audit committees or supervisory boards this remark 
appears quite important and questions the ability of the audit committee to actually fulfill this 
requirement.  
Furthermore, Hennrichs (2014) is convinced more concentration in the market can be 
expected, as “mid-tier audit companies will not participate at all in a tendering process for 
major corporations”. Even though, the audit committee during the tendering process is 
supposed to include mid-tier firms, Kaindl (2014) and experts 1, 5, 8, and 9 are convinced that 
this measure will not change anything in regard to major corporations. Their argument is that, 
even though, the audit committee should include mid-tier firms in the tendering process they 
are simply not able to audit complex companies due to their missing network and know-how. 
Furthermore, expert 5 claims that mid-tier audit companies will only be included in the 
selection process to fulfill legal requirements, and not because they have a real chance to audit 
major corporations. Both expert 8 and 9, point out during this discussion that there is no one 
besides the Big Four that can really handle an audit of the Deutsche Bank, expert 5 states the 
Volkswagen AG as such an example. 
Overall, there seems to be quite a consensus that in the market of major corporations, nothing 
will change in regard to the effects of an enhanced audit committee on the market 
concentration of the Big Four. Expert 9 actually points out that “besides the fact that mid-tier 
companies cannot audit the Deutsche Bank, this would not impact audit quality in a positive 
way. That is quite a dilemma that you get. You want to increase the market diversity with an 
enhanced audit committee, but you have to watch out for the audit quality with this attempt”.  
He, therefore, underpins the question whether regulation aiming at a market diversification 
can actually be welcoming when audit quality might be weakened in exchange.   
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Nevertheless, this weak intervening process ‘3C’ can only be applied to major corporations. 
How and if changes occur in a size segment underneath those is not clear. 
5.4.5 Effects of EU and National Oversight Coupled with the Enhanced Audit 
Committee  
It is further argued that the enhanced role of the audit committee together with the 
strengthened national oversight might positively increase audit quality. Since this argument 
was mentioned when asking for the effect of the enhanced audit committee on audit quality, 
the authors argue that this argument should be discussed in this section because it indicates 
that the audit committee itself possibly will not bring about change on the objective of quality. 
Expert 8 points out the following:  
The audit committee or the supervisory board needs to have expert knowledge 
which has already been the case since BilMoG [major accounting reform in 
Germany in 2009]. But what I think is important to know is that they have now 
true responsibilities towards the oversight, to show that they comply with the 
procedures. This is a major improvement. They have to state how they have 
assessed the quality of the audit and that the corporation between auditor and audit 
committee meets the requirements and facilitates an orderly financial accounting. 
Also, by explaining this procedure as well to the shareholder’s meeting the 
commitment of the audit committee will probably increase. Therefore, I hope, the 
audit committee and the auditor will truly increase their communication, which 
will increase audit quality. For sure. 
Expert 1 echoes this dual measure impact on quality as he argues that now a certain liability, 
due to the formal expectations to the oversight, has been imposed on the audit committee, 
which in turn increases audit quality. 
These experts point out that even though the audit committee alone might not be able to 
increase audit quality, it seems that the simultaneous increase of oversight might trigger this 
impact.  
5.4.6 Implementing the Findings into the Analytical Framework 
Overall, there is strong support for the measure as such. Nevertheless, for the case of 
Germany, the laws that are already in place seem to weaken the impact of the audit reform. 
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Furthermore, the missing definition of the ‘financial expert’ is perceived as a major problem 
of this measure, even though this part of the measure is welcomed as well. 
The intervening process ‘3A’ cannot be discussed as the document analysis, as well as the 
interviewees, do not address this objective.  
The intervening process ‘3B’ on the other hand, is faced with support and criticism. Support 
because it is argued that an increase in communication is important and welcomed. Criticism 
is raised because the current German rules hinder real changes in Germany. Furthermore, it 
was found that the measure of oversight coupled with the enhanced audit committee can 
contribute to an increase in audit quality. Nevertheless, the main problems to achieve this 
enhancement are the German laws that are in place already. Especially the expectation gap is 
argued not to be addressed by this measure.  
Lastly, the intervening process ‘3C’ finds no support, as it is argued that the audit committee 
cannot help to diversify the market. As pointed out by expert 9 the main problem with this 
measure in regard to objective C is the negative side effect on quality.   
The implemented findings of this section result in the following graph.  
 
Figure 5.6 - Findings of the Enhanced Audit Committee Implemented into the Analytical Framework 
(Own Representation) 
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5.5 Impact of the Strengthened Public Oversight 
Authorities on the Corresponding Objectives 
The strengthening of the public oversight is another measure which is expected to impact the 
German audit market. Regarding the analysis of this measure it is important to consider that 
there are two levels on which the oversight of auditors shall be enhanced. On the one hand, 
the Directive 2014/56/EU establishes uniform requirements which shall strengthen the public 
oversight authorities of the Member States and, on the other hand, the public oversight shall 
be increased on an EU level. Under the overall measure ‘enhancing oversight at national and 
European level’ summarizes several measures, such as “the designation of a single competent 
authority to bear ultimate responsibility for the audit public oversight system” (EC, 2014b), 
the strengthened sanctioning regime and the establishment of the CEAOB.  
Since this study analyzes the reform from a German perspective, the focus of this section lies 
on the evaluation regarding the enhanced national oversight. Consequently, the enhanced 
European oversight is only addressed partly, with respect to the German stakeholders’ 
opinions on this issue. Therefore, the effects of this measure on independence are only 
discussed from a national point of view, while the facilitation of a cross-border provision is 
addressed only from a European perspective by considering the German stakeholders’ 
opinions. The other objectives are discussed in regard to both, the enhanced national and the 
European oversight.  
Due to the unique two-tier system of German oversight, consisting of the WPK and APAK as 
described in section 5.1, the determination of a competent authority in Germany is 
particularly notable. Therefore, this section starts with a discussion about the construction of 
the national oversight in Germany, before evaluating the measure’s effects on the objectives. 
5.5.1 Interpretation and Construction of the New National Oversight in 
Germany 
The discussion about the determination of a competent authority is accompanied by the 
question of whether it is necessary to change the current German oversight system. Expert 4, 
who is a representative of the WPK and expert 8 claim that the current system is effective and 
thus, there is no need for a reform. Furthermore, the WPK (2012) argues that there is no proof 
for a lack of effectiveness or efficiency of the current system and, therefore, it is not necessary 
to change the existing oversight system. Contrary to this, expert 9, who is the Head of 
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APAK’s Administration, identifies a need to reform the German oversight. He argues that “an 
enhancement of the oversight is necessary, since the competent authority should be not only 
responsible for the inspections, but also for direct and operative oversight of the auditors” 
(expert 9).  
Among the German audit profession, the German regulators, and institutions, there is a 
discussion which institution shall be granted the ultimate responsibility for the German audit 
oversight in the future. The BMWi will announce at the end of June 2015 who will be 
responsible, but thus far there are the following possibilities. Currently, the APAK already has 
the ultimate responsibility regarding all auditor oversight activities (APAK, 2015, Online). 
However, presently the APAK only has the right to instruct the WPK and has no direct 
authority over auditors as it lacks public authority (APAK, 2015, Online). Consequently, all 
experts confirm that the APAK as it exists now cannot fulfill the requirements of the 
Directive 2014/56/EU. Therefore, the possibilities are to transform the APAK into a public 
corporation, to create a new authority responsible for the public oversight in Germany or to 
integrate this task into an existing authority such as the BaFin or BMWi (Lenz, 2015).  
Whereas most interviewed experts predict that the APAK will be transferred from a 
commission to a public authority (expert 1, 3, 5, 8, 9; Giersberg, 2015), expert 7 and the 
German Institution for Mid-Tier Audit Companies have a very strong contradicting opinion 
(Verband für mittelständische Wirtschaftsprüfung, 2014b). Expert 7 claims that the APAK 
will definitively not be responsible, as the transformation into a new authority is too 
expensive and hence, he argues to integrate the oversight of auditors in Germany into an 
existing authority. This is supported by Wittsiepe (2015) and the German Institution for Mid-
Tier Audit Companies (Verband für mittelständische Wirtschaftsprüfung, 2014b) as they 
claim that the APAK is not a public authority and does not fulfil the conditions set out by the 
Directive 2014/56/EU regarding the professional requirements of its members. To summarize, 
it is not yet clear who will be responsible for oversight in Germany and the BMWi’s decision 
is necessary to clarify this aspect of the reform. It is recognizable that personal interests, 
especially of the affected institutions, such as the WPK and the APAK, but also of the 
German Institution for Mid-Tier Audit Companies, guide this power play. The German 
Institution for Mid-Tier Audit Companies has a severe interest that not a renewed APAK will 
be responsible for the oversight, as the institution expects to receive more sympathies when 
an authority is established within the ministries (expert 3).  
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5.5.2 Effects on Independence (‘4A’) 
Independence from the Profession and Financial Independence 
The discussion about the designation of a single competent authority in Germany has its 
origin in the long lasting debate about the APAK’s alleged or de facto independence.  Even 
though the addressed independence does not refer to auditor independence, the authors 
decided to code these arguments into this level because the assurance of auditors’ 
independence requires an independent oversight (IDW, 2012).   
Especially the German Institution for Mid-Tier Audit Companies argues that the current 
German auditor oversight commission is not independent, because most of the APAK‘s 
members have a Big Four background and still receive pensions from the Big Four (Gschrei, 
2015). With this aspect in mind, the German Institution for Mid-Tier Audit Companies calls 
for a new staffing of the APAK, in case the APAK is in any form responsible for the 
oversight of German auditors in the future (Gschrei, 2015). Lenz (2015) also acknowledges 
that it is not only necessary to transfer the APAK into a public-law institution, but also to staff 
the oversight authority with full-time employees that are independent of the auditing 
profession. 
The German Institution for Auditors (IDW 2012; IDW, 2011a; IDW, 2010) also agrees that 
for the effective functioning of public auditor oversight, whose role is to secure independence, 
it is key that the oversight body itself is independent of the profession. This view is also 
shared by expert 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9 who further stress that remuneration must be attractive 
in order to secure a financial independence from the profession. Consequently, in their 
opinions the real independence of the oversight authority must be granted in order to evaluate 
the independence of auditors and audit companies.  
Contrary to this, expert 5 (a management board member of PwC) claims that the APAK is 
already the “most independent” commission as its members are voluntary individuals who are 
independent of the auditing profession. According to him, the discussion about the public 
oversight in Germany is just a “perception problem” and the restructuring of the oversight is a 
formal issue which contributes to a better comprehension of the German oversight system.  
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Professional Competences of the National Oversight Authority 
Aside from being independent, it is also essential that the oversight function is exerted by 
personnel who have sufficient expertise (Ollrog, 2015). Expert 1, 3, 6, 8 and 9 also stress that 
the professional competencies are key to the success of the oversight body. However, expert 8 
questions if the individuals with a background independent from the auditing profession are 
even able to assess the quality of audits. Consequently, it is a balancing act between the 
struggle of having independent individuals in the national oversight authority and having 
enough competence and knowledge to exert supervision.  
Increased National Oversight Leads to a Reinforcement of Independence 
For the evaluation of the audit reform, it is necessary to assess whether, according to the logic 
of the program, an increased national oversight can lead to more independence, as the EC 
argues. The balancing act between having enough competencies in the oversight body and 
being professionally and financially independent enough has to be coped with in order to 
follow the logic of a reinforced independence. While most of the analyzed documents and the 
interviewees do neither confess nor reject this intervening process, Gschrei (2015), the IDW 
(2011a) and expert 1 explicitly claim that increased audit oversight leads to more 
independence of the auditor from the auditee. However, whether this will be true can only be 
assessed after the implementation of the reform.  
5.5.3 Effects on a Clarified Societal Role (Quality) (‘4B’) 
Increased Competences on National Level 
The business journalist Giersberg (2015) argues that the audit reform enhances the oversight 
authority and consequently, the audit inspection reports will gain more importance when 
selecting an audit company, which leads to an increased audit quality. Expert 6 states that the 
enhancement of the national oversight will lead to a change of behavior of the auditors as it 
increases the auditor’s awareness that audit inspections might occur more often. This pressure 
might implicitly increase audit quality, but may also lead to more formalism and 
inefficiencies, as we see in the United States. Furthermore, expert 9 argues that the 
appointment of full-time personnel is a possible factor that increases audit quality, as financial 
self-interests are reduced. Expert 1 is also convinced of the positive intervening process ‘4B’. 
Contrary to this, the WPK (2010) argues that state authorities and supervision does not “per 
se” contribute to audit quality, instead the principle “substance over form” should be 
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applicable. However, by allowing that Member States can transfer tasks from the ultimate 
authority to already established structures, the audit reform follows this principle (WPK, 
2010). Furthermore, expert 3 questions the effect of enhanced national oversight on audit 
quality, as he believes that this measure will only increase the documentation of several 
processes and does not contribute to the understanding of the company, which would indeed 
improve audit quality.  
Overall, the document analysis and the interviews reveal that there is no complete rejection of 
the intervening process ‘1B’. At the moment though, it is difficult to predict whether the 
enhanced role of the national oversight will increase audit quality.  
Increased Competences and Know-How on EU Level 
Due to the audit reform the CEAOB is established which is responsible to “ensure effective 
coordination of supervision of audit firms operating across the EU” (EC, 2014b). According 
to the EC, the CEAOB also contributes to an improved audit quality. The analysis of the 
documents did not include statements regarding an evaluation of the establishment of the 
CEAOB. Nevertheless, this might be a result of the applied selection criteria as those were 
limited to Germany and the CEAOB was not specifically searched for. Nevertheless, as the 
interviewees addressed this aspect of the audit reform, the authors decided to include this 
discussion. Therefore, in the following, only the opinions of the interviewed experts are 
reflected.  
The experts 1, 2, 7 and 9 claim that the regulation is intensified and that the CEAOB will have 
know-how and competences which no institution had during the financial crisis. Hence, 
according to their point of view the increased know-how resulting from a better exchange of 
information and the improved competencies of the CEAOB can increase audit quality. Expert 
2 further argues that the CEAOB will coordinate the work among national oversight bodies in 
a way that the CEAOB offers support in the application and development of inspection 
methods which increases audit quality on a European level. According to expert 9, the 
increased dialog among different parties, leads to a strengthened understanding of different 
issues, which over time increases audit quality. This is justified for example by the Common 
Audit Inspection Methodology, which has been established within the European Audit 
Inspection Group (EAIG) (expert 9). Moreover, expert 1 and 9 argue that the exchange of 
experiences among the CEAOB will generate synergies, which might enhance audit quality.  
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5.5.4 Effects on Market Diversification (‘4C’) 
The EC further argues that by an increased monitoring of the market, the audit market will 
become more dynamic (EC, 2014b). However, Die Steuerberatung (2014), a business journal, 
argues that the extensive Member State options and the freedom of the states to organize the 
national oversight, “involve the risk that the interests of smaller and mid-tier” audit 
companies are not considered sufficiently. Therefore, it is important to actively involve 
smaller and mid-tier audit companies and institutions into the implementation process, since 
they are underrepresented most of the time (Die Steuerberatung, 2014).  
In contrast, it is positively perceived that the changes in the oversight favors a 
debureaucratization as a differentiation between small and big audit companies is made in 
regard to quality controls (Verband für mittelständische Wirtschaftsprüfung, 2014a; Expert 3; 
Expert 7; Expert 8). This implies that smaller audit firms are not subject to quality controls 
anymore. Consequently, this differentiation encourages smaller auditors to offer auditing 
services (Verband für mittelständische Wirtschaftsprüfung, 2014a).  
5.5.5 Effects on Cross-Border Provision (‘4D’) 
According to the EC’s logic, the enhanced European oversight will also positively affect the 
cross-border provision of auditing services, as harmonization and uniform monitoring 
increase due to this measure (Directive 2014/56/EU).  
Expert 8 expects that the enhanced European oversight, with the CEAOB, will contribute to a 
harmonization within Europe, even though a full harmonization will not be reached as each 
country has its own peculiarities. According to expert 8 the harmonization by the CEAOB is 
beneficial because an exchange of information will harmonize practical aspects such as “how 
to determine materiality, or which limits for materiality are used in practice?”  
Contrary to this, expert 3, the CEO of a small audit company, does not identify a need to 
harmonize the mid-tier sector, because smaller and mid-tier auditors will face language and 
legal barriers if they want to offer audits abroad. Furthermore, expert 3 indicates that 
harmonization is beneficial for bigger audit firms as it possibly reduces costs for them by 
providing the opportunity to exchange personnel in the company. However, expert 6 who is 
member of the management board of KPMG stresses that it is unrealistic to strive for 
excessive harmonization as “the national legislation is too inhomogeneous”. From his point of 
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view, cooperation among European countries via the CEAOB is useful, but national 
differences, in particular in corporate and business law, will in the forseeable future require 
that national personnel are responsible for the audit. Similarly, expert 2 argues that too much 
harmonization would possibly destroy effective national oversight structures, which explains 
why Germany will apply the option to maintain the responsibility distribution between the 
Federal Government and the federal states. Expert 9 also welcomes the coordination function 
which is attributed to the CEAOB, and he further perceives it positively that special 
requirements, such as the sanction system, are still organized nationally. Expert 5, a PwC 
management board member, supports the decision to keep the sanction system at national 
level, as it is necessary to limit harmonization in order to respect national differences. Overall 
it becomes visible that the interviewed experts appreciate the cooperation and coordination 
exerted by the CEAOB, but they clearly refuse extensive harmonization.  
5.5.6 Effects on Improved Supervision and Coordination (‘4E’) 
The EC also draws the conclusion that enhanced national and European oversight contributes 
to an improved supervision and coordination. This is certainly a statement which everybody 
would approve of. However, some conditions must be met in order for this equation to hold 
true.  
Conditions for Success On National Level 
As already discussed in section 5.5.3, the increased competences which will be assigned to 
the national oversight authority might enhance audit quality. This intervening process is 
explicitly acknowledged by the stakeholders and might implicitly contribute to an improved 
supervision. Nevertheless, some conditions must be fulfilled to guarantee the success of the 
enhanced national oversight.  
The IDW (2012), WPK (2015), as well as expert 1, 2 and 7, claim that the establishment of a 
new or renewed oversight system in Germany must secure that current oversight structures 
are changed sufficiently but not destroyed completely. Furthermore, the restructuring should 
not cause a loss of the functionality of the oversight, especially during the transition period 
(IDW, 2012; WPK, 2015, expert 2). On the one hand, when constructing a renewed oversight 
system, there is a risk that temporary legal loopholes evolve which must be avoided. On the 
other hand, duplicated examinations should be avoided which might arise when uncertainty 
about responsibilities exist among the involved parties (IDW, 2012; WPK, 2015, expert 2).  
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Exchange of Information between Member States through CEAOB  
According to the Regulation (EU) 537/2014), the exchange of information between Member 
States will foster coordination and cooperation among supervisory authorities of third 
countries.  Even though, an exchange of information among European audit authorities 
already exists, for example by means of the EAIG, expert 2, 5, 7 and 9 expect that exchange 
of information will increase and be more efficient due to the institutionalization of the 
exchange of information. Moreover, in comparison to the ESMA guidelines, expert 2 
perceives the cooperation by exchanging information among parties that are currently 
conducting the oversight as advantageous because over-regulation is avoided. The document 
analysis also points out that KPMG (2014b) “welcomes the creation of a new Committee of 
European Audit Oversight Bodies” as it “will contribute to promoting greater consistency in 
the EU … [and] greater transparency on broader systemic issues in the EU” (p.3).   
As stated above, the increased exchange of information, also contributes to a better know-how 
of the authorities and hence, improves audit quality while simultaneously harmonizing audits 
in Europe to a certain degree (expert 1, 2, 7, 8 and 9).  Consequently, the exchange of 
information not only contributes to an improved supervision and coordination, but also to 
audit quality and the facilitation of cross-border audit services.  
5.5.7 Implementing the Findings into the Analytical Framework 
Aside from the discussion about where the restructured oversight will be located within the 
German oversight system and the discussion about APAK’s independence in mind and 
appearance, all stakeholders agree that the financial and professional independence must be 
secured while simultaneously granting that the oversight body is equipped with sufficient 
expertise to conduct its function. If these conditions are met, the logic of the intervening 
process ‘4A’ can be affirmed; however, the future will demonstrate whether this is the case.  
Regarding the second objective, it must be stressed that the competences of the national 
oversight are increased which might lead to an increase in audit quality. Nevertheless, thus far 
it is difficult to estimate if the audit quality increases but the possibility to increase audit 
quality through this measure is given. On a European level, it is argued that the increased 
know-how resulting from a better exchange of information, and the improved competences of 
the CEAOB might increase audit quality.  
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Furthermore, the consideration of the interests of small and medium-sized audit companies 
and the debureaucratization in favor of the non-Big Four audit companies are necessary steps 
to facilitate a more dynamic audit market.  
The facilitation of cross-border provision of audit services which involves more 
harmonization among the countries of the EU is perceived with mixed feelings. On the one 
hand, the expected work of the CEAOB is appreciated which might lead to an increased 
exchange of useful, practical information. On the other hand, the stakeholders clearly oppose 
a full harmonization due to the national peculiarities of auditing.  
Moreover, it is argued that on a national level the increased competences of the oversight 
body might improve supervision if duplication of tasks among different bodies is avoided and 
the current national oversight structures are not completely destroyed. Additionally, the 
exchange of information will not only improve audit quality and the facilitation of cross-
border audit services, but also the supervision and coordination will be reinforced due to a 
more effective institutionalization. 
Overall, it becomes visible that even though other arguments than those published by the EC 
were identified, the logic of this measure and its connection to the objectives was affirmed. In 
contrast to the first three measures, the opinions of the stakeholders regarding the concept of 
enhanced oversight are more optimistic. Furthermore, in comparison to the measures 
discussed before, it is evident that this measure does not impact the objectives in a way that 
they become conflicting, for example as it was the case for the external rotation and its 
contradicting effects on independence and quality.   
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Figure 5.7 - Findings of Enhanced National and European Oversight Implemented into the Analytical 
Framework (Own Representation) 
5.6 Summary of the Findings 
In regard to the first measure, the analysis demonstrates that the effects of mandatory external 
rotation on independence, quality and market diversification are questionable and even 
contradicting (figure 5.3). Furthermore, a negative side effect of mandatory external rotation 
on the facilitation of cross-border provision of audit services and on the measure of an 
enhanced audit committee is identified. Most importantly tough is the finding that the impacts 
of this measure cause a contradiction between reinforced independence and audit quality, 
which implies a trade-off between these objectives.  
The evaluation of the second measure, the prohibition of NAS and NAS fee-limit, finds 
support for the EC’s argued increase of independence in appearance (figure 5.6).  
Nevertheless, a major restriction of the impact of this measure in Germany is the already 
implemented laws which imply that no major changes might occur. Furthermore, it cannot be 
proven that this measure contributes to a reinforced independence or to a more dynamic audit 
market, as it is presumed by the EC. In addition, the measure’s impacts result in a conflict 
between an increase in independence and a more dynamic audit market.  
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In contrast to the first two measures, the analysis of the documents and interviews reveals a 
general support for the ‘enhanced audit committee’ (figure 5.7). Nevertheless, the EC’s 
assumed intervening processes cannot be confirmed. However, the analysis finds that this 
measure coupled with an enhanced EU and national oversight might improve audit quality. 
Furthermore, again a trade-off is identified, in this case between audit quality and market 
diversification.  
Contrary to the other three measures, the EC’s assumptions regarding the enhanced EU and 
national oversight and its corresponding objectives can be validated (figure 5.8). If particular 
conditions are met, it is probable that this measure can improve independence and contribute 
to a more dynamic audit market. Additionally, a major finding which is distinctive for this 
measure, is that the intervening process onto the objective of improved supervision and 
coordination simultaneously reinforces the facilitation of cross-border provisions of auditing 
services and audit quality.  
Overall, the analysis points out that the intervening processes of the measures ‘external 
mandatory rotation’, the ‘prohibition and cap of NAS’, as well as the ‘enhancement of the 
audit committee’ are not in accordance with the EC’s intended objectives. The intervening 
processes of the measure, ‘enhancement of the EU and national oversight’, on the other hand, 
might accomplish the EC’s intended objectives. The study also pinpoints to interdependencies 
between measures and objectives, which seem not to be considered by the EC.  
Another major finding is that in order to increase independence, audit quality fades into the 
background. Even though, it started out to be equally important for the EC, audit quality was 
found to fade into the background in favor of independence and market diversification 
(Wadewitz, 2013b; WPK, 2010; IDW, 2012; experts 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9).  
Especially revealed from the expert interviews is the observation that the 21 Member State 
options will cause a deharmonization and inhomogeneity between European countries. These 
options, therefore, provide 21*31 (28 EU Member States plus Norway, Liechtenstein and 
Iceland) possible combinations for the implementation of the audit reform. Expert 1, 5 and 6 
regard this as patchwork of a reform which results in immense problems for audited 
companies, and expert 6, therefore, predicts that the audit reform cannot reach its goals. 
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6 Discussion  
This chapter starts by pointing out the contradictions in the audit reform which impact 
society’s perception about the audit reform. Afterwards, the applied concepts and theories of 
this study will be discussed. The chapter concludes with the limitations of the findings and 
future research.   
6.1 Contradicting Concepts in the Audit Reform 
The analysis already reveals that contradictions between and within the measures and 
objectives prevail. These contradictions are also mirrored in the underlying concepts of the 
audit reform, namely in the concepts of audit quality, independence, the expectation gap, and 
oversight, which are now further discussed.  
The following quote sets the background for two lines of discussion: “The primary objective 
of the reform is to increase the quality of statutory audit. This means both enhancing statutory 
auditors’ independence and providing investors and shareholders of audited entities with 
better and more detailed information via the audit report” (EC, 2014b, Online). This quote 
points out that the EC aims to improve audit quality by firstly enhancing auditors’ 
independence and secondly, by closing the expectation gap for shareholders.  
Following the first line of argumentation, the EC sets up the equation that every measure 
which enhances auditor’s independence directly increases audit quality. The findings in 
chapter four demonstrate that this equation is present in the audit reform. Nevertheless, this 
simple assumption does not reflect the complexities that audit quality involves. Hence, the 
authors criticize this approach of the EC.  
According to the IAASB’s (2014) “Framework for Audit Quality: Key Elements that create 
an Environment for Audit Quality”, audit quality contains the elements “inputs, processes, 
outputs, interactions and contextual factors” (p.3). These five elements actually contain 15 
sub-elements that constitute “an environment which maximizes the likelihood that quality 
audits are performed on a consistent basis” (IAASB, 2014, p.3; Appendix G). When 
considering this complex framework, it becomes visible that the EC’s simple equation for 
audit quality is doubtful. The findings of this study confirm this complexity in regard to the 
relation between independence and audit quality. The analysis of ‘mandatory external 
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rotation’ demonstrates that the effects of this measure lead to contradicting impacts on the 
objectives as the effects of rotation result in a trade-off between independence and audit 
quality (figure 5.3). This indicates that audit quality is a complex topic and that the audit 
reform lacks a focus on specific elements or indicators of audit quality. Therefore, the reform 
tries to achieve a complex objective with relatively simple measures. Considering that the 
IAASB with the support of IFAC needed more than four years to establish a framework for 
audit quality, underpins this complexity (IFAC, 2015).  
Furthermore, the study illustrates that independence in the audit reform is addressed on 
different levels and not just on the auditor level as the EC strives for in the quote above (EC, 
2014b).  As seen in chapter five, the measures consider the auditor’s, the audit firm’s, the 
audit committee’s and the oversight’s independence. Therefore, the audit reform does not 
draw a clear line about the boundaries between each of the various approaches to 
independence. It appears that the EC wants to improve audit quality at all costs by using every 
different type of independence. Consequently, it might be argued that the audit reform 
misuses concepts which lead to confusion in the effects of the different concepts of 
independence. When analyzing the audit reform, the authors experienced this problem of 
incoherent labeling of independence. As a result, the analysis was adapted in order to take the 
different concepts of independence into account. Thus, the authors considered whether or not 
the found arguments address a type of independence that reinforces auditor independence. 
Therefore, the audit committee’s independence is not considered whereas the oversight 
independence is linked to auditor’s independence and hence, included.  
The above illustrates the contradictions in the composition of the audit reform. As pointed out 
by the public interest theory, the financial crisis led to a demand of regulation in society. 
Since the financial crisis 2007-08 did not only affect institutional investors but also small 
investors and pension fund holders, a wide group of society was impacted by the financial 
crisis. Therefore, according to the public interest theory the general society should welcome 
the audit reform. In contrast, the findings of this study reveal that the professionals, who 
understand the complex constructions of independence and audit quality, reasonably question 
this regulatory attempt. The authors argue that the general society might perceive audits to be 
improved simply because of the discussion around the audit reform. However, the authors 
recognize that the general society cannot fully comprehend these immensely complex 
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theoretical foundations. Hence, the general society might overestimate the restricted impacts 
of the audit reform or underestimate the involved problems.  
The second argument arising out of the above-mentioned quote, refers to an increase in audit 
quality through “better and more detailed information” for stakeholders, which according to 
the EC reduces the ‘expectation gap’ (EC, 2014b, Online). Connecting to the discussion 
above, the authors find that the EC simplifies the solution to reduce the expectation gap. As 
found in chapter five the assumed impact of the enhanced role of the audit committee does not 
contribute to a reduction of this expectation gap. Due to the shift of information from the 
planned external communication to the internal communication (between auditor and audit 
committee), the goal to clarify the societal role of auditors is not achieved. The authors found 
strong incomprehension in regard to this measure of the audit reform as an enhanced audit 
report would have been a major improvement in regard to the expectation gap. Therefore, the 
authors question the impact of this part of the audit reform on audit quality. It appears that the 
EC again underestimates the complexities of the expectation gap. On the one hand, society 
has increased expectations regarding the information from the auditor, as the audit reform 
makes the promise to provide more information. On the other hand, the regulation does not 
improve the information given in an extended audit opinion, as the duties of the auditors to 
external addressees are unchanged. Consequently, the ‘reasonableness gap’ is further 
expanded due to the increased expectations of the general society towards audits and the 
unchanged duties of the auditor (Hassink et al., 2009). In order to actually reduce the 
expectation gap, the duties of the auditor should have been increased not only internally 
(Hassink et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, this study surprisingly reveals that the measure ‘enhanced national and EU 
oversight’ is highly welcomed by the stakeholders. The authors expected that there would be 
high criticism against oversight because oversight involves the risk of overregulation and 
standardization. However, oversight seems to be a measure that can be easily implemented 
but the effects and its real efficiency will only become visible in the long-term. Therefore, it 
can be critically asked if this measure is only a symbolic change. Applying this thought to the 
case of Germany which is a code law country, the enhancement of oversight might have a 
strong rhetorical power, as German regulation is detailed and intense (The Hofstede Center, 
n.d.). As a result, the perceptions of the German Society of the audit reform might be more 
positive than the actual improvements. Furthermore, temporal differences might occur as the 
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perceptions of the German society are now positively influenced but the impact of an 
enhanced oversight might only come later. Moreover, the findings reveal that EU and national 
regulations clash and lead to tensions. For Germany, the audit reform implies that the 
oversight structure has to be changed, but there is no evidence that this is workable. Beyond 
that the authors question if it is reasonable to restructure the current well-functioning 
oversight system in Germany which evolved within the distinct German context. 
Consequently, the dissonance within European and national level confirms the complexities 
of multilevel regulation which is in accordance with Chowdhury and Wessel (2012). 
Overall, the discussion illustrates that even though the audit reform aims to manage current 
problems of auditing which cause negative effects on society, the effects of the measures and 
the contradictions within the composition of the audit reform does not augur well for societal 
problems.   
6.2 Discussion of the Program Impact Theory and the 
Problematics of Government 
Besides some modifications of the program impact theory, this study also confirms the 
assumptions of the program impact theory and the model of problematics of government by 
Rose and Miller (1992), which will be discussed in the following.   
The study supports that the program impact theory represents a suitable and structured 
framework to analyze complex correlations in programs. This allows a structured approach 
which provides deeper insights into the audit reform. The authors argue that without this 
approach findings could have stayed unrevealed because the theory provides a framework that 
allows keeping track of the bigger picture. Especially during the coding of the documents and 
interviews, as well as during the execution of the expert interviews, the program impact 
theory provided necessary structure to guide the authors through the analysis. Structuring 93 
pages of extracted arguments into the right category was extremely challenging and only 
possible due to the framework provided by the program impact theory.  
Additionally, the study confirms that the intervening processes are a crucial element of the 
program impact theory as the analysis is based on these assumptions. This was already 
pointed out by Rossi, Freeman and Lipsey (2004). Nevertheless, it is essential to acknowledge 
that a categorization for these intervening processes is required. The problem with 
categorizations is that it contains the risk of making statistic and deterministic decisions. Even 
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though the authors took a great effort to secure objectivity, other researchers could categorize 
differently. Therefore, the findings might be limited in the possibility to deduce 
generalizations. 
The findings further demonstrate that the program impact theory provides only a pure 
evaluation of the current status. This implies that this theory does not directly provide 
suggestions for improvements of the program. Hence, the program impact theory only 
facilitates deconstructive critique as it only points out where improvements are needed and 
not how improvements can be made. Nevertheless, as this study points out the intervening 
processes that do not function in the assumed way, the study helps to avoid inadequate 
measures in future programs. Furthermore, by indicating the intervening processes that do 
function, the study allows to focus on justified and effective measures that might reach the 
intended objectives in future programs. Hence, it is possible to deduce policy implications by 
applying the program impact theory as it reveals strengths and limitations of the logic of the 
program which can be considered in future reforms. 
The study also affirms the concept of complexity in regulation as pointed out in section 6.1. 
Besides the practical implications for society, complexity in regulation also involves 
theoretical considerations. Due to the problems that arise from the complexity of the audit 
reform, and coupled with the problem of multilevel regulation, the authors have extended the 
program impact theory. In its initial form, the program impact theory only uses unlabeled 
arrows (Weiss, 1972) to show the connections between the measures and objectives. 
Therefore, the authors expand the simplicity of the program impact theory with the objective 
to reflect the complexity of the audit reform. For this purpose the authors labeled the arrows 
and differentiated between the supporting and non-supporting intervening processes by using 
either straight or dotted lines. Furthermore, the differentiation is strengthened through 
arguments presented in bullet points underneath the arrows. This represents an extension of 
the program impact theory and allows further insights into the studied subject, in this case the 
audit reform.  
The problematics of government made the authors aware that interdependencies e.g. tradeoffs 
can be expected within the objectives of the audit reform. Consequently, the authors took 
great care to capture these interdependencies and implement them into the analytical 
framework. Hence, this study confirms these interdependencies in regulation. Unexpectedly, 
the authors also found interdependencies within the measures, which have been implemented 
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in the analytical framework as well. Therefore, the initial idea to capture cause relations 
became more dynamic during the process of evaluation. The acknowledgment of these 
interdependencies represents a development of the program impact theory.  
Additionally, the term “rule at a distance” (Rose & Miller, 1991, p.184) proposed in 
problematics of government can be affirmed. This term refers to the self-interest of each actor 
involved in regulation which results in options for directives and regulations and constitutes 
shifts in the measures throughout their development. Consequently, the audit reform is 
immensely complex and imbeds further problematics of government, which is visible in this 
analysis. Especially the Member State options represent a major patchwork of regulation 
which affirms complexities of regulation. Furthermore, the study substantiates that multilevel 
regulation might lead to inconclusive regulations. During the analysis of mandatory external 
rotation, an argument re-emerged which mirrors this inconclusiveness. This refers to the so-
called ‘short runners’ which means that those companies that changed their auditor most 
recently are obliged to rotate their auditors first (Regulation (EU) 537/2014, L158/112). Both 
the document analysis and the interviews consider this as absurd. The compromise dialog, 
which takes place between the national and EU level actors, might be the cause for this 
incomprehensible regulation and reinforces the concept of multilevel regulation.  
Furthermore, as pointed out by Rose and Miller (1992), regulation is a “problematizing 
activity” (p.181) because addressing one problem to solve societal issues usually triggers 
other problems. As the EC wants to prevent another financial crisis, the EC problematizes 
reality, which might have a negative impact on other societal problems resulting in another 
wave of regulation. Since this paper finds the impact of the implemented measures restricted 
in their success to address the objectives, the study indicates the possibility of further 
regulatory activity in this area. Therefore, the study affirms Rose and Miller’s (1992) 
‘problematizing activities’. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Rose and Miller (1992) “we do 
not live in a governed world so much as a world traversed by the ‘will to govern’, fuelled by 
the constant registration of ‘failure’, the discrepancy between ambition and outcome, and the 
constant injunction to do better next time” (p.191). Even though, this paper indicates that the 
measures of the audit reform are mostly not in accordance with the EC’s intended objectives, 
it has to be acknowledged that this situation might to a certain extent be a natural aspect of 
regulation. A perfectly working process between measures and objectives might, therefore, be 
illusionary.   
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6.3 Limitations of the Findings and Future Research 
The study provides evidence in which way the measures of the audit reform are in accordance 
with the EC’s intended objectives in Germany. Besides the methodological limitations 
discussed in chapter 3.5, the German setting is characterized by unique factors which limit the 
transferability of the study to other EU countries. Especially the findings regarding the 
measure ‘prohibition and cap of NAS’ appears to be quite distinct for Germany. Most of the 
new aspects of this measure are already implemented in current German law and hence, the 
results are based on this unique situation. Therefore, it might be complicated to generalize the 
results of this measure.  
Nevertheless, the limitation of a single case study presents an area of possible future research 
by applying the concept of this study to other EU Member States. This would reveal major 
differences in the logic of the audit reform occurring through special customs and regulations 
in the area of auditing in different Member States. The authors anticipate that especially for 
the analysis of the measure ‘prohibition and cap of NAS’ studies settled in other countries 
will find quite deviated effects of NAS due to the different contextual background of each 
country. 
Another factor that restricts the results is the fact that the impact of the audit reform is very 
special in Germany due to the so-called Mittelstand (mid-sized companies). From roughly 3.7 
million German companies in 2013, 99% belong to the German Mittelstand and contribute 
55% to the gross domestic product (BMWi, 2014). As only 1,600 companies fall under the 
definition of a PIE in Germany (WPK, 2014a), it can be argued that the reform’s impact in 
Germany is limited. However, it must be recognized that the DAX30 companies produced 
roughly the same turnover as the whole Mittelstand (BMWi, 2014). Therefore, the impact of 
PIEs is still crucial to the German economy and, hence, this study is valuable. 
Moreover, the conduction of the interviews represents a limitation of the findings. As 
appendix C points out, the authors chose to pose the questions in a quite general manner at 
first. This was done in order to not bias the interviewees in their responses. Nonetheless, this 
contains the risk that the interpretations of the answers appear to be subjective. In order to 
assure the rigor of the results, the authors used interpreting questions, asking specifically 
about the interviewees’ assumptions and assessment of the examined intervening processes.   
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Further, the authors have taken into account that the nine interviewees selected on the basis of 
their organizational background and knowledge of the audit reform, present subjective 
opinions which might present a lack of transferability of the study’s findings. In avoidance of 
this problem, the analysis is based on a document analysis and interviews as this iterative 
process contributes to objectivity. Furthermore, during the interviews, as well as the 
document analysis, the authors were confronted with some exaggerated statements. If 
exaggerated statements are used in this paper, the authors indicate the organizational 
background of those interviewees in order to address this limitation. 
Another limitation that is recognized by the authors is caused by the restricted time frame of 
this study. The authors acknowledge that if the document analysis had been finished prior to 
the interviews, the discussion with the interviewees might have been more constructive. As 
the document analysis is not extensive in regard to some intervening processes, the authors 
acknowledge that if this finding had been available prior to the interviews, the authors would 
have facilitated an interview guidance focusing on these topics. This might have resulted in a 
compelling discussion.  
The currentness of the topic represents another caveat since the outcome of the program will 
only be discernable in the years following the actual implementation. This would imply that 
this study can only represent a prediction. Nevertheless, as this study does not focus on future 
outcomes but on the logic of the audit reform, the program impact theory facilitates 
evaluating this logic. This seems to be a reasonable investigation as the high resonance of the 
contacted interview partners and their importance in their organizational setting support the 
author’s approach to the evaluation of the audit reform.  
However, the authors highly suggest an extension of this study when the program has actually 
been applied. Therefore, future researchers may conduct an outcome evaluation which 
“answers questions about program outcomes” (Rossi, Freeman & Lipsey, 2004, p.71) after the 
reform has been implemented and hence, represents the subsequent step of the program 
impact theory. It would be particularly interesting to compare those findings with the findings 
of this study. Furthermore, regarding the objective to contribute to a more dynamic audit 
market, it is feasible to conduct quantitative analyses in order to reveal the impact of the audit 
reform onto this objective.  
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Furthermore, the authors acknowledge that if the intervening processes had been analyzed 
separately for each stakeholder group, the findings of this study might have been different. A 
separate analysis for each stakeholder group is, however, only possible if the sample size is 
increased significantly. Questionable though is whether this separation actually leads to 
meaningful findings as the bigger picture cannot be captured.   
Furthermore, a limitation of the program impact theory, which applies especially to this study, 
is the choice of considered measures in the analysis. The authors are aware that the overall 
findings of this study depend on the chosen measures. For example, if the authors had chosen 
only the measures ‘enhanced audit committee’ and ‘enhanced EU and national oversight’, the 
overall finding of this study would have pointed to a less negative, or even neutral, correlation 
between the reform’s measures and the intended objectives. Additionally, the authors 
recognize that positive side effects might not be found due to the selection of the analyzed 
measures. For example, the jointly positive impact of the enhanced EU and national oversight 
and the enhanced audit committee on audit quality would have been missed if one measure 
was removed from the analysis. Therefore, the authors acknowledge that other positive or 
negative side-effects and interdependencies are not revealed due to the limitation to four 
measures. Moreover, external disturbing factors that might influence the intervening 
processes have not been considered in this study. As the authors had to respond to the 
complexity of the audit reform by limiting the evaluated measures to four, the above 
limitations apply. Nevertheless, this limitation also provides a possible future research area. 
Future researchers could include other measures to their evaluation in order to extend this 
study. 
Another possible future research in the German audit market, but possibly also for other 
markets, can also be suggested. A major recurring argument in this study against a more 
dynamic audit market is that non-Big Four audit companies do not possess a sufficient global 
network to conduct audits for major corporations. Therefore, a study comparing global 
networks of international companies with the presence of mid-tier audit companies in these 
countries could show if the objective of a diversified audit market is actually reasonable. Such 
a study would majorly contribute to the discussion of market diversification in the audit 
market which then can contribute with vital policy implications. 
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7 Conclusion 
“Any change, even a change for the better, is always accompanied by drawbacks 
and discomforts.” Arnold Bennett (1867-1931) 
This study mirrors the German perspective in which way the measures of the EU audit reform 
are in accordance with the EC’s intended measures by applying the program impact theory. 
The analysis demonstrates that most of the EC’s assumed intervening processes cannot be 
affirmed, which points to a limit of the future impact of the audit reform in Germany. 
Nevertheless, it becomes visible that some aspects of measures are welcomed by various 
stakeholders in Germany, which indicates that the EC’s attempt to further regulate auditing 
might be justified. The study also stresses the uniqueness of customs and laws for auditing in 
the EU Member States. Consequently, the authors question if it is meaningful to strive for 
harmonization in audit regulation with a reform that addresses this goal besides other 
objectives. It seems that if harmonization is the main goal, it would be necessary to abandon 
national audit customs and laws. Whether this alternative is then the silver bullet is, however, 
questionable itself.  
Besides the empirical implications of this study, it contributes to theory by applying the 
analytical framework of the program impact theory to a current and highly influential topic. 
Furthermore, the application of this theory to audit regulation represents a new research area, 
examined through the lens of this theory. Moreover, the study extends and improves the 
program impact theory as it incorporates additional considerations from the problematics of 
government.  
In conclusion, the authors are surprised how politicians can conduct a reform that involves 
major contradictions in the effects of the audit reform. The effects of some measures lack 
empirical evidence or show strong negative side-effects on other measures or objectives. 
Nevertheless, these measures are still applied in the audit reform, which is incomprehensible 
to the authors. Therefore, the authors have the impression that regulation of auditing might be 
trapped in a dilemma. On the one hand, politicians seem to lack the relevant knowledge of 
complex concepts in auditing which is supported by the EC’s above-discussed concept of 
audit quality. On the other hand, regulation should not be conducted by the regulated 
themselves who have the needed knowledge. This dilemma results in a compromise reform 
which is, therefore, restricted in its impacts. 
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Even though the findings might imply a limited correlation between the audit reform’s 
measures and objectives, the quote mentioned above stresses a reflective consideration of 
those evaluations. Regulation is a process which strives for improvements, but 
accomplishments might be limited due to the complex, regulative process in the EU.  
Nevertheless, the possibility of failure should not prevent the attempt to aim at improvements 
of current problems. Therefore, the identified achievements should at least be acknowledged.  
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Appendix A – Key Actors of Auditing in 
Germany 
 
Key Transnational Interest Parties in European Auditing (Samsonova-Taddei & Humphrey, 
2015, p. 60) 
Applying the model of Samsonova-Taddei and Humphrey (2015) to Germany, the following 
actors are identified: 
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Key Actors of Auditing in Germany (Own Representation; based on Samsonova-Taddei & 
Humphrey, 2015, p.60)  
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Appendix B – Overview of Used Documents 
German Auditing 
Institution 
No. Of sources: 39; 
used: 20     
Authors Titel If German: English translation 
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AOC 2015 
Eckpunktepapier zur Novelle der 
Wirtschaftsprüferordnung Stellungnahme der APAK 
Key issue paper to new audit 
reform - statement of the APAK 
Bundesministerium 
der Justiz (2015) 
Referentenentwurf des Bundesministeriums der 
Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz 
Abschlussprüfungsreformgesetz – AReG 
Regulation draft of the Ministry 
of Justice and Consumer 
Protection 
Gschrei, M. & Luxi, 
L. (2015) 
Tec-Dax: Münzregen für den Mittelstandler - 
Umschwung 2013 von Dauer? 
Tec Dax: will the positive 
improvement for mid-tiers in 
2013 sustain? 
Gschrei, M. (2015) 
wp.net-Stellungnahme zum Eckpunktepapier der 
Bundesregierung zur Reform der 
Wirtschaftsprüferordnung vom 13.02.2015 
wp.net statement to key issue 
paper of the audit reform from 
13th February 2015 
IDW 2010 
Stellungnahme Grünbuch: „Weiteres Vorgehen im 
Bereich der Abschlussprüfung: Lehren aus der Krise“ 
(KOM(2010) 561 endgültig) 
Statement to the Green Paper: 
"Further steps in the audit 
reform: learnings from the crisis" 
IDW 2011a 
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170 rue de la Loi, 1000 Brussels   
IDW 2011b 
Presseinformation 1/2011 - IDW: Stärkere 
Anbindung des Abschlussprüfers an die 
Überwachungsorgane 
löst viele Fragen des Grünbuchs 
Press release - IDW: Strong bond 
between auditor and oversight 
answers many question of the 
Green Paper 
IDW 2011c 
Presseinformation 10/2011 - IDW: EU-
Kommissionsvorschlag zur Abschlussprüfung - 
Chance nicht genutzt 
Press release - IDW: EC draft for 
audit reform - many chances are 
left out 
IDW 2012 
Stellungnahme zu den Vorschlägen der EU-
Kommission vom 30.11.2011 zum Europäischen 
System der Abschlussprüfungen 
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Verband für 
mittelständische 
Wirtschaftsprüfung 
(2015) Das APAK Debakel The APAK debacle 
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[KOM(2011) 778 end.] und zum Vorschlag der 
Europäischen Kommission für eine Verordnung des 
Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates über 
spezifische Anforderungen an die Abschlussprüfung 
bei Unternehmen von öffentlichem Interesse 
[KOM(2011) 779 end.] 
Statement of the WPK: Proposal 
of the EX for a directive 
changing the Directive 
2006/43/EG concerning audits 
and concolsidated statements  
WPK (2013) WPK Marktsturkturanalyse 2013 
Market analysis 2013 from the 
WPK 
WPK (2014a) 
MITTEILUNGEN DER 
WIRTSCHAFTSPRÜFERKAMMER WPK - 
Magazin Mai 2014 Statement of the WPK 
WPK (2014b) 
MITTEILUNGEN DER 
WIRTSCHAFTSPRÜFERKAMMER WPK - 
Magazin Dezember 2014 Statement of the WPK 
WPK (2015) 
Stellungnahme der Wirtschaftsprüferkammer zum 
Eckpunktepapier des BMWi vom 6. Februar 2015 
„Eckpunkte zur Umsetzung der EU-
Abschlussprüferreform – Reform der 
Wirtschaftsprüferaufsicht und des Berufsrecht der 
Wirtschaftsprüfer/vereidigten Buchprüfer in der 
Wirtschaftsprüferordnung“ Berlin, den 20. Februar 
2015 
Statement of the WPK to the key 
issues paper of the BMWi from 
6th of February 2015 "Key issues 
of the implication of the EU audit 
reform" 
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German Audit 
Profession 
No. of source: 19; 
used: 12     
Citation Titel Translation of titel 
Buhleier, C.; 
Niehues, M. & 
Splinter, S. (2014a) 
Corporate Governance Forum. Sonderausgabe zur 
Reform der Abschlussprüfung. Neuer 
Herausforderungen für Unternehmen, Aufsichtsräte 
und Abschlussprüfer 
Corporate Governance Panel - 
Special Edition for the audit 
reform - New challenges for 
companies, the supervisory board 
and auditors 
BDO (2014) 
SONDERNEWSLETTER REFORM DER 
ABSCHLUSSPRÜFUNG 
Special edition newsletter on EU 
audit reform  
Buhleier, C.; 
Niehues, M. & 
Splinter, S. (2014b) 
EU-Reform der Abschlussprüfung und 
Auswirkungen auf den Aufsichtsrat 
EU audit reform and ist 
implications for the supervisory 
board 
Deloitte (2012a) 
Informationen für Aufsichtsrat 
und Prüfungsausschuss 
Information for the supervisory 
board and the audit committee 
Deloitte (2012b) 
Deloitte Audit Reform Briefing: Unprecedented 
reform proposed for the EU audit market   
Deloitte (2013) 
Informationen für Aufsichtsrat und 
Prüfungsausschuss 
Information for the supervisory 
board and the audit committee 
EY (2014a) 
EY News and views 
New and recent global policy developments   
EY (2014b) European Union audit legislation   
KPMG (2014a) Schwerpunkt Regulierung Focus: Regulation 
KPMG (2014b) EU audit reforms – the KPMG view   
KPMG (2014c) Nichtprüfungsleistungen durch den Abschlussprüfer NAS from auditors 
KPMG 2015 KPMG Global Audit Committee Survey   
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German Business 
Media 
No. of sources: 45; 
used:35 
Citation German Titel  Translation of titel 
apa (2014) Lücken in neuen Regeln für die Abschlussprüfung Gaps in new rules for audits 
Bauer, U.M. (2015). 
Mehr Bewegung im Prüfermarkt, Auswirkungen der 
Neuregelung der Jahresabschlussprüfung in der EU 
Movement in the audit market - 
impact of the new rules for audits in 
the EU 
Betriebs Berater 
(2014) 
Mit den Abschlussprüfern hatte der im Februar 2010 
ernannte EU-Kommissar für Binnenmarkt und 
Dienstleistungen … 
The 2010 announced Eu 
commissioner for market and 
services wanted the auditors… 
Boecker, C. 
Hartmann, S. & 
Zwirner, C. (2013) 
Preis und Konzentration auf dem 
Abschlussprüfungsmarkt 
Überlegungen vor dem Hintergrund der Qualität von 
Abschlussprüfungen 
Prices and Concentration in the 
audit market - Considerations 
regarding audit quality 
Börsen-Zeitung 
(2013) EU lässt Wirtschaftsprüfer rotieren EU makes auditors rotate 
Der Aufsichtsrat 
(2014a) 
 Gewandelter Aufsichtsrat und Prüfungsfremde 
Leistungen 
des Abschlussprüfers 
Changes for the supervisory board 
and NAS 
Der Aufsichtsrat 
(2014b) WP-Markt in Bewegung Audit market is moving 
Der Betrieb (2015) 
Der Referentenentwurf für eine 
Abschlussprüfungsreformgesetz - Viva 
Mitgliedstaatenwahlrecht 
The draft regulation of the audit 
reform - long live the Member 
States’ options 
Die Steuerberatung 
(2014) 
Neuer europäischer Rechtsrahmen für 
Abschlussprüfer veröffentlicht - DStV begleitet 
Umsetzung 
New legal european framework for 
auditors - the DStV (German Tax 
Association) chapersones 
implementation 
Dobler, Dobler & 
Fichtl (2013) 
Beratung durch Abschlussprüfer in deutschen 
Familienunternehmen 
Advisory Services in German 
family owned Businesses 
FAZ (2014) 
Mehr Verantwortung für den Aufsichtsrat -Die EU-
Abschlussprüferreform nimmt Prüfungsausschuss in 
die Pflicht 
More responsibilities for the audit 
committee - the EU audit reform 
takes the audit committee into 
responsibility 
Fockenbrock (2013) Als Bettvorleger gelandet Reform ends as beside rug 
Giersberg (2015) 
Aufsicht und Kontrollgremien nehmen Prüfer in die 
Zange 
Oversight and Control Boards put 
the screws on auditors 
Haufe (2013) EU beschneidet die Macht der "Großen Vier" EU prunes power of Big Four 
Hecht, J. (2013) Wir werden kritisiert zu hart zu sein We are critizised of being to harsh 
Hopt (2013) Die EU-Kommission übertreibt The EU commission exaggerates 
Kaindl (2012) EU präsentierung Reformpläne EU presents reform plans 
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Kaindl (2014) 
Abschlussprüferreform - EU bestätigt 
Regulierungsvorschläge 
Audit reform - EU confirms reforms 
measures 
Köhler, A. & 
Gehring, K. (2015) 
Externe Pflichtrotation des Abschlussprüfers - 
Implikationen für die Qualität der Abschlussprüfung 
External rotation of auditors - 
implications for audit quality 
Lanfermann, G. 
(2015) 
Zur Zulässigkeit von Nicht-Prüfungsleistungen nach 
der EU-Abschlussprüferverordnung 
Discussing legitimacy of NAS after 
the audit reform 
Lückmann, R. 
(2014) Wirtschaftsprüfung: Buhlen um Mandanten Auditing: touting for mandates 
managermagazin 
(2015) Absturz vom Gipfel Crash from the peak 
Metzger S. (2012) 
Mittelständische Wirtschaftsprüfer kämpfen in 
Brüssel - Die deutschen Vertreter von zehn 
Netzwerken wollen weiterhin 
Gemeinschaftsprüfungen durchsetzen - und so mehr 
Mandate bekommen. 
Mid-sized auditors fight in Brussels 
- representatives from ten networks 
trying to push through joint audits 
in order to receive more mandates 
Ollrog (2015) 
Der EU ist die heutige Berufsaufsicht nicht 
unabhängig genug 
The EU finds the German Oversight 
not to be independent 
Pfitzer (2012)  
EU-reform der Abschlussprüfung Berichterstatter des 
Rechtsausschusses zerpflückt Entwurf der EU-
Kommission zu Beratungsleistungen 
EU audit reform - correspondent of 
judiciary committee picks the draft 
for NAS to pieces 
Plendl (2015) Bäumchen, Bäumchen, wechsel dich 
not possible to translate; German 
Children Game; implies something 
like the a merry-go-around in the 
reform 
Ruhnke, K. (2014) Gemischter Applaus für EU-Prüferreform 
Mixed applaus for the EU audit 
reform 
Stahl, M. & Pundt, 
M. (2015) 
Mögliche Auswirkungen der EU-Reform der 
Abschlussprüfung auf die Arbeit der Aufsichtsräte in 
Deutschland 
Possible implications of the EU 
audit reform for the work of 
supervisory board members in 
Germany 
Velte, P. (2014a) 
Abschluss der EU-Reform zu Abschlussprüfung - 
Ausgewählte Regulierungsmaßnahmen im Überblick 
Finalization of the EU audit reform 
- An overview of selected measures 
Velte, P. (2014b) 
Rezension zur Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von 
Professor Dr. Dr. h.c. Wolfgang Ballwieser 
Review of the commemorative 
publication for Professor Dr. Dr. 
h.c. Wolfgang Ballwieser 
Wadewitz, S. 2013a Prüferregulierung geht in die heiße Phase Final stage of audit regulation 
Wadewitz, S. 2013b Die Prüfung bleibt das Kerngeschäft Audit stays the core business 
Wadewitz, S. 2014 Zentrifugalkräfte  Centrifugal forces 
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Academics 
No. Of Sources: 20; 
used: 14     
Authors Titel If German: English translation 
Dobler, M. (2014) 
Auditor-provided non-audit services in listed and 
private family firms   
Fiolleau, K., Hoang, 
K., Jamal, K., & 
Sunder, S. (2013) 
How Do Regulatory Reforms to Enhance Auditor 
Independence Work in Practice?   
Hennrichs, J. (2014)  Abschlussprüferreform im Unionsrecht 
Audit Reform in the european legal 
framework 
Köhler, A.G. (2010)  
Mandatory Rotation in the German Audit Market – a 
Scenario Analysis   
Krauß, P.,  
Pronobis, P., & 
Zülch, H. (2015) 
Abnormal audit fees and audit quality: initial 
evidence from the German audit market   
Krauß, P., Quosigk 
B.M., & Zülch, H. 
(2014)  
Effects of Initial Audit Fee Discounts on Audit 
Quality: Evidence from Germany   
Le Vourc’h, J. & 
Morand. P. (2011) 
Study on the effects of the implementation of the 
acquis on statutory audits of annual and consolidated 
accounts including the consequences on the audit 
market   
Lenz, H. (2015) 
Eckpunkte zur Umsetzung der EU-
Abschlussprüferreform Cornerstones of the EU audit reform 
MarketLine (2013) Accountancy in Germany   
Quick, R. & Sattler, 
M. (2011)  
Das Erfordernis der Umsatzunabhängigkeit und die 
Konzentration auf dem deutschen Markt für 
Abschlussprüferleistungen 
The claim of turnover independence 
and the concentration in the German 
market for audit services 
Quick, R. & 
Warming-
Rasmussen, B. 
(2009) 
Auditor Independence and the Provision of Non-
Audit Services: Perceptions by German Investors   
Ratzinger-Sakel, 
N.V.S (2013) 
Auditor Fees and Auditor Independence—Evidence 
from Going Concern Reporting Decisions in 
Germany   
Tepalagul, N. & 
Lin, L. (2015) 
Auditor Independence and Audit Quality: A 
Literature Review   
Velte, P., 
Stiglbauer, M. 
(2012) 
AUDIT MARKET CONCENTRATION IN 
EUROPE AND ITS INFLUENCE ON AUDIT 
QUALITY   
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Appendix C – Interview Guideline 
 
Dear XY, 
As promised we hereby send you the interview guideline for our telephone interview. As mentioned earlier, we 
are researching whether the measures of the EU audit reform are in correspondence with the EC’s intended 
objectives. We particularly focus our research on the opinion of German auditing actors.  
Below you can find our guiding interview questions. We would like to have an open discussion with you and 
based on your input we will ask follow-up and/or specifying questions. 
 
I Perception of EC’s objectives of the audit reform 
1. Do you see an emphasis from the European Commission in regard to the objectives of the EU audit reform? If 
yes, please specify. 
 
II The following questions refer to the regulation 537/2014 regarding audits of PIEs  
2. To what extent can the obligatory external rotation of audit companies reach the objective of  
2.1 reinforced independence?  
2.2 a more dynamic audit market? 
3. It is argued that the obligatory external rotation of audit companies can contribute to increased audit quality. 
What is your opinion on this assumed correlation? 
4. Can the prohibition of certain non-audit services and the limitation of non-audit fees increase independence of 
auditors? 
5. Do you think that the enhanced role of the audit committee can contribute to 
5.1 increased audit quality? 
5.2 a more dynamic market? 
 
III The following questions refer to the directive 2014/56/EU  
6.To what extent can the strengthened national audit supervision authorities contribute to the objective of  
6.1 increased independence? 
6.2 harmonization of EU regulation in the audit market? 
6.3 supervision of auditors in Germany? 
 
As we would like to capture your subjective opinion on these topics, we have stated the questions quite broadly. 
Regarding the execution of the interview, we might ask further questions in between as mentioned above. 
Furthermore, if you wish to add information we hereby encourage you to do so. 
Please find attached the current table of content as well as an abstract for your information. Please let us know if 
you have any questions. We are looking forward to talk to you on XY! 
 
All the best,  
Lisa Maier and Laura Warkotz 
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Example of interpreting question conducted by the interviewers to secure that justified 
conclusions can be drawn from the interviewees’ answers: 
II. 2.2 Do you think that there is a positive, negative or neutral correlation between mandatory 
external rotation and a more dynamic audit market? And why? 
Expert 1: Actually, I think there is a negative correlation. In my opinion the Big Four will 
push the mandates back and forth among themselves. This results in a merry-go-around … the 
big audit companies simply have the capacities to audit big companies and the small ones do 
not have these capacities. In the end, it is all about capacities. It just does not work 
otherwise… So all in all I believe that a more dynamic audit market cannot be reached, 
simply because the mid-tier and smaller audit companies do not have the sufficient capacities.    
Expert 3: I do not think that this reform will break up the oligopoly that we have at the 
moment. Small audit companies like mine are simply not made to audit PIEs … Absolutely 
due to the missing capacities we are not able to audit those big mandates. Also, the mid-tier 
and the bigger mid-tier audit companies will have trouble to get the whole organization 
done… like organizing audits in many countries at the same time. So this rotation thing might 
have good intentions but I do not see it in reality. … It will not change the market 
concentration for Big audit mandates. And personally, me as a small audit company I do not 
think about those mandates anyways.  
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Appendix D – Coding Categories 
Impact of the Obligatory External Rotation of PIEs on the Corresponding Objectives  
Interpretation of the Measure Itself   
 Affected Companies 
Point of Rotation 
Effects on Independence (‘1A’) 
Reduced Familiarity by Mandatory External Rotation 
Questionable Intervening Process between External Rotation and Independence 
Legal Grey Zone 
Effects on Clarify Societal Role (Quality) (‘1B’) 
Weak Intervening Process between External Rotation and Audit Quality 
Loss of Knowledge 
Questionable Effects of Low-Balling  
Effects on Market Diversification (‘1C’) 
Necessity to Increase Diversification by Mandatory External Rotation 
Intervening Process between Mandatory External Rotation and Market Diversification 
Missing Capacities and Competences of non-Big Four Companies 
Direction of Change 
Side Effect on Cross-Border Provision (‘1D’) 
Side Effect on the Audit Committee 
 
Impact of Prohibition of Specific Non-Audit Services and the Limitation of Non-Audit Fees on the 
Objectives 
Current NAS and Fee-Limit Rules in Germany 
Current Application: Total Volume Fee-Limit  
Current Application: Prohibition of NAS 
Current Application: NAS Fee-Limit 
German Audit Market Fee Distribution  
Effects on Independence (‘2A’) 
Increased Independence in Appearance  
Increased Independence in Mind 
No Impact on Independence in Mind  
Volume Fee-Limit of §319a HGB is Sufficient  
Side Effect on Clarify Societal Role (Quality) (‘2B’) 
Correlation between Specialized Knowledge, Costs and Audit Quality  
NAS and the Effect on Societal Role of Auditor Depends on Company Characteristic  
Tax Services Improve Audit Quality 
Effects on Market Diversification (‘2C’) 
Increased Market Concentration by Volume Fee-Limit 
Shift from Auditing to Advisory 
Side Effect on Cross-Border Provision (‘2D’) 
 
Impact of the Enhanced Role of the Audit Committee of PIEs on the Objectives 
Discussion of the Measure Itself 
Strong Support for the Enhancement of the Audit Committee  
Assembly of the audit committee - the ‘financial expert’  
Effects on Reinforced Independence (‘3A’) 
Effects on a Clarified Societal Role (‘3B’)  
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Increased Information exchange is questionable 
Expectation Gap cannot be closed 
Contribute to a more Dynamic Market (‘3C’) 
Tendering will increase diversification  
Tendering is not able to increase diversification  
Oversight Coupled with the Enhanced Audit Committee Has Ability to Increase Audit Quality  
Impact of the Strengthened Public Oversight Authorities on the Objectives 
Interpretation and Construction of the national oversight in Germany  
Questionable necessity  
Structure of national oversight 
Effects on Independence (‘4A’) 
Independence from profession and Financial Independence 
Professional Competences of the National Oversight Authority 
Increased national oversight leads to more independence  
Effects on Clarified Societal Role (Quality) (‘4B’)  
Increased competences on national level  
Increased competences and know-how on EU level  
Effects on Market Diversification (‘4C’) : Interests of small and mid-tier audit companies 
Facilitate Cross-Border Provision (‘4D’): Need for harmonization on EU-level in audit? 
Improve supervision and Coordination (‘4E’) 
Conditionfs for Success On national level  
Exchange of information between Member States trough CEAOB   
 
Appendix E: Development of audit reform based on information on the European Commission's website
Own Representation, List is not exhaustive 
Categories Green Paper 2010 European Commission 30 November 2011 European Commission 16 June 2014
Substantive 
verification
"The Commission wishes to explore the case for 
"going back to basics" with a strong focus on 
substantive verification of the balance sheet and less 
reliance on compliance and systems work" (EC, 2010a, 
p.7) 
"It should also explain the variation in the weighting of 
substantive and compliance testing when compared to the 
previous year." (EC Proposal Regulation, 2011, p. 7)
Substantive verification is not mentioned anymore -> DELETED
Audit Report: 
external 
communication
"One has to consider whether informative matters e.g. 
potential risks, sectoral evolution, commodity and 
exchange rate risk, etc. being provided together or as 
part of the auditor's report may provide more value to 
stakeholders." (EC, 2010a, p.7-8)
"The content of the audit report disclosed to the public is 
expanded so that it explains the methodology used, especially 
how much of the balance sheet has been directly verified and 
how much has been based on system and compliance testing, the 
levels of materiality applied to perform the audit, the key areas of 
risk of material misstatements of the financial statements, 
whether the statutory audit was designed to detect fraud and, in 
the event of a qualified or adverse opinion or a disclaimer of 
opinion, the reasons for such a decision." (EC Proposal 
Regulation, 2011, p. 7) Furthermore: "indicate the date of the 
appointment and the period of total uninterrupted
engagement including previous renewals and reappointments; (r) 
indicate the non-audit services that the
audit committee allowed the statutory auditor or the audit firm to 
provide to the audited entity; The audit report shall not be longer 
than four pages or 10000 characters" (EC Proposal Regulation, 
2011, p.42-43)
Major weakening: all facts mentioned in the proposal BUT
"methodology used, especially how much of the balance sheet has
been directly verified and how much has been based on system and
compliance testing, the levels of materiality" must now only be
published to the audit committee not to the public --> not for external
communication; (Regulation (EU) 537/2014, 2014, L158/91).
"Indicate the date of the appointment and the period of total
uninterrupted engagement including previous renewals and
reappointments" (Regulation (EU) 537/2014, 2014,
L158/90)."Indicate any services, in addition to the statutory audit"
(Regulation (EU) 537/2014, 2014, L158/90). DELETED: size of
report
Audit report: 
internal 
communication
Better internal communication (long-form report to 
supervisory board as in Germany) (EC, 2010a, p. 8)
"An additional more detailed audit report for the audit entity 
itself which will provide detailed information on the audit carried 
out to the audit committee and management"  (EC Proposal 
Regulation, 2011, p.7).
The additional report to the audit committee is even more extended 
since the proposal, some facts are added and some facts that the 
proposal wanted to publish to the public are now only in the report to 
the audit committee (see column audit report external 
communication).(Regulation (EU) 537/2014 2014, L158/92). "The 
member states can require that the additional report is also submitted 
to the administrative and supervisory board" (Regulation (EU) 
537/2014, 2014, L158/91).
Independent 
check of CSR 
report
"The question should be raised whether there might be 
a need for an independent check [of CSR report] on the 
reported information and whether auditors should play 
a role in this regard." (EC, 2010a, p.8-9)
DELETED -
Audit Report: 
financial 
outlook
"It is important to consider … the extent to which 
auditors should themselves provide an economic and 
financial outlook of the company" (EC, 2010a, p.9)
DELETED "The scope of the statutory audit shall not include assurance on the 
future viability of the audited entity or on the efficiency or 
effectiveness with which the management or administrative body has 
conducted or will conduct the affairs of the entity" (Directive 
2014/56/EU, 2014, p. L158/211).
M
ea
su
re
s
Appendix E: Development of audit reform based on information on the European Commission's website
Own Representation, List is not exhaustive 
Categories Green Paper 2010 European Commission 30 November 2011 European Commission 16 June 2014
M
ea
su
re
s
ISA "The Commission is considering when and how to 
introduce ISAs in the EU. The introduction could be 
done via binding or non binding Community law 
instruments." (EC, 2010a, p.10)
"Compliance with the International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) 
by all statutory auditors and audit firms. Member States should 
ensure that the audit standards are adapted to the size of the 
audited entity to ensure a proportionate and simplified audit for 
SMEs." (EC Proposal Directive, 2011, p.7)
"The Commission shall be empowered to adopt by means of 
delegated acts in accordance with Article 39 the international auditing 
standards referred to in Article 26 of Directive 2006/43/EC in the area 
of audit practice, and the independence and internal quality controls 
of statutory auditors and audit firms for the purposes of their 
application within the Union" (Regulation (EU) 537/2014, 2014, p. 
L158/90)
Third party 
appointment of 
audit company
"The Commission is considering the feasibility of a 
scenario where the audit role is one of statutory 
inspection wherein the appointment, remuneration and 
duration of the engagement would be the responsibility 
of a third party, perhaps a regulator, rather than the 
company itself." (EC, 2010a, p.11)
DELETED ? -
Mandatory 
Rotation
"In this context, the mandatory rotation of audit firms – 
not just of audit partners – should be considered. … To 
prevent partners from changing firms to "take along" 
certain clients with them, rotation rules, if adopted, 
should ensure that not only firms, but partners are also 
rotated." (EC, 2010a, p.11)
The regulation introduces mandatory rotation of audit firms after 
a maximum period of 6 years that may be, under certain 
exceptional circumstances, extended to 8 years (decided by 
competent authority). Mandatory rotation might be extended to 9 
years if two audit firms are used (exceptional 12 years decided by 
competent authority).  A cooling off period of 4 years will be 
applicable. (EC Proposal Regulation, 2011, p.8) Internal rotation 
of key audit partners of 7 years with a cooling off period of 3 
years (EC Proposal Regulation, 2011, p. 56) and the audit firm 
shall establish "an appropriate gradual rotation mechanism with 
regard to the most senior personnel" (EC Proposal Regulation, 
2011, p. 56).  Transitional periods are suggested (EC Proposal 
Regulation, 2011, p.82-83)
Introducing mandatory rotation of statutory auditors and audit firms 
every 10 years. A cooling off period of 4 years applies. Can be 
extended to 20 years where a public tendering process for the 
statutory audit is conducted, can be extended to 24 years when joint 
audit has been conducted. On a exceptional basis the competent 
authority can further extend the maximum duration for 2 more years. 
Internal rotation of key audit partners of 7 years with a cooling off 
period of 3 years and the audit firm shall establish an appropriate 
gradual rotation mechanism with regard to the most senior personnel. 
(Regulation (EU) 537/2014, 2014,  L158/97-99). Transitional periods 
are established but they are longer than in the EC Proposal Regulation 
of 2011 (Regulation (EU) 537/2014, 2014, p. L 158/111-112)
Appendix E: Development of audit reform based on information on the European Commission's website
Own Representation, List is not exhaustive 
Categories Green Paper 2010 European Commission 30 November 2011 European Commission 16 June 2014
Prohibition of 
non-audit 
services
"The Commission would like to examine reinforcing 
the prohibition of non-audit services by audit firms. 
This could potentially result in the creation of "pure 
audit firms" akin to inspection units." (EC, 2010a, 
p.12)
"Auditors will be prohibited from providing non-audit services to 
audit clients. The provision of non-audit services to non-audit 
clients is allowed. Large audit firms will be required to separate 
their audit activities into pure audit firms i.e. a complete ban on 
the provision of non-audit services by the large audit firms." (EC 
Proposal Regulation, 2011, p. 6). "For of this Article, non-audit 
services shall mean: (a) services entailing conflict of interest in 
all cases: such as expert services unrelated to the audit, tax 
consultancy, general management and other advisory services; or 
designing and implementing internal control or risk management 
procedure related to the preparation and/or control of financing 
information included in the financial statements and advice on 
risk; (b) services which may entail conflict of interest such as 
providing comfort letters or due diligence." (EC Proposal 
Regulation, 2011, p. 30-31)
"Prohibited non-audit services shall mean: (a) special tax services  (b) 
services that involve playing any part in the management or decision-
making of the audited entity; (c) bookkeeping and preparing 
accounting records and financial statements; (d) payroll services; (e) 
designing and implementing internal control or risk management 
procedures related to the preparation and/or control of financial 
information or designing and implementing financial information 
technology systems; (f) valuation services, including valuations 
performed in connection with actuarial services or litigation support 
services; (g) some legal services,  (h) services related to the audited 
entity's internal audit function; (i) services linked to the financing, 
capital structure and allocation, and investment strategy of the audited 
entity, except providing assurance services in relation to the financial 
statements, such as the issuing of comfort letters in connection with 
prospectuses issued by the audited entity; (j) promoting, dealing in, or 
underwriting shares in the audited entity; (k) some human resources 
services"  --> Member states may prohibit services other than those 
and allow services included in the list under certain circumstances. 
(Regulation (EU) 537/2014, 2014, p. L158/86-87) --> Interesting 
example: no need for approval by the competent authority in regard to 
due diligence or comfort letters to investors, whereas in the proposal 
there was a possible threat to conflict of interest
Financial audit 
services - 
Definition
Not included "The fees for the provision of related financial audit services to 
the audited entity should be limited to 10 % of the audit fees paid 
by that entity. Financial audit services include: (a) the audit or 
review of interim financial statements; (b) providing assurance on 
corporate governance statements; (c) providing assurance on 
corporate social responsibility matters; (d) providing assurance 
on or attestation of regulatory reporting to regulators of financial 
institutions beyond the scope of the statutory audit and designed 
to assist regulators in fulfilling their role, such as on capital 
requirements or specific solvency rations determining how likely 
an undertaking will be to continue meeting its debt obligations; 
(e) providing certification on compliance with tax requirements 
where such attestation is required by national law; (f) any other 
statutory duty related to audit work imposed by Union legislation 
to the statutory auditor or audit firm." (EC Proposal Regulation, 
2011, p. 30).
Not applicable anymore
M
ea
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Appendix E: Development of audit reform based on information on the European Commission's website
Own Representation, List is not exhaustive 
Categories Green Paper 2010 European Commission 30 November 2011 European Commission 16 June 2014
Limit audit fees 
total fee and 
NAS-fee
Examine "a limit to the proportion of fees an audit firm 
can receive from a single audit client compared to the 
total audit revenues of the firm. could be envisaged 
along with appropriate disclosures" (EC, 2010a, p.12)
"Additionally, where the total fees, audit and related financial 
audit services, received by an auditor from a PIE reach more than 
20 % or, for two consecutive years, more than 15 % of the of the 
total annual fees received by the statutory auditor or audit firm 
carrying out the statutory audit, such auditor or firm shall disclose 
to the audit committee the fact and appropriate safeguards should 
be applied. If total fees from one PIE more than 15% for two 
years, then the authority has to be informed by the auditor. Then 
the authority decides if  the audit can be continued for not more 
than 2 years" (EC Proposal Regulation, 2011, p. 29). The fees for 
the provision of related financial audit services to the audited 
entity should be limited to 10 % of the audit fees paid by that 
entity ((EC Proposal Regulation, 2011, p. 30).
Related financial services is deleted from article 4; "Total fees 
received by an auditor from a PIE for three consecutive financial 
years are limited to 15%. If these 15% are exceeded the audit 
committee shall decide whether the statutory auditor or the audit firm 
or the group auditor, can continue, but not more than two years." 
(European Regulation, 2014, p. L158/86).                                               
"Non-audit services other than those referred to in Article 5(1) of this 
Regulation, the total fees for such services shall be limited to no more 
than 70 % of the average of the fees paid in the last three consecutive 
financial years for the statutory audit(s) of the audited entity and, 
where applicable, of its parent undertaking, of its controlled 
undertakings and of the consolidated financial statements of that 
group of undertakings." (Regulation (EU) 537/2014, 2014, p. 
L158/85)
Auditing of 
audit 
companies / 
Transparency 
report of audit 
companies
"How to achieve more transparency with regard to the 
audit firm's own financial statements" (EC, 2010a, 
p.12)
"Auditors will be required to disclose financial information, 
showing in particular their total turnover divided into audit fees 
paid by PIEs, audit fees paid by other entities and fees for other 
services. … The transparency reports of auditors of PIEs should 
be completed by a statement on the firms' own corporate 
governance." (EC Proposal Regulation, 2011, p. 7). Furthermore, 
"a list of public-interest entities for which the statutory auditor or 
audit firm has carried out statutory audits during the preceding 
financial year and a list of the entities from which the statutory 
auditor or audit firm receives more than 5% of its annual 
revenue" has to be established (EC Proposal Regulation, 2011, p. 
49).
Same as proposal, but deleting the list of entities from which the 
auditor receives more than 5% of its annual revenue (Regulation (EU) 
537/2014, 2014, p.L158/95) and deleting the corporate governance 
statement which was proposed in the 2011 proposal, there is just left a 
description of the governance structure (Regulation (EU) 537/2014, 
2014, p. L158/94)
Code of 
governance for 
audit firms
"Code of governance for audit firms" (EC, 2010a, p.12) "Establishing additional requirements on the internal organization 
and governance of audit firms". (EC Proposal Regulation, 2011, 
p.17)
DELETED
Ownership 
rules for audit 
firms
"Revisiting Ownership Rules of audit firms" (EC, 
2010a, p.12)
Permitting broader ownership structure for audit firms (EC 
Proposal Directive, 2011, p.6)
DELETED
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Oversight 
bodies
"The supervision of audit firms in Europe must be 
performed on a more integrated basis, with closer 
cooperation between the national audit oversight 
systems. One possible option could be to transform the 
EGAOB into a so-called "Lamfalussy Level 3 
Committee". ... Another option could be the 
establishment of a new European Supervisory 
Authority or the integration of audit matters into one of 
the supervisory authorities which are being established 
under the Commission's financial supervision 
proposals. ... The Commission would like to consider 
whether communication between the auditors and the 
relevant securities regulator should become mandatory 
to all large or listed companies; special consideration 
could also be given to communication with appropriate 
authorities in the case of fraud within companies." 
(EC, 2010a, p. 14-15)
"EU-level cooperation by the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA). National audit supervisory authorities would 
be strengthened. The mandate, powers and independence 
requirements for audit supervisors would be established at EU 
level, but supervision would be carried out nationally." (EC 
Proposal Directive, 2011, p.8). "Each Member State should 
designate a competent authority responsible for the supervision of 
auditors and audit firms auditing PIEs." (EC Proposal Regulation, 
2011, p.8). "The regulation requires that the EU-wide cooperation 
between competent authorities takes place within ESMA" (EC 
Proposal Regulation, 2011, p.9). "The powers to adopt 
supervisory measures and the sanctioning powers of competent 
authorities are enhanced" (EC Proposal Regulation, 2011, p.10). 
Sanctions in the regulation are extended to strengthen the power 
of oversight bodies (EC Proposal Regulation, 2011, p.78)
"The cooperation between competent authorities should be organized 
within the framework of a Committee of European Auditing 
Oversight Bodies (CEAOB), which should be composed of high- level 
representatives of the competent authorities. In order to enhance 
consistent application of this Regulation, the CEAOB should be able 
to adopt non-binding guidelines or opinions. In addition, it should 
facilitate the exchange of information, provide advice to the 
Commission and contribute to technical assessments and technical 
examinations. For the purpose of carrying out the technical 
assessment of public oversight systems of third countries and to the 
international cooperation between Member States and third countries 
in this area, the CEAOB should establish a sub-group chaired by the 
member appointed by the European Supervisory Authority (European 
Securities and Markets Authority — ESMA) (2) and should request 
the assistance from ESMA" (Regulation (EU) 537/2014 2014, 
L158/82).  Sanctions are extended but they are not in the regulation 
anymore, instead in the directive. (Directive 2014/56/EU, 2014, 
p.L158/215)
Mandatory 
joint audits
"... the Commission could consider introducing the 
mandatory formation of an audit firm consortium with 
the inclusion of at least one non-systemic audit firm for 
the audits of large companies." (EC, 2010a, p.16)
DELETED -
Quality 
Certification of 
Audit Firms
"The creation of a European quality certification for 
audit firms" (EC, 2010a, p.16)
"European certification of audit firms recognizing their aptitude 
to perform high quality audits of listed companies. The 
certificates would be issued by ESMA" (EC Proposal Directive, 
2011, p.6). "A 'voluntary' pan-European audit quality certification 
is introduced to increase the visibility, recognition and reputation 
of all audit firms having capacities to conduct high quality audits 
of PIEs." (EC Proposal Regulation, 2011, p.9)
"The amended Directive … establishes a “European passport” for 
audit firms in order to facilitate cross-border mobility within the EU 
and strengthen the single market for audit." (EC, 2014b; see Directive 
2014/56/EU, 2014, L 158/204)
Quality 
Certification of 
Auditors
"European passport for auditors" (EC, 2010a, p.18) "Mutual recognition of statutory auditors approved in Member 
States to ensure cross-border mobility of auditors." Either through 
an aptitude test or an 3-year supervised adaptation period (EC 
Proposal Directive, 2011, p.7)
"Mutual recognition of statutory auditors approved in Member States 
to ensure cross-border mobility of auditors." Either through an 
aptitude test or an 3-year supervised adaptation period" (Directive 
2014/56/EU, 2014, p. L158/205)
Contractual 
Clauses
"The Commission will also seek to address the issue of 
... "Big Four only clauses"" (EC, 2010a, p.16)
Prohibition of Big 4-only contractual clauses (clauses requiring 
that the audit is undertaken by one of the Big 4 firms). (EC 
Proposal Directive, 2011, p.8) and (EC Proposal Regulation, 
2011, p.8)
Prohibition of contractual clauses (Directive 2014/56/EU, 2014, 
p.L158/22) and (Regulation (EU) 537/2014, 2014, L158/97)
Contingency 
Plan
Contingency plan for big Four companies (EC, 2010a, 
p.16-17)
The supervisory authorities are required to "ask large audit firms 
to establish contingency plans" (EC Proposal Regulation, 2011, 
p.9)
DELETED
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SMEs Simplify audits for SMEs (EC, 2010a, p.18-19) SMEs "would no longer be required by EU law to have their 
financial statements audited, although Member States may still 
require it." If so: audits have to be "adapted to the dimension and 
scale of those undertakings" (EC Proposal Directive, 2011, p.8) 
"Article 34 of Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council (2) does not require small undertakings to have their 
financial statements audited." (Regulation (EU) 537/2014, 2014, p. L 
158/200
M
ea
su
re
s
Enhanced Role 
of Audit 
Committee
"Regular dialogue should be assured between the 
company's Audit Committee, the external i.e. statutory 
auditor as well as the internal auditor." (EC, 2010a, 
p.8)
Stricter rules on the appointment of auditors with an increased 
role for the audit committee. "The audit committee's 
recommendation for the appointment of an auditor should be 
discussed at the general meeting of shareholders. The audit 
committee's independence and technical competence should be 
reinforced: at least two of its members must be independent and 
at least one member of the audit committee shall have 
competence in auditing and another member in accounting and/or 
auditing. Regular dialogue will be held between auditors, audit 
committees and supervisors." (EC  Proposal Regulation, 2011, p. 
8)
Content is basically the same, but the regulation proposals of 2011 
moved into the directive 2014. And at least one member of the audit 
committee shall have competence in accounting and/or auditing 
(Directive 2014/56/EU, 2014, p. L158/221).
Mandatory 
tendering
Mandatory tendering (EC, 2010a, p.16) "Mandatory tendering for audit mandates by audit committee of 
the audited company" (EC Proposal Regulation, 2011, p. 8)
Mandatory tendering as suggested in proposal 2011
 139 
 
Appendix F – Sources Justifying the 
Intervening Process  
 
 
Sources which justify the intervening processes between the measures and objectives as 
represented in chapter 4.3 (Own Representation)  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Measure
Reinforce 
Independence
Clarify Societal 
Role
Contribute to a 
Dynamic Audit 
Market
Facilitate Cross-
Border Provision
Improve Supervision 
& Coordination
Rotation 1A) Regulation (EU) 
537/2014, #21
1B) EC, 2014b, 
Online
1C) EC, 2014b, 
Online
- -
NAS/Fee-Limit 2A) Regulation (EU) 
537/2014, #7-8; EC, 
2014b, Online
- 2C) EC, 2014b, 
Online
- -
Supervisory Board / 
Audit Committee
3A) Regulation (EU) 
537/2014, #7
3B) Regulation (EU) 
537/2014, #7, #14, 
#21; Directive 
2014/56/EU, 2014, 
#5, #24; EC, 2014b, 
3C) Regulation (EU) 
537/2014, #18; EC, 
2014b, Online
- -
Oversight 4A) Regulation (EU) 
537/2014, #22
4B) Regulation (EU) 
537/2014, #12, #23, 
#24, #27; Directive 
2014/56/EU, 2014, 
4C) Regulation (EU) 
537/2014, #25, #30; 
EC, 2014b, Online
4D) Directive 
2014/56/EU, 2014, 
#3, #4, #22
4E) Regulation (EU) 
537/2014, #27, #29
Objective
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Appendix G – A Framework for Audit Quality 
 
A Framework for Audit Quality: Key Elements that create an Environment for Audit Quality 
(IAASB, 2014, p.3) 
